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ABSTRACT 
 
CONTROLLING OR COMPLYING? THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
OF COORDINATED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Ramkumar Ranganathan 
Lori Rosenkopf 
 
 In this dissertation, I examine firms' strategic actions and outcomes in multi-firm 
standards consortia, fast emerging as dominant organizational arrangements for 
coordinating technological change. Building on strategic networks, the resource-based 
view and technological change research, I demonstrate how firms’ positions in 
technological (patent-based) and relational (alliance-based) networks affect their choices 
within and between technical standards organizations. Empirically, I focus on committees 
in the computer industry that devise peripheral interface standards. 
 The first essay studies firm-level factors that affect progress towards the 
coordinated standard. Highlighting how the multiplex nature of inter-organizational 
relationships affects voting behavior of firms, I find that the influence of network 
resources is contingent upon the type of inter-organizational tie (technological vs. 
relational). When these ties are considered jointly, firms possessing superior positions 
both networks exhibit higher support for its progress as they stand to benefit more from 
the adoption of the standard. 
 The second essay examines how divergence in member firms' interests may drive 
new inter-organizational relationships. Although firms that are peripheral in the 
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technological network are disadvantaged with regard to knowledge relevance in the 
standard-setting process, I show that they can obtain relational benefits from 
technologically central firms. To enhance the standard’s legitimacy by soliciting wide-
ranging participation from firms, central firms may be motivated to forge such alliances.  
 In the final essay, I explore how firms navigate two competing standards - a 
voluntary standards committee and a sponsor-backed consortium. I examine and contrast 
firms' product introduction and patenting decisions on the sponsor-backed standard, 
arguing that while products accelerate the standard's adoption, patents hinder it. I find 
that while firms that possess prior technological and relational linkages with the sponsor 
firms tend to introduce more products but fewer patents, the opposite is observed for 
firms that are technologically central in the competing voluntary standards committee. 
 Overall the findings from this dissertation greatly enhance our understanding of 
firms' strategies in multi-organizational contexts that adjudicate technological change and 
shape technological evolution. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background and motivation 
 A central concern in strategic management and organization theory research has 
been to understand how firms compete in environments characterized by technological 
change and innovation (e.g. Tushman and Nelson, 1990; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; 
Christensen, Suarez and Utterback, 1998). That technological change creates both 
considerable challenges and opportunities for firms is now well-documented by prior 
research (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Rosenbloom & 
Christensen, 1994; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Tripsas, 1997; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; 
Cooper & Smith, 1992; Benner and Tushman, 2002; Agarwal and Helfat, 2009). Some 
scholars have categorized current times as “neo-Schumpeterian” with technological 
change being continuous rather than marked by structural breaks of creative destruction 
(e.g. Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995a).  
 In these environments, even after a dominant design emerges in an industry 
following a radical technological change (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990), there may be continuous refinement of the architecture or platform that 
spurs both component and architectural innovations and creates ongoing challenges for 
firms (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). While market-based 
competition (or de-facto standards) is certainly one way that firms attempt to favorably 
shape such technological evolution, several kinds of multi-organizational structures that 
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bring together firms with non-overlapping (and often divergent) interests to coordinate 
decisions and mitigate uncertainty have become increasingly common. Multi-firm 
technical committees that develop technology standards are fast emerging as one such 
alternative organizational arrangement, where the direction of technological change is 
debated between large numbers of firm representatives (Dokko, Nigam and Rosenkopf, 
in press; Farrell and Saloner, 1988). The technology standards specification that emerges 
out of these discussions becomes a blueprint that, in part, directs the future innovation 
efforts of the materially affected firms. At the extreme, by virtue of network externalities, 
standards may even completely dictate the future technological trajectory (Arthur, 1989; 
Katz and Shapiro, 1986; cf. Dosi, 1982; cf. Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). 
 The growing importance of such multi-firm standards committees is evident by 
the resources firms are allocating to them (Farrell and Saloner, 1988) and the impact their 
standards have had on popular products and technologies (e.g. the 3G, Wi-Fi and USB 
technologies - all ubiquitous today - have emerged from discussions in standards 
organizations). However, most academic research on technology standards has tended to 
either focus solely on market-based standards competition (cf.. Chiao, Lerner and Tirole, 
2007) or, adopting a policy viewpoint, has attempted to contrast the quality and 
timeliness of committee-based decision-making with market-based mechanisms (e.g. 
Farrell and Saloner, 1988; David and Greenstein, 1990; Chiao, Lerner and Tirole, 2007; 
Simcoe, 2012). From a firm strategy standpoint, standard-setting committees, and more 
broadly, multi-organizational bodies still remain a "black box" with several critical 
unanswered questions. For instance,  managerial research has very little to offer on the 
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specific choices made by firms within these multi-firm committees - ostensibly there are 
likely to be tensions or tradeoffs underlying these choices as firms with conflicting 
interests attempt to eke out a common technological agreement. It is both academically 
and managerially imperative to understand the characteristics of firms that are able to 
drive shared decisions to their advantage. Similarly, with the emergence of several 
standards committees with overlapping memberships and competing interests (e.g. 3G, 
4G, CDMA, WiMax, Wi-Fi etc.), beyond basic notions of size and rivalry (Axelrod et al, 
1995), we do not understand how firms might navigate this complex landscape or for that 
matter strategize across these committees in terms of technological and product decisions. 
This dissertation attempts to fill these gaps by building arguments using an inter-
organizational conceptual lens to predict several such critical aspects of firm behavior 
both within and across standards organizations, and by providing representative empirical 
evidence to support these claims.  
Overview of relevant literature 
 The majority of studies that discuss technology standards have a rich tradition in 
economics, particularly the economics of innovation and new technologies. The 
predominant focus in this line of research has been to understand why technology 
standards arise, what the consequences of standards are from a policy and societal 
standpoint, the different institutional mechanisms by which standards are formed and the 
relative merits and demerits of each of these mechanisms. This research informs us that 
technology standards generally arise in industries where network externalities (increasing 
returns to adoption) are significant (e.g. Katz and Shapiro, 1986) and compatibility 
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between different components of a complex technological system is essential to drive 
user demand (David and Greenstein, 1990; Farrell and Saloner, 1992), that these 
standards can create "lock-in" effects at the industry level (e.g. Arthur, 1989) and that the 
technological specifications underlying the standard may be sub-optimal (e.g. David and 
Greenstein, 1990; Farrell and Saloner, 1985). Further, this research has documented that 
standards may arise either through direct competition (e.g. Fontana, in press; Cusumano 
et al, 1992) or through coordination and anticipation by the materially affected firms 
(Cargill, 1989). While the former are called de-facto standards, the latter which emerge 
out of negotiations and deliberations in multi-firm technical standards committees, are 
labeled de-jure standards. Several papers have compared the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the market-based, laissez-faire approach to standards emerging from the coordinated 
approach. These studies have argued that although the committee approach is typically 
slower than the market-based approach, it results in higher quality technological 
decisions (e.g. Farrell and Saloner, 1988). Reflecting the growth in formal and informal 
committee-based standards setting bodies since the mid-1990s, recent studies continuing 
in this vein have begun to conduct more granular inquiries at the committee and firm 
level of analysis. For instance, Chiao, Lerner and Tirole (2007) compare provisions and 
laws across different standards-setting organizations. Rysman and Simcoe (2008) and 
Lemley and Shapiro (2007) focus at the level of analysis of specific intellectual property 
disclosures from standards committees in order to understand the technological impact of 
standards and the additional legal and policy challenges posed by these types of 
arrangements. 
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 Taken together, the findings from these studies predominantly inform normative 
debates at the policy level about technology standards. The strategic viewpoint of the 
single firm and its existing relationships with other firms is largely underexplored.1From 
the considerable body of research in strategy and organization theory, we now know that 
firms' resources and capabilities are heterogeneous and often idiosyncratically developed 
by path-dependent experiences and opportunities (e.g. Denrell, Fang and Winter, 2003; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Barney, 1991).  When a large number of firms with these 
heterogeneous capabilities attempt to develop a shared technology standard, it is likely 
that there will be divergent viewpoints (Simcoe, 2012), with the resolution of these 
conflicts potentially more beneficial to some firms and more detrimental to others. Thus, 
when analyzing firms' strategic actions within these committees and outcomes of their 
participation, it is essential to take into account the specific nature of such divergence and 
how the process of standards formation and conflict resolution within these committees 
may differentially enable or advantage some firms and constrain or hinder others.  
 In this dissertation, I use an inter-organizational theoretical lens to understand 
such divergences and the resolution of conflict in these multi-organizational settings. My 
theoretical arguments are primarily anchored in strategic networks theory (Gulati et al, 
2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Prior studies using strategic networks have shown that 
firms’ resources arising out of the pattern of their inter-organizational relationships affect 
both strategic decisions & outcomes. The influence of strategic networks on different 
                                                          
1
 There are two notable exceptions - Leiponen (2008), one of the few studies that adopts the firm as the unit 
of analysis, shows that participation in multiple industry consortia helps firms contribute to standards 
specifications. Waguespack and Fleming (2009) focus on startups finding that participation in standards-
setting organizations improves the likelihood of a favorable liquidity event.  
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types strategic decisions - including knowledge sharing within the firm (Tsai, 2002), 
strategic investments (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001), alliance formation between firms 
(Gulati, 1995a; Gulati, 1999; Walker et al, 1997; Rosenkopf & Padula, 2008) and 
acquisition decisions (Yang et al, 2011) - has been established in these studies. Similarly 
the relationship between a firm’s strategic network position and different strategic 
outcomes - including innovation (Ahuja, 2000), firm survival (Baum et al, 2000), market 
share (Shipilov, 2006) and firm performance (Zaheer and Bell, 2005) - have also been 
explored. Intuitively, we would expect the influence of strategic networks on firms’ 
conduct to be especially salient in the standards-setting context, as negotiations to arrive 
at a consensus standard are conducted at the multi-firm level, where prior inter-
organizational linkages are likely to have an important bearing. 
 Although in reality firms are simultaneously embedded in multiple types of inter-
organizational relationships, as Shipilov and Li (in press) point out, “prior studies have 
assumed away the multiplicity of roles, interests, and relationships between 
organizations”. Departing from this assumption of a single type of inter-organizational 
linkage (e.g. alliances or board interlock ties or customer-supplier networks etc.), I 
emphasize the importance of considering multiplex ties – that firms’ network resources 
arising out of these different relationships may both independently and in combination 
affect their conduct in the standards organization.  
 I focus on two relationships between member firms that I argue are salient in 
determining strategic choices in technical consortia –technological knowledge 
interdependence relations (also referred to as technological network) and strategic 
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alliance ties (also referred to as relational or alliance network). Several scholars studying 
technological change and innovation have focused on these two types of relationships as 
being instrumental linkages that drive both firm performance as well as the overall 
evolution of technology in an industry (e.g. Henderson and Clark, 1990; Afuah and 
Bahram, 1995; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Afuah, 2000; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; 
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003;Adner and Kapoor, 2010).   
 For instance, Henderson and Clark (1990) show that when the structure of 
technological knowledge shifts, firms face challenges in adapting in spite of possessing 
relevant knowledge about specific technological components within the structure. Afuah 
(2000), Afuah and Bahram (1995) and Adner & Kapoor (2010) focus on the 
technological interdependence between various firms in an industry as a key factor in the 
adaptability of these firms to technological changes. Stuart and Podolny (1996) treat 
these technological knowledge interconnections as constituting a network landscape that 
they then use to explain how different groups of firms compete. In this dissertation, I will 
argue that a firm's position within this structure of technological knowledge determines 
its ability to shape standards discussions.  
 A related stream of research, recognizing that capabilities critical to the firm often 
reside outside its boundaries (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Rosenkopf and Nerkar; 
2001;Dyer and Singh, 1998), has focused on strategic alliances and networks composed 
of such alliance ties. Alliances are especially critical in dynamic environments, where 
firms faced with unforeseen technological change may be unable to internally build the 
capabilities required to adapt to the change (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). That strategic 
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alliances have become ubiquitous is evident by the extent of their adoption across a 
whole range of industries (Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007). This stream of research 
suggests that inter-firm strategic relationships are conduits to accessing new knowledge, 
building complementary capabilities and distributing innovation challenges across the 
network of collaborators (e.g. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Powell et al, 1996; Stuart, 2000; Schilling and Phelps, 
2007). In this dissertation, building on this stream of research, I argue that a firm's prior 
investments in such boundary-spanning relationships will influence both its willingness 
to support technological standards within a committee and also its actions across multiple 
standards committees (cf. Christensen and Bower, 1996; Ghemawat, 1991; Taylor and 
Helfat, 2009). I also theorize on how interactions within the standards committee may 
further influence formation of such relationships. 
Outline of the dissertation 
 Following this introduction chapter (Chapter 1), I present an overview of the 
empirical setting (Chapter 2). The core of this dissertation is then organized as three 
separate essays (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), each of which is focused on a specific research 
question and the dissertation concludes with an integration of the findings, a discussion of 
the limitations and directions for future research (Chapter 6).  
 In the first essay, I ask, what are the antecedents of member firms’ strategic 
decisions to support or contest standards that are proposed within these technical 
committees?  In the second essay, I study the relational benefits firms derive from 
 participating in these alliances and ask what explains the heterogeneity of these benefits 
across member firms? Fin
alliance consortia, and in particular I attempt to understand another intriguing aspect of 
this phenomenon – that many firms actually simultaneously participate in multiple 
consortia that may have overlapping and even competing interests. Here, I ask 
drives whether and how firms choose to contribute in multiple, competing consortia? 
relationship between the three essays
elaborated in a separate chapter
Figure 1: Conceptual links between the dissertation essays.
The following is a brief outline of the arguments in each of these essays.
 
9 
ally, in the third essay, I study competition between different 
 is shown in the figure below. Each essay is further 
.  
 
 
- what 
The 
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Essay One: Do Ties Really Bind?  
 In the first essay, I study firm-level factors that affect efforts to achieve 
coordination within technical consortia.   As technology standards that emerge from these 
consortia have the potential to erode a firm’s competencies (Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Garud et al, 2002), I propose that a firm’s decision to contest 
these standards is rooted in the divergence of the proposed standards from its 
technological capabilities and that this divergence can assessed by the firm’s position in 
the network of technological knowledge interdependence relations between member 
firms of the consortium. Underlying this argument is that principle that the extent to 
which a firm’s technology contributes to the emerging technological trajectory is not only 
dependent on the properties of this technology but also on the relational context that this 
technology is positioned within (Podolny and Stuart, 1995).  
 The technological knowledge network, constructed from patent citation linkages 
between firms, reveals the technological antecedents of inventions (e.g. Stuart and 
Podolny, 1996; Stuart, 1998) and thus captures both the structure of knowledge 
interdependence amongst firms as well as the importance of each firm’s knowledge vis-à-
vis its consortium peers. I posit that the more centrally positioned a firm is in the network 
of knowledge relations, the more foundational its knowledge has been in driving prior 
search and innovation efforts of other member firms, and thus greater the likelihood that 
the consortium will continue to not only build on these foundational technologies but also 
11 
 
resolve conflicts at the core of this knowledge.  On the other hand, a firm in a more 
peripheral position in this network faces the challenging prospect that it will be 
marginalized in standards discussions, given the tangential nature of its knowledge 
amongst member firms. Thus, such a firm will be more likely to have a viewpoint that is 
divergent and more likely to disagree with coordination efforts.  
 I then contrast this effect of a firm’s technological knowledge network position 
with the effect of a firm’s position in a network of prior business relationships (strategic 
alliance ties) between member firms of the consortium. Although research has 
emphasized value arising from trust, social capital and relational capabilities in 
connection with alliance network position (Koka and Prescott, 2002; Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 
1997), I argue that this value is limited in technical consortia where decisions are 
generally based on technological relevance (Rosenkopf et al, 2001). Instead, firms in 
central positions in the network of alliance ties are faced with a tradeoff when they 
participate in technical consortia – they can continue to compete using current 
technologies without a coordinated standard by exploiting the superior extra-mural 
complementary assets that derive from their alliance network position (Rothaermel, 
2001), or they can risk supporting a new standard that may benefit them (Tripsas, 1997) 
but that may also erode the value of these assets (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Wu, Wan 
and Levinthal, 2011).  Although complementary assets have traditionally been viewed as 
helping firms buffer the competence-destroying impact of radical technological change 
(Tripsas, 1997), the presence of such powerful assets in the form of existing strategic 
customer and supplier relationships may additionally influence how firms evaluate future 
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technological change (e.g. Christensen and Bower, 1996).  Additionally, the more central 
the firm facing this tradeoff is positioned in the alliance network, the less likely it will 
meet with retaliation from other firms even it counters coordination efforts to define a 
common standard (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). Therefore, I argue that the overall 
tendency for such a central firm will be to slow down the progress of the standard by 
contesting it within the consortium, thus enabling it to continue or even accelerate the 
exploitation of its inter-firm complementary asset position outside the consortium.  
 However, this tendency will be moderated when such firms are also at the center 
of the technological (knowledge) network –the combination of favorable technological 
standards with a superior complementary asset position sets up these firms to benefit 
from the emerging standard, and thus amplifies the necessity to achieve coordination 
within the consortium.  
Essay Two: Give and Take?  
 Essay Two builds upon the foundational arguments laid out in Essay One. As 
illustrated in Figure 3, while Essay One argues that the heterogeneity of firms’ existing 
network resources and capabilities is reflected in the heterogeneity of their actions within 
technical standards consortia, Essay Two suggests that the pattern of interaction, 
involvement and decisions in the consortia subsequently affects future capability 
development opportunities of firms. This essay attempts to understand the factors 
influencing the heterogeneity of such capability development benefits that firms may 
derive from participating in standards consortia (e.g. Lavie et al, 2007).   
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 I contrast a firm’s ability to achieve technological benefits from the standard (e.g. 
Rysman and Simcoe, 2008) with its ability to achieve strategic alliance benefits (e.g. 
Rosenkopf et al, 2001). Technological benefits to a firm arise when other firms introduce 
standard-compliant products and technologies that continue to build on its technological 
capabilities. Echoing arguments from Essay One, these benefits derive from a firm’s 
position in the technological network of member firms which allow it to ensure that the 
standard builds on its knowledge base. For similar reasons, these firms may also be more 
attractive as strategic alliance partners and may even be able to forge these alliances on 
favorable terms (Stuart, 1998; Stuart, 2000).  
 However, prior research has suggested that strategic alliances with other member 
firms may also accrue to a firm because of the level of its involvement and interaction in 
a consortium (Rosenkopf et al, 2001). By providing these forums for interaction, I argue 
that technical consortia may open up alliance opportunities especially for firms that are 
likely to be technologically disadvantaged by the acceptance of the standard. In 
particular, firms that are becoming increasingly peripheral in the technological 
knowledge interdependence network of member firms will benefit if they can forge 
strategic alliances with more central firms in this network (cf. Baum et al, 2000).  
 However, it is less clear why technologically central firms would form these 
bridging ties with increasingly peripheral firms. I propose two reasons for this counter-
intuitive behavior of central firms and both of these draw upon central firms’ incentives 
to see that a shared standard is coordinated expeditiously so that their technological 
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advantage within the consortium translates into industry-wide technology adoption and 
performance benefits.  
 Firstly, central firms need to build the legitimacy of the standard by ensuring that 
participation in drafting the standard is broad and not confined to those central firms who 
would obviously benefit from it. As Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy (2002) illustrate with 
the example of Sun Microsystems, firms that attempt to push through the standard 
without wide-ranging support suffer from the ‘sponsor’s legitimacy trap’ which 
ultimately deters the adoption of the standard. Thus, there is a disincentive for 
technologically central firms to achieve only the ‘minimum’ coordination to pass a 
standard. This is also reflected in the informal norms of standards committees where 
although a two-thirds majority is generally sufficient to proceed with a proposal, 
outstanding objections and comments are usually given due consideration. Echoing 
arguments from Essay One, these objections are more likely to come from 
technologically peripheral firms who perceive the standard to be disadvantageous. The 
greater the number of objections, the greater the time taken to reach a consensus and the 
more distant and uncertain the benefits to technologically central firms become. 
Unresolved objections can lead to even more adverse consequences for the consortium if 
disadvantaged firms decide to opt out of membership altogether or decide to focus their 
efforts in a competing standards alliance.  
 Second, even a small number of modules in the technological system under 
consideration can lead to high levels of product complexity that mixing and matching 
different combinations of these modules entails, thus making it difficult for any one firm 
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to control how the technology evolves (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). The example of IBM 
360 illustrates IBM’s unsuccessful attempt to control the technological evolution of the 
system although it was the technologically central firm that had foundational knowledge 
of the system’s architecture (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Thus, there may be a necessity 
for even technologically central firms to invest in wide-ranging relational capital to 
counter this uncertainty or possible loss of architectural control. In sum, to enhance the 
standard’s legitimacy and to counter technological uncertainty, technologically central 
firms may be incentivized to forge bridging alliances with technologically peripheral 
firms. 
Essay Three: Closing the door on open standards? 
 Essay Three studies orchestration of a competing standards organization by a 
small number of powerful sponsor firms. I theorize about which firms from the first (non-
sponsor backed) standards committee might join the sponsor-backed standard and also 
what might determine their product development and patenting decisions in this standard. 
I find that while technological and relational dependence on sponsor firms may drive 
firms to join the sponsor-backed standard, a firm’s technological position in the first 
committee has an opposing effect. Further, I contrast patenting behavior with products –
while technologically central firms in the first standard introduce fewer products that aid 
in the adoption of the sponsor-backed standard (building on Essay One), they make a 
higher number of patent claims on it. When firms have prior relational and technological 
ties to the sponsor firms, opposite effects are observed. 
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CHAPTER 2: EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW 
The International Committee for Information Technology Standards 
I focus my empirical inquiry in this dissertation on voluntary standards 
committees in information technology which, since 19612, have been under the purview 
of the International Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS). 
Accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), INCITS brings together 
more than 1700 firms for the creation and maintenance of formal de-jure IT standards. It 
operates more than 50 different technical committees under ANSI rules which are 
designed to ensure that voluntary standards are developed by the “consensus of directly 
and materially affected interests”.  
INCITS is an appropriate empirical setting to study the emergence of industry-
wide information technology standards because it does not have a specific sponsor-
backed agenda and allows for equal contribution and representation of all organizations, 
large and small. It is financially supported by the Information Technology Industry 
Council (ITI), which is a large trade association representing the majority of the 
population of firms in the information technology products and services sector3. 
Irrespective of their size, a participating member firm can appoint only one principal 
voting representative. Further, membership is open to all (including the general public) 
and the $1200 committee participation fee constitutes a very low entry barrier for firms, 
thus encouraging the involvement of several small startup firms and independent 
                                                          
2
 Between 1961 and 1997, INCITS was known as the Accredited Standards Committee X3, Information 
Technology (INCITS website) 
3
 ITI members employ more than one million people in the United States and in 2000, their revenues 
exceeded $668 billion worldwide (INCIS website). 
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technology consultants. Organizations may also obtain advisory memberships (non-
voting memberships) by paying a smaller service fee. Advisory members are allowed to 
attend meetings, and submit contributions.  
INCITS follows several processes to ensure that the standard does reflect a 
consensus of all the firms involved and is not created out of the vested interest of a few 
firms. For example, firm representatives vote through letter ballot procedures at several 
milestones during the standards development process. Both the initiation of a new project 
as well as the approval of a standards specification requires that a two-thirds majority 
vote be achieved. More importantly, the INCITS procedures mandate that resolution 
meetings to address no-votes be held even if the two-thirds majority has been achieved. 
As documented in the INCITS policies and procedures document, "the purpose of...letter 
ballot resolution is to resolve any comments submitted with “No” votes in response 
to...letter ballots, such that those “No” votes become “Yes” votes and indicate greater 
consensus...". Firms are also not permitted from discussing how they are planning to vote 
on a specific ballot measure. Ballots are generally submitted electronically and results of 
the ballots are available only after the voting process is complete. 
Member firms are also required to voluntarily disclose any proprietary interest 
they may have in the proposed standards to reduce the risk of antitrust liability. To select 
standards solely based on technological excellence, the procedures also mandate that 
firms do not discuss topics such as specific pricing policies, sales plans, customers or 
suppliers at meetings. Minutes of these meetings are also typically transcribed by INCITS 
officers and available for public review.  
18 
 
The importance of INCITS as a standards body in the information technology 
sector is also evident from the more than 750 standards published since its formation. 
These standards encompass several information technology domains including 
programming languages, computer graphics, cyber security, distributed processing and 
computer peripheral interfaces.  
 Within INCITS, I focus on decision-making within three inter-related sub-
committee groups that devise standards for computer peripheral interfaces – namely, the 
T10, T11 and T13 sub-committees. I track activity in these committees from 1994 (the 
year T10 was formed) up until 2008. These are interface standards committees in the 
‘architectural innovation’ sense (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Iansiti and Clark; 1994) as 
the specifications they draft affect different components of a computer system,  including 
the microprocessor circuitry and digital logic to support different peripheral devices (e.g. 
microprocessors, controller cards and device drivers), the data processing algorithms and 
protocols to transfer the data between these devices and the computer, the electrical 
connectors (e.g. USB cables, converter plugs, ports and sockets) that physically transmit 
this data, and the actual peripheral devices that store or generate this data (e.g. hard disks, 
digital cameras, portable drives, speakers). The computer industry is also an ideal 
empirical setting to study the influence of inter-organizational relationships in a 
technological standards-setting context. This industry is characterized by rapid and 
sustained technical innovation as well as divided technical leadership amongst firms 
(Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999). Although the dominant Windows-Intel (‘Wintel’) 
architecture emerged in the 1980s (Hagedoorn et al, 2001), it has undergone significant, 
and almost continuous change with major component-level innovations (e.g. optical 
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drives and flash memory as opposed to the earlier magnetic tape and disk technologies) 
and architectural innovations (e.g. the emergence of USB, Firewire and SCSI as different 
computer peripheral connect standards superseding traditional serial and parallel port 
interface technologies). Vertically disintegrated platforms have also resulted in the locus 
of technological innovation being fragmented (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999) 
 The materially affected firms in these committees included companies across the 
entire value chain of the computer industry. These included semiconductor firms, hard 
disk manufacturers, cable and controller firms as well as systems software firms. These 
member firms were also representative of the population of firms in these sectors. For 
example, in the year 2008 (the last year of the data), INCITS member firms in my sample 
that were classified under the SIC code 3570 (computers and office equipment) had a 
combined market share of 95%4, those that were classified under the SIC code 3571 
(electronic computers) had a combined market share of 98% and those classified under 
the SIC code 3678 (electronic connectors) had a combined market share of 70%. Thus, 
both complementors (Adner and Kapoor, 2010) as well as competitors (cf. Hagedoorn et 
al, 2001) co-participated in these committees during the time of study.  
 The T10 sub-committee is responsible for developing standards for connecting 
peripheral devices for personal computers, particularly the series of SCSI (Small 
Computer System Interface) standards including parallel-SCSI and serial-SCSI 
(Firewire/1394). The T11 sub-committee develops similar peripheral standards, but 
targets higher-performance computing applications such as connecting multiple devices 
                                                          
4
 Calculated as a percentage of revenues of all publicly listed firms in that SIC code in that year 
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on a high-speed storage-area network. These standards include Intelligent Peripheral 
Interface (IPI), High-Performance Parallel Interface (HIPPI) and Fibre Channel (FC). 
Finally, the T13 sub-committee develops a family of standards called ATA/Serial ATA 
(AT-Attachment) which is used in connecting a majority of hard-disks today. While all 
three sub-committees run in parallel, they develop closely related interface standards (the 
T11 and T13 were created out of the T10 committee).   
 
The Universal Serial Bus Implementers Forum (USB-IF) 
In Essay Three where I study the orchestration of a competing sponsor-backed 
standard, I contrast the Universal Serial Bus standard with the standards emerging from 
INCITS. The USB standard is a particularly interesting setting to study the evolution of a 
competing multi-firm standards organization. A sponsor backed consortium, the USB 
Implementers Forum was also formed in the mid-1990s (around the same time the 
INCITS voluntary standards committees), thus allowing me to build track records of 
participation in the voluntary consortium for firms who joined both alliances.  
Although both the INCITS and the USB organizations devised specifications to 
standardize the connection of peripheral devices to computers, they greatly differed in 
both technical scope and organizational governance. While all firms that join INCITS are 
part of the standards development projects, the USB-IF was geared towards diffusing the 
USB technology through promotions, testing and product certification, workshops and 
developer conferences. Although the USB-IF supported a technical working group to 
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augment and extend the USB standard, the underlying goal was mainly to improve 
interoperability amongst devices that use the USB standard and not to forge a consensus 
in the industry around its design. Member fees were also higher when compared to the 
INCITS committees ($4000 per year).  From a development standpoint, there were 
limited opportunities for non-sponsor firms to modify the base USB standards 
specification. Whereas INCITS develops non-proprietary standards, the copyright for the 
USB specification is owned solely by the sponsor firms and not by the standards 
organization (Source: USB version 2.0 specification). The specification itself clearly 
categorizes participants in the working group as either "promoter company employees" or 
"contributor company employees". Although the USB-IF had more than 700 firms listed 
as members, there were only 13 such contributor companies who participated in drafting 
the most recent version of the USB specification. This is in contrast to the INCITS 
standards body where the majority of firms that were members were also active in 
contributing to the standard.  
The first version of the USB specification was put forth by a group of seven 
sponsor firms, led by Intel Corporation5 in 1996. This version supported a maximum data 
transmission rate of only 12 Mega-Bits per second – this was slower by an order of 
magnitude when compared to some of the INCITS backed standards such as 1394a that 
supported a transmission rate of more than 400 Mega-Bits per second or Fibre-channel 
that supported more than 4000 Mega-Bits per second. The transfer speeds on USB were 
in many instances lower than the peripheral device speeds themselves, thus restricting its 
use to low performance applications. The objective of the USB standard was to facilitate 
                                                          
5
 This group consisted of Intel, Microsoft, Compaq, Digital, IBM, NEC and Nortel. 
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an expansion of peripherals, specifically for the Personal Computer (PC), by providing a 
low cost and easy to configure connectivity solutions without needing to open up the 
computer chassis to plug the peripheral in (Polishuk, 1998). In contrast with the INCITS 
standards, the USB technology was designed such that there was a "master-slave" 
relationship between the host (the microprocessor and controller that were on the PC 
motherboard) and the peripheral devices (the memory sticks, cameras and other 
peripheral devices). This meant that the flow of communication, data transfer and even 
electrical power was controlled from the PC and not from the peripheral devices, thus 
almost mandating the need for a more powerful microprocessor. It is important to note 
that although the underlying technological components and modules were the same 
across these two standards specifications, architecturally, they were very distinct as the 
sequence and structure of communication between the modules greatly differed. 
Although USB was widely perceived to be technologically inferior to the INCITS 
interface standards, it gained steady acceptance and a large variety of devices supporting 
the USB standard became available over the years. The USB-IF consortium eventually 
grew to more than 1000 member firms with more than 7800 certified USB products. 
About 80 firms from the INCITS voluntary standards consortium also joined the USB 
consortium.  
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CHAPTER 3: ESSAY ONE - DO TIES REALLY BIND? 
 In this essay, I study the firm-level factors that affect progress towards the 
coordinated INCITS standards, highlighting how the multiplex nature of inter-
organizational relationships affects voting behavior of firms in the standards committees. 
Introduction 
Multi-partner technology standards organizations are fast emerging as the 
preferred organizational arrangement for coordinating technological change across large 
numbers of firms.  The 3G and Wi-Fi consortia in wireless telecommunications, the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in software and the Firewire and USB standards 
committees in computer peripherals are well-known examples of such alliances that have 
had an important bearing on the evolution of technologies and products in these sectors. 
By developing technology standards, certifying products built on these standards, and 
providing publicity for these certified products, these alliances have become dominant 
forums for adjudicating technological change (Rosenkopf et al, 2001; Lavie et al, 2007; 
Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). Firms too have recognized the importance of participating in 
these standards-setting alliances – for instance, Intel Corporation, although primarily a 
chip-maker, actively participates in more than 150 distinct such alliances (source: Intel 
website). These memberships go beyond silicon and semiconductor standards, to include 
consumer electronics committees, audio specifications as well as software and web 
standards. 
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However, while the focus of prior academic research has been on understanding 
bilateral inter-firm relationships, less is known about how coordination is achieved within 
these more expansive multi-lateral organizational arrangements, and what implications 
such coordination may have on the subsequent fortunes of firms. Two characteristics of 
such alliances make the question of coordination a particularly interesting and puzzling 
one. First, as firms that are participating in these alliances each have path-dependent 
technological capabilities arising from idiosyncratic opportunities and experience (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Denrell, Fang and Winter, 2003), the 
coordinated change is also likely to be a “contested” one, as interests arising from these 
different capabilities may diverge. Second, the absence of a hierarchical governance 
mechanism to resolve contests and conflicts between large numbers of firms (which may 
be possible with alliances involving fewer firms – e.g. Gulati and Singh, 1998) makes the 
emergence of coordinated change and the popularity of this type of arrangement even 
more surprising and counter-intuitive. From a managerial perspective, understanding this 
puzzle is critical to both evaluating investments in such alliances and assessing the 
subsequent implications of committing to technical decisions emerging from these 
alliances. In this paper, I take a first step towards illuminating this under-explored, but 
increasingly important phenomenon by studying firm-level factors that affect alliance-
wide efforts to achieve coordination and consensus. I ask, what are the antecedents of 
member firms’ strategic decisions to support or contest standards that are proposed within 
standards committees?   
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I focus on both the independent and the joint effect of two relationships between 
member firms participating in a standards committee, on efforts to achieve a coordinated 
standard–  viz. technological knowledge relations (referred to as the technological 
network) and strategic alliance ties (referred to as relational or alliance network). Using a 
novel panel dataset of voting records of more than 150 firms over a 14 year standard-
setting period in a leading peripheral interconnect standards consortium in the computer 
industry (INCITS), I find that more centrally positioned firms in the technological 
network exhibit lower opposition to the standard as their knowledge is more foundational 
and relevant in developing the standard and resolving conflicts between member firms. In 
contrast, I find that firms in more central positions in the strategic alliance network are 
more likely to contest the standard - such positions already endow the firms with 
advantageous complementary assets that they can continue to exploit without agreeing to 
the technological change imminent with a shared standard. Thus, the influence of 
network centrality on firms’ actions in a multi-firm setting differs depending upon which 
type of inter-organizational tie is considered. Moreover, when the multiplicative effect of 
these relationships is factored in, centrality in the technological network moderates the 
opposing effect of centrality in the alliance network on consensus formation – firms that 
possess superior resources in both networks stand to benefit more from a shared standard, 
and thus exhibit a higher support for its coordination. Thus, consensus may be facilitated 
by the fact that firms in technologically intensive industries have a history of not only 
path-dependent capability development but also one of building on extra-mural sources 
of knowledge (e.g. Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). The ability of a multi-firm technology 
standards organization to jointly develop a standard may be affected by both the level of 
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knowledge integration of its member firms and the level of symmetry in their strategic 
alliance collaborations with one another.  
This work contributes to research at the intersection of strategy, organization 
theory and technological change. The findings suggest that the role strategic network 
resources play in influencing firms’ strategic decisions is, in part, driven by both the 
context in which these decisions are being made as well as the multiplicity of inter-
organizational relationships. The particular contextual emphasis of this paper is on multi-
firm standards organizations, an increasingly preferred form for coordinating 
technological change. This paper also contributes to the literature on technological 
change and the evolution of technological trajectories. While a majority of studies in the 
technological change literature emphasize the importance of dominant design and the 
challenges that firms face in adapting to such discontinuities (e.g. Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990), this paper highlights the strategic choices 
that firms need to make in a post-dominant design era of technological change.  
The findings of this study are also managerially relevant. Firms not only need to 
make decisions whether to support standards, but also need to evaluate the investments 
they need to make in sending engineers to participate in drafting and contributing to these 
standards. This is becoming more critical given the proliferation of standards forums in 
technology-driven industries and their strategic importance. Understanding decision-
making in these consortia may also provide insights for policy makers who are interested 
in determining whether these coordinated outcomes promote industry-wide decisions that 
benefit consumers or whether they support only a few advantaged firms. 
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Technology consortia – forums of contested coordination 
Shaped by heterogeneous, path-dependent capabilities and beliefs, firms make 
different strategic bets on technologies (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Denrell, Fang and 
Winter, 2003). The presence of network externalities and switching costs in technology-
driven industries such as personal computers (Katz and Shapiro, 1986) provides a 
selection mechanism for a ‘winning’ or dominant design amongst these technologies 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Schilling, 2002). Although the emergence of a dominant 
design selects between different technological platforms (Baldwin and Woodard, in 
press), it leaves considerable scope for future technical elaboration, both at the 
component and at the inter-component level. Subsequent technological change is often 
‘de-jure’ - where multiple firms cooperatively refine the scope of various components 
that constitute the system and define standardized rules for how these components should 
interoperate. The ability of a firm to control the subsequent evolution of these 
technological trajectories in ways that sustain or enhance the value of its capabilities 
therefore becomes a crucial determinant of future advantage (Teece, 2007). Technology 
standards consortia are venues where firms have opportunities to shape such change 
(Dokko, Nigam and Rosenkopf, in-press). These multi-partner organizations develop 
voluntary technology standards by the consensus of various firms that are materially 
affected by these technologies. By shaping choices made within multi-firm consortia, 
firms can build attributes of their firm-specific technologies into the evolving industry 
standard (Garud et al, 2002).  
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Although such expansive multi-firm committees operate to reduce technological 
uncertainty and avoid costly standards wars (cf. Rysman and Simcoe, 2008), the reality of 
different firms’ private and divergent interests (Garud et al, 2002) is likely to complicate 
whether an individual firm views these standards as beneficial or detrimental. Decisions 
made within these committees have significant and divergent consequences for the value 
of firms’ technological capabilities (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Dokko and Rosenkopf, 
2010).  In particular, architectural standards that propose standardized rules for 
interaction between components or modules (e.g. Henderson and Clark, 1990), have the 
potential to cause adverse technological, economic and organizational consequences for 
firms. From a technological standpoint, by forging a consensus amongst different firms 
about how different components of a technical system interact, standards reduce 
uncertainty. Products become more modular as technological and market uncertainty 
reduces (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) and increasing modularity results in de-coupling 
of tasks and functions (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). By uncoupling tasks that are integrated 
within components and allowing for further component specialization (Schilling, 2000), 
standards may thus result in architectural competence-destroying technological shifts for 
firms (Henderson and Clark, 1990).  Standards also allow different components to be 
produced separately and different variants of the same component to be used 
interchangeably (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995a) – again, entailing architectural shifts 
that may be challenging for firms. From an economic standpoint, conceding to a standard 
may require rework or retrofit of a firm’s technologies to follow the new rules of inter-
component interaction specified by the standard. These concessions may also require 
additional investments in personnel and technological capabilities without an assured 
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economic return in sight. From an organizational standpoint, the effects of cognitive and 
organizational inertia have been elaborated in research on the challenges of technological 
change (e.g. Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). The changes that the 
firm needs to make in processes, structure and resource allocations to conform to the new 
technological order may face opposition within the organization. Status-quo in the 
existing pattern of commitments to internal and external relationships may be a form of 
organizational truce (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Christensen and Bower, 1996).  In sum, 
firms may have technological, economic and organizational incentives to not support the 
emergence of a coordinated standard and may choose to contest the standard if they 
perceive it to be unfavorable.  
As decision-making in voluntary standards committees is consensus based, even 
contestation by a small number of firms is likely to delay the standard-setting process if 
not derail it completely. Simcoe (2012) for instance finds that the conflicts arising out of 
private firm interests led to a delay of more than eight months in the standards process for 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) committee. Even if a consensus standard 
eventually does get published and accepted, such delays may allow an inertial firm to 
adapt to the new technological rules proposed by the standard. In dynamic settings 
marked by frequent technological changes, the ability to negotiate and extend the life 
cycle of products or technologies even by a few months may therefore be critical to a 
firm’s competitiveness and even survival. 
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Theoretical arguments 
I propose that firms’ decisions to contest or support the standard are shaped 
independently and jointly by their positions in two different networks - the technological 
knowledge network and the strategic alliance network of member firms. Below, I discuss 
why each of these network positions is pertinent in decision making in the technology 
standards context and hypothesize on the nature of that influence.  
 
Technological knowledge network position 
The technological knowledge network is a structural representation that captures 
the pattern of how firms have utilized each other’s technological knowledge in building 
their own innovations. If this network is constructed for firms that participate in a 
technical standards committee, then a particular firm’s position in this network may help 
identify whether the proposed standard aligns with or diverges from the firm’s 
technological capabilities. Essentially, this position is a reflection of the degree to which 
a firm’s knowledge across the different technologies (that constitute the system under 
discussion in the technical standards committee), is considered central within the 
committee. Centrality of knowledge then reflects the extent to which the community of 
firms considers the particular firm’s stock of relevant knowledge valuable for drafting the 
standard.  
Such a knowledge network can be constructed by plotting the linkages between 
firms based on their patent citation patterns for the relevant technology set. Knowledge 
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interconnections are revealed in patent citations which document the technological 
antecedents of inventions (e.g. Benner and Tushman, 2002; cf. Benner and Waldfogel, 
2007)6. Citations received by a patent are an indication of that technology’s importance, 
impact and potentially economic value (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005). This 
technological structure of markets approach was first introduced in Podolny and Stuart 
(1995) and further elaborated in Stuart and Podolny (1996) and Stuart (1998). The 
principle of this approach is that the extent to which a firm’s technology contributes to 
the emerging technological trajectory is not only dependent on the properties of this 
technology but also on the relational context that this technology is positioned within 
(Podolny and Stuart, 1995).  
Firms that are more central within the technological network will have greater 
incentives to support the standard. Centrality indicates how foundational the firm’s 
technologies have been in the past, in driving innovation (search) efforts of the other 
member firms (cf. Stuart and Podolny, 1996). There is thus a greater likelihood that the 
compatibility rules that emerge from the standards committee will continue to build on 
these foundational technologies – more specifically, following a local search logic, firms 
negotiating the standard are unlikely to find a compatibility solution in an area that is 
distant from the core of the knowledge network (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Fleming and 
Sorenson; 2004; Levinthal, 1997), especially when there are conflicts and contests 
between firms with divergent technological capabilities. It follows then that firms that are 
the most centrally positioned are likely to be the closest in terms of ‘technological 
                                                          
6
 Patent linkages give a more accurate conceptualization of technological interconnections than product 
linkages. This is because a firm’s technological reach is much greater than its product reach (Patel and 
Pavitt, 1997) as firms tend to know more than they make (Brusoni et al, 2001). 
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distance’ from the emerging consensus and therefore stand to benefit the most from the 
standard.  
Peripheral firms on the other hand face the challenging prospect that their 
knowledge will be marginalized in compatibility discussions, given its tangential nature 
within the community of member firms. Thus the technological change proposed by the 
consensus standard is more likely to favor firms in central technological positions and 
less likely to favor firms in more peripheral technological positions. Peripheral firms will 
therefore be more likely to have viewpoints that are divergent and thus more likely to 
disagree with the standard. This idea is also consistent with prior research on institutional 
change that suggests that challenges to any prevailing order are more likely to originate 
from the periphery of a field than the core (e.g. Kraatz and Moore, 2002). Such firms also 
have to consider the organizational costs of acceding to an unfavorable standard that 
requires several stakeholders to overturn their technological assumptions and reconfigure 
well-established routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman, 
1994). Therefore,  
 
Hypothesis 1: The more (less) central a focal firm is within the technological 
knowledge network of participating member firms, the lower (higher) its rate of 
opposition to the coordinated standard.  
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Strategic alliance network position  
A large body of research in strategic alliances and alliance networks has theorized 
about the advantages that accrue to firms that are central in a strategic alliance network. 
Firms that are embedded in such a network are posited to possess wide-ranging social 
capital, relational capabilities and inter-firm trust (e.g. Koka and Prescott, 2002; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998), that could be construed as sources of advantage in 
multi-firm settings. However, although a central firm’s influence derived from its 
accumulated social capital may be valuable, this value is limited in a technical committee 
that sets standards, particularly where a firm can neither be a focal sponsor of the 
standard nor control the membership or define the technical agenda. As engineers 
constitute the majority of participants, formal criteria for evaluating proposals are 
primarily based on technical knowledge and technical excellence (Rosenkopf et al, 2001). 
Although the consequences of the standard are strategic to firms, the process itself has a 
“bottom-up” flavor to it (cf. Rosenkopf et al, 2001). Tactics of politics and influence, 
including lobbying or attempting to convince other firms’ engineers outside the confines 
of formal meetings may backfire. Technical standards committees also generally limit 
firms to a single organizational vote, irrespective of the extent of their market power, 
their inter-organizational influence or the number of engineers they designate to attend 
committee meetings. Thus, a firm’s strategic alliance network position may not readily 
translate into advantageous technical committee decisions. 
Instead, firms in central positions in the network of alliance ties are faced with a 
tradeoff – they could continue to compete using current technologies without supporting 
34 
 
a coordinated standard by exploiting the superior complementary capabilities that derive 
from their alliance network position (cf. Rothaermel, 2001), or they could opt to support 
the new standard that may benefit the entire industry but that might also erode the value 
of these assets (Wu, Wan and Levinthal, 2011).  Reflected by their alliance network 
positions, such firms typically have access to superior complementary capabilities, 
including an established value chain of suppliers and distributors, well-developed inter-
firm electronic exchange systems, and potentially higher order capabilities such as 
alliance management (Kale, Dyer and Singh; 2002). Prior research that has studied the 
challenges of technological change for firms has highlighted the critical role such 
complementary capabilities play in helping the firm capture value during technological 
change (Teece, 1986) or even buffer the firm from the disruption and erosion of its 
technological competencies (Tripsas, 1997). However, recent studies extend these 
arguments by suggesting that complementary capabilities may also be a ‘prism’ through 
which firms evaluate technological options (Wu, Wan and Levinthal, 2011). If 
technology standards are adopted, then the transition to these standards may completely 
devalue the usefulness of these complementary capabilities for firms (Taylor and Helfat, 
2009) and such considerations will affect how firms view the option to support or contest 
technological standards. If a firm’s inter-firm complementary capabilities are powerful 
but are also specific to the existing technological order or architecture of the system, then 
it is more likely to view the standard as a capability-eroding shift and contest it.  Even 
when a firm possesses more flexible complementary capabilities that may be potentially 
re-deployable under different technological orders, the uncertain nature of technological 
change spurred by the standard may cause such a firm to resist it. The example of IBM’s 
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360 illustrates how a firm may adopt a conscious strategy of controlling the architecture 
of a system, but may still fail to achieve this control (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). The 
modular nature of modern technological systems leads to high levels of product 
complexity that mixing and matching different combinations of these modules entails, 
thus making it difficult to predict how the technology co-evolves with the diffusion of 
different module combinations (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). By slowing the standard’s 
emergence, such a firm will at the very least be able to gradually phase in the necessary 
capability adjustments in order to transition over to the new standard.  
The example of the personal computer industry illustrates the challenges 
standards pose to firms’ complementary capabilities by devaluing their alliance network 
positions. In the early 1990s, increasing standardization within and between computer 
components led to increasing modularity and de-integration of the supply chain, enabling 
the entry of several component manufacturers (“OEM”), resellers (“VARs”) and other 
distributors. Such fine-grained specialization and standardization in computer modules 
allowed startups such as Dell Computer to design just-in time fulfillment and delivery 
systems by bypassing the traditional supply chain. This de-valued established PC 
manufacturers’ (e.g. IBM, Digital, HP, Compaq) investments in their alliance networks. 
Eventually, this led to the merger of Digital, HP and Compaq and the sale of the PC 
business by IBM. 
Even when firms do recognize the need to build organizational linkages between 
an emerging technological standard and existing complementary capabilities to sustain 
the value of these capabilities (Taylor and Helfat, 2009), existing commitments to 
downstream customers and upstream suppliers may restrict their ability to carry out such 
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changes (e.g. Christensen and Bower, 1996). These constraints will be more pervasive for 
firms that are more centrally embedded in the alliance network (Uzzi, 1997). Thus, such 
firms are more likely support the existing technology order rather than risk obsolescence 
of their complementary capabilities from new technological standards. By contesting the 
standard, such firms at the very least may buy additional time that can then be used to 
make the necessary technology investments as well as the internal and external 
organizational reconfiguration to support these investments while simultaneously 
exploiting their current alliance position to the maximum.  
Additionally, firms that are in central positions in the alliance network derive 
greater bargaining power from these positions as they control resource flow within the 
network, including information about the nature of technological investments of partner 
firms, their product quality as well as their fidelity. By virtue of such control, these firms 
can afford to undertake more self-serving actions in multi-firm settings, such as 
contesting attempts to coordinate a shared outcome. The likelihood that such actions will 
be met with retaliation diminishes with the asymmetry between such central firms and the 
rest of the network (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Chen, 1996). Therefore,  
 
Hypothesis 2: The more (less) central a focal firm is within the strategic alliance 
network of participating member firms, the higher (lower) its rate of opposition to 
the coordinated standard.  
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The multiplex effect – joint influence of the two network positions 
 Although firms that are centrally positioned in the strategic alliance network will 
have a greater tendency to contest the standard, this tendency will be moderated when 
such firms are also at the center of the technological network. The combination of 
favorable technological standards with superior inter-firm complementary capabilities 
sets up these firms to benefit the most from the standard, and thus makes it even more 
imperative for such firms to achieve coordination. A more central technological position 
will dampen the incentives for such firms to oppose the standard as technological 
divergence is reduced. The more the other consortium member firms consider the firm’s 
knowledge foundational, the more the standard’s rules are likely to favor it. The 
combination of technological influence as well as better inter-firm capabilities from a 
stronger alliance position suggest that such a firm is well-positioned to favorably shape 
the standard within the committee and also expeditiously build and license technology 
outside of it. Further, such a firm’s extensive prior extra-mural commitments reveals the 
presence of boundary-spanning knowledge conduits and a more flexible, modular 
organizational structure (Schilling, 2000) that resolves issues of local search and 
organizational inertia (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003) which might otherwise impede the 
firm’s support for the standard.  Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The more central a focal firm’s technological network position, the 
lower the positive effect of its strategic alliance network position on its rate of 
opposition to the coordinated standard. 
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Figure 1 summarizes these arguments. The horizontal axis represents a firm’s position in 
the network of inter-firm technological knowledge, while the vertical axis is its position 
in the network of inter-firm strategic alliance relationships. Firms located in the right side 
of the matrix, i.e. in quadrants 2 and 4, are the technologically central firms that are more 
likely to be advantageously positioned with respect to the technology proposed by the 
standard, whereas firms located in the left hand side of the matrix - in quadrants 1 and 3 - 
are the technologically peripheral firms that are more likely to have divergent 
technological viewpoints not incorporated in the standard. Similarly, firms located in the 
top half of the matrix, quadrants 1 and 2 are more likely to have strong inter-firm 
complementary capabilities that negatively influence their support for any technological 
change through the standard whereas firms located in the bottom half of the matrix in 
quadrants 3 and 4 have weak inter-firm complementary capabilities that make them less 
predisposed against the coordinated standard. The interesting interaction between these 
two network positions is captured in the upper right hand quadrant 2 – as firms with 
strong complementary capabilities are also in favorable positions to benefit 
technologically from the standard, they are likely to increase support for achieving a 
coordinated standard. 
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Figure 2. Summary of arguments for Essay One 
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Methodology 
Data Sources and Sample 
The data for this study came from a variety of different sources. Data on firms’ 
memberships, their technical contributions in the standards committee, their balloting 
attendance and their strategic choices to support or contest the emerging consensus 
standard were all obtained from the standards committee’s electronic database. I tracked 
firms’ decisions in these committees from the time of their formation – 1994 - up until 
the year 2008.  
Patent data to calculate firms’ technological knowledge network positions were 
obtained from the NBER project (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005). From the full patent 
dataset of more than 3 million patents, the sample of patents that matched the member 
firms of the technical subcommittees was extracted. This subset was further filtered by 
the technological categories and sub-categories that were relevant to the standards under 
consideration. These included HJT category 2 (Computers and Communications) with 
sub-categories 21 (Communications), Computer Hardware and Software (22), Computer 
Peripherals (23), Information Storage (24), Electronic business methods and software 
(25) and HJT category 4 (Electrical and Electronic) with sub-categories 41 (Electrical 
Devices), Measuring and Testing (43), Power Systems (45), Semiconductor Devices (46), 
Miscellaneous Electrical/Electronic (49). One limitation of using the NBER data is that 
only patent data up to 2006 are available and therefore technological positions calculated 
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in 2007 and 2008 are right-truncated. However, in robustness checks, I found that 
limiting the sample to 2006 does not change the results. 
Data to calculate firms’ strategic alliance network positions were obtained by 
searching Factiva for alliance announcements for each member firm. As Lavie (2007) 
and Schilling (2009) have shown in prior works, the SDC Platinum data on alliances 
covers only a small subset (less than 50%) of the alliance population and is therefore 
inappropriate to accurately construct an alliance network. By including all leading news 
sources, Factiva provides a more comprehensive dataset to track alliance announcements. 
One limitation of using Factiva is that it reports both rumored and actual alliances and 
often includes duplicate listings of the same alliance announcement from multiple media 
sources. I used a combination of manual and automated techniques to separate the 
duplicates and exclude rumored ties. Factiva also did not distinguish between technology 
development (R&D alliances) and technology licensing or distribution collaborations. 
However, my theoretical arguments in Hypotheses 2 and 3 that discuss the influence of 
firms’ complementary capabilities are focused mainly on the second type of alliance tie. I 
again used a combination of manual and automated techniques to parse the text in the 
description of the alliance announcements and categorize each alliance. Out of a total of 
10389 alliances, I categorized 6490 as technology licensing or distribution collaborations 
and the remaining as R&D alliances.7 
Next, data on firm financials, industry participation and mergers and acquisitions 
was obtained using a combination of Standard & Poor’s Compustat, Hoover’s, 
                                                          
7
 Alternative specifications with all alliances yielded substantively similar results. 
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BusinessWeek online, Corptech, Storagesearch.com and several other specialized media 
outlets that cover computer hardware, networking and peripherals sectors. Multiple data 
sources helped in not only triangulating the information but also, in several cases, 
supplementing the Compustat data that is restricted to publicly listed firms. Finally, I 
gathered data on firms’ participation in a competing standards body (Universal 
Synchronous Bus – USB – Implementers’ Forum) using the annual membership data 
from their archival sources.  
Measures 
Dependent variable. Firm’s votes against passing the consensus standard: To capture a 
firm’s opposition to the consensus standard, I used a count of the number of times a firm 
votes against unconditionally proceeding with the proposed standard in committee ballot 
measures, in a given year. Ballot measures are a mechanism by which firms vote whether 
or not to unconditionally proceed with the current version of the proposed standard’s 
technological specifications. Although most standards consortia formally adopt a two-
thirds majority rule (or simple majority in some cases), specific objections of firms that 
contest the standard typically need to be addressed before the development can proceed. 
A standards committee that chooses to progress despite outstanding concerns, faces a 
legitimacy issue and runs the risk that firms may drop out of standards deliberations or 
join a competing consortium (cf. Garud et al, 2002). By not voting for the unconditional 
progress of the standard to the next stage of development, firms may thus be able to delay 
the emergence of new technological rules that drive the direction of technological 
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investment and market acceptance. They may do so either by declining the passage of the 
standard and/or by requesting several hundred changes to the specifications. 
Independent variables. Variables, measures and data sources are listed in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: Essay One. Variables, measures and data sources 
Variable Name Measure Data source 
Technological knowledge 
network centrality 
In-degree centrality in a directed patent citations 
network of member firms (five year moving 
window) 
NBER patent 
data 
Strategic alliance network 
centrality 
Degree centrality in an undirected strategic 
alliance network of member firms, with edges 
weighted by number of distinct ties between firms 
(five year moving window) 
Factiva for 
alliance 
announcements 
Balloting rate Yearly count of number of ballots casted INCITS 
database 
Proposals authored Yearly count of number of technical proposals 
authored by firm’s engineers 
INCITS 
database 
Tenure on Standards 
alliance 
Time elapsed in years since firm first joined the 
standards alliance 
INCITS 
database 
Total Patent stock Five year stock of firm’s patents NBER patent 
data 
Diversity of Patent stock Number of distinct technological classes reflected 
in firm’s patent stock 
NBER patent 
data 
External Citations to 
Patent stock 
Number of citations to firm’s patent stock from 
patents not owned by member firms 
NBER patent 
data 
Diversity of Ext Citations 
to Patent stock 
Number of distinct technological classes reflected 
in patents that cite the firm’s patents and are not 
owned by members 
NBER patent 
data 
Knowledge insularity 
(Self-citations) 
Number of citations firm makes to own patents NBER patent 
data 
Technological opportunity Sum of firm’s patenting activity in different 
technological classes weighted by overall 
patenting intensity in these classes 
NBER patent 
data 
Density of patent network Proportion of total possible patent linkages that 
exist 
NBER and 
INCITS 
database 
Alliances to firms outside 
standards 
Yearly count of alliances to non-members Factiva 
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Variable Name Measure Data source 
(Table continued) 
Membership in competing 
standard 
Flag indicating USB standard membership USB-
Implementers 
Forum 
Size in Assets Asset base in $ bn Compustat, 
Hoovers, 
Corptech 
Size in Revenues Revenues in $ bn Compustat, 
Hoovers, 
Corptech 
Capital spend Capital expenditure in $bn Compustat 
Financial slack in Cash Cash in $bn Compustat 
Financial slack in long 
term debt 
Debt in $bn Compustat 
Financial Performance 
(Net Income) 
Net income in $bn Compustat 
Market share in sector 
(revenues) 
Proportion of sector’s revenues (sector defined by 
primary 4 digit SIC) 
Compustat, 
Hoovers, 
Corptech 
Investment share in sector 
(assets) 
Proportion of sector’s asset (sector defined by 
primary 4 digit SIC) 
Compustat, 
Hoovers, 
Corptech 
Overall sector size (assets) Assets in $bn cumulated across firms in primary 
4-digit SIC of firm 
Compustat, 
Hoovers, 
Corptech 
 
 Technological knowledge network position:  To compute this position, I used the 
NBER patent data to construct a technological network of patent citations. I used a five-
year moving window of patent citations to derive this network. For example, for the year 
1994, the citations network for patent citations from 1989 to 1993 was constructed. For 
the year 1995, the window begins in 1990 and ends in 1994.  
 The citations network was constructed in a three step iterative process. First, 
patent data for each member firm was obtained from the NBER database, beginning with 
the earliest available year (1975). Then, for each patent, all the citing patents were 
45 
 
derived for each year in each of the moving windows. The assignee names for each of 
these citing patents were matched with the member firms, as the variable of interest is 
within- committee technological linkages. A technological network linkage between firm 
‘i’ and firm ‘j’ is defined in year ‘t’ if at least one patent of firm ‘i’ was cited by at least 
one patent of firm ‘j’ in any year from ‘t-5’ through ‘t-1’ and if both firm ‘i' and firm ‘j’ 
are members of the standards sub-committee in year ‘t’. I constructed these linkages 
separately for each subcommittee (T10, T11 and T13) as each sub-committee maintains a 
separate membership roster and all firms are not members of all subcommittees. Patent 
application year (rather than patent grant year) was used for the citing patent since the 
linkage can be considered to be established once the patent application is submitted. 
Finally, this list of network links was input to network analysis software (Borgatti et al, 
2002; Miura, 2012) and a centrality measure was calculated for each firm. This process 
was repeated for each of the moving windows corresponding to the years 1994 through 
2008. Since patent citations are unidirectional, I treated the resultant network graphs as 
directed adjacency matrices and used the in-degree centrality measure.  
Strategic alliance network position:  To compute this position, I used the Factiva 
alliance data of technology licensing and distribution collaborations. The alliance 
network was derived on the same lines as the technological citations network, using the 
same lengths for time windows, the co-membership criteria and a degree centrality 
measure. However, there were three additional considerations for constructing the 
alliance network. First, alliances with more than two member firms were elaborated to 
include all dyadic tie combinations amongst the participating firms before computing the 
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centrality measures. Second, the alliance network was coded as a symmetric bi-
directional network as strategic alliances are generally treated as reciprocated 
relationships in the literature. Finally, I used the number of ties between two firms as the 
edge-weight to calculate the degree centrality. This allowed me to accurately reflect both 
the breadth and the depth of existing collaborations in firms’ alliance network positions.8 
Interaction between Technological network position and Alliance network 
position: A mean-centered interaction term of the technological network position variable 
and the alliance network position variable was computed for every member firm for 
every year in the sample. 
Controls 
Firms’ tendencies to oppose or support the standard may be influenced by factors 
other than the hypothesized predictors. I use a number of controls to rule out these 
alternate hypotheses. First, firm’s tendency to contest the standard may also depend upon 
its overall rate of attending and voting in the meetings in which these measures are 
proposed. I capture this tendency in the variable Balloting rate. Second, I control for the 
number of Proposals authored by the firms’ engineers as this involvement may reflect a 
time commitment or sunk investment on the part of the firm that affects its voting 
behavior. Third, I control for Tenure on Standards alliance by calculating the number of 
years elapsed since the firm first joined the standards body. Although unlikely, firms with 
                                                          
8
 Although a weighted technological network could have been constructed using number of patent citations 
or number of patents cited as weights, I chose to use a binary approach as several scholars (notably Alcacer 
and Gittelman (2006)) have suggested that using citation count or patent count to measure knowledge flows 
suffers from examiner added bias.  
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higher tenure may be able to gain leadership positions on task committees and influence 
the decision-making process. Firms that join the standards body in the early years may 
also have made technological investments that are aligned with the standard. Fourth, the 
nature of a firm’s proprietary technological investments may affect its opposition to the 
consensus standard independent of its position in technological and alliance networks. I 
included several measures to control for the breadth, depth and insularity of these 
investments. These variables are Total Patent stock, Diversity of Patent stock, External 
Citations to Patent stock, Diversity of Ext Citations to Patent stock and Knowledge 
insularity (Self-citations) and their construction is described in greater detail in Table 1. 
These are calculated using five year windows. Fifth, a firm’s strategic decisions within 
standards committees could be shaped by its technological opportunity set or competitive 
pressures (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; Stuart, 1998). Firms with more liberal opportunities may be 
less resistant to the standard than firms that occupy competitive niches. To reflect such 
tendencies, I computed the variable Technological opportunity, using the method 
described by Ahuja (2000) and the variable Overall sector size (assets), using a simple 
sum of the assets of all publicly listed firms in the firm’s primary 4-digit SIC code. I also 
controlled for the number of Alliances to firms outside standards as well as Membership 
in competing standard as these might influence firms’ voting patterns (cf. Leiponen, 
2008). Finally, I use a number of accounting measures to control for firm size, slack and 
performance. These include Size in Assets, Size in Revenues, Capital spend, Financial 
slack in long term debt, and Financial Performance (Net Income). I also control for a 
firm’s competitive market position in the variable Market share in sector (revenues). 
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Methods 
I model the data as an unbalanced panel as membership in the subcommittees 
varies over the years. I use firm-subcommittee fixed-effects models to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity (Woolridge, 2003). I chose fixed effects models over random-
effects models because the latter assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is 
uncorrelated with the variables of interest. This assumption may not be tenable if there 
are invariant, unobserved firm characteristics which are correlated with the firm’s 
technological and/or alliance network position, as well as its tendency to support or 
oppose the standard. For example, firms that choose to actively patent and have 
technological knowledge collaborations with other firms (potentially resulting in a more 
central technological network position) may also choose to generally support a shared 
standards development program. By using firm-fixed effects models, I can control for 
these unobserved characteristics to the extent that they are time invariant.9  
However, as firm fixed-effects models condition on within-firm variation only, I 
also conducted robustness checks with random-effects models and found no substantive 
differences in the results. Finally, I lag the independent variables and controls by one year 
to rule out simultaneity or reverse-causality effects (with the exception of Balloting rate 
that needs to reflect the same time period as the dependent variable).  
The nature of the dependent variable (count) implies a Poisson process. However, 
over-dispersion (standard deviation is approximately twice the mean) implies that a 
                                                          
9
 Firm fixed effects models also automatically include time invariant effects specific to the sector or 
industry 
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negative binomial specification is more appropriate to model the data. However, a 
conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model is not a true fixed-effects model since 
it fails to control for all its predictors (Allison & Waterman, 2002; Hilbe, 2011). I 
therefore use conditional fixed-effects quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson regressions 
with robust standard errors to account for the overdispersion (Simcoe, 2007).10 
 
Results 
 Table 2 lists the sample statistics and correlations. This table shows that 
multicollinearity could be a potential concern as there is a moderate correlation between 
the two network centrality variables. I provide more details on the multicollinearity 
checks following a discussion of the main results. 
TABLE 2: Essay One. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
# Variable Name Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 
1 Voting against standard (DV) 0.76 1.49 1    
2 Balloting rate 6.46 5.51 0.31 1   
3 Proposals authored 0.65 1.58 0.38 0.21 1  
4 Tenure on Standards alliance 7.2 4.07 0.11 0.06 -0.04 1 
5 Total Patent stock 2061.21 2964.54 0.12 -0.01 0.15 0.26 
6 Diversity of Patent stock 48.11 26.51 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.17 
7 External Citations to Patent stock 20260.33 31593.55 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.29 
8 Diversity of Ext Citations to Patent stock 139.5 87.95 -0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.31 
9 Knowledge insularity (Self-citations) 3297.63 6510.57 0.16 0.06 0.17 0.25 
10 Technological opportunity 105391.06 164698.6 0.09 0 0.08 0.06 
11 Density of patent network 0.18 0.1 -0.12 -0.31 -0.17 0.02 
12 Alliances to firms outside standards 11.04 32.52 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.17 
13 Membership in competing standard 0.46 0.5 0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.62 
14 Size in Assets 23.8 28.95 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.24 
                                                          
10
 Negative binomial models yield substantively similar results 
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# Variable Name Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 
15 Size in Revenues 18.84 24.02 0.08 0.1 0.08 0.28 
16 Capital spend 1.34 1.77 0 0.07 0.06 0.19 
17 Financial slack in Cash 2.57 3.29 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.25 
18 Financial slack in long term debt 2.93 4.47 -0.01 0.1 0.01 0.16 
19 Financial Performance (Net Income) 0.96 2.59 0.08 -0.03 0.07 0.23 
20 Market share in sector (revenues) 0.22 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.15 
21 Investment share in sector (assets) 0.24 0.24 0.02 0.11 0 0.08 
22 Overall sector size (assets) 111.54 121.14 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.17 
23 Technological  network centrality 0.62 0.23 -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 0.33 
24 Strategic alliance network centrality 0.72 1.08 0.13 0 0.08 0.32 
 
# Variable Name 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
5 Total Patent stock 1        
6 Diversity of Patent stock 0.7 1       
7 External Citations to Patent stock 0.87 0.57 1      
8 Diversity of Ext Citations to Patent stock 0.65 0.81 0.75 1     
9 Knowledge insularity (Self-citations) 0.9 0.49 0.92 0.59 1    
10 Technological opportunity 0.73 0.53 0.63 0.47 0.63 1   
11 Density of patent network 0.1 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.1 0.12 1  
12 Alliances to firms outside standards 0.61 0.26 0.64 0.3 0.69 0.36 0.09 1 
13 Membership in competing standard 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.2 0.16 0.1 0.23 
14 Size in Assets 0.67 0.64 0.77 0.79 0.7 0.4 0.06 0.5 
15 Size in Revenues 0.65 0.59 0.78 0.77 0.72 0.37 0.03 0.48 
16 Capital spend 0.65 0.62 0.72 0.73 0.67 0.44 0.07 0.31 
17 Financial slack in Cash 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.64 0.47 0.2 0.04 0.33 
18 Financial slack in long term debt 0.68 0.57 0.81 0.76 0.71 0.46 0.07 0.36 
19 Financial Performance (Net Income) 0.48 0.29 0.43 0.25 0.52 0.24 0.05 0.61 
20 Market share in sector (revenues) 0.36 0.42 0.43 0.53 0.46 0.22 -0.05 0.26 
21 Investment share in sector (assets) 0.37 0.46 0.42 0.56 0.41 0.21 -0.06 0.19 
22 Overall sector size (assets) 0.29 0.36 0.26 0.31 0.19 0.19 -0.01 0.18 
23 Technological  network centrality 0.52 0.72 0.55 0.79 0.45 0.31 0.34 0.27 
24 Strategic alliance network centrality 0.53 0.39 0.54 0.39 0.56 0.21 0.15 0.7 
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# Variable Name 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13 Membership in competing 
standard 
1            
14 Size in Assets 0.25 1           
15 Size in Revenues 0.23 0.94 1          
16 Capital spend 0.17 0.86 0.82 1         
17 Financial slack in Cash 0.25 0.85 0.8 0.7 1        
18 Financial slack in long term 
debt 
0.13 0.84 0.81 0.75 0.59 1       
19 Financial Performance 0.2 0.5 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.21 1      
20 Market share in sector 
(revenues) 
0.18 0.63 0.67 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.27 1     
21 Investment share in sector 
(assets) 
0.1 0.67 0.63 0.55 0.59 0.6 0.2 0.91 1    
22 Overall sector size (assets) 0.21 0.38 0.32 0.35 0.3 0.27 0.27 -0.08 -0.1 1   
23 Technological  network 
centrality 
0.38 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.28 0.38 0.39 0.22 1  
24 Strategic alliance network 
centrality 
0.33 0.63 0.61 0.46 0.62 0.34 0.67 0.36 0.31 0.21 0.45 1 
 
Tables 3 and 4 display the results of the main regressions used to test the 
hypotheses. In the models in Table 3 (Models 1 to 6), I excluded nodes that were 
disconnected from the technological and alliance networks from the regressions. In the 
models in Table 4 (Models 7 to 12), I assigned a zero value for the centrality measure if a 
firm was not connected into the network. The difference between the two is 22 firms.  
Models 1 and 7 include only the hypothesized variables and no controls. Models 2 
and 8 include only the control variables and not the hypothesized variables. All the other 
models show the results from the step-wise addition of independent variables to the 
controls-only model.  
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TABLE 3: Essay One. Results for Hypothesis tests. Firm Fixed-effects Poisson models 
excluding disconnected nodes. 
Dependent variable is Rate of Firm’s voting against proceeding unconditionally with 
standard in a subcommittee in a given year. All models exclude disconnected nodes. 
MODELS 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) 
       
Technological network centrality -3.5544*** -3.1347*** 
 (0.9430) (1.1303) 
 
   
Strategic alliance network centrality 0.6518*** 
 (0.1446) 
 
   
Technological centrality  
X Alliance centrality 
-1.6685*** 
(0.4092) 
  
 
CONTROLS 
 
 
  
Balloting rate 0.0584*** 0.0551*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0160) 
Proposals authored 0.0143 0.0085 
 (0.0384) (0.0353) 
Tenure on Standards alliance -0.0585 -0.0249 
 (0.0382) (0.0418) 
Total Patent stock 0.0004* 0.0004* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Diversity of Patent stock 0.0213 0.0316 
 (0.0218) (0.0202) 
External Citations to Patent stock 0.0000** 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Diversity of Ext Citations to Patent stock -0.0097 -0.0052 
 (0.0075) (0.0073) 
Knowledge insularity (Self-citations) -0.0002** -0.0001** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Technological opportunity 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Density of patent network -1.0469 0.6523 
 (2.4902) (2.6117) 
Alliances to firms outside standards -0.0046 -0.0027 
 (0.0045) (0.0047) 
Membership in competing standard -0.1731 -0.0690 
 (0.2887) (0.2848) 
Size in Assets -0.0061 -0.0103 
 (0.0143) (0.0141) 
Size in Revenues 0.0158 0.0173 
 (0.0184) (0.0188) 
Capital spend -0.2353* -0.2189* 
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MODELS 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) 
 (0.0514) (0.0506) 
Financial slack in long term debt -0.0765 -0.0909 
 (0.0697) (0.0700) 
Financial Performance (Net Income) 0.0018 0.0075 
 (0.0284) (0.0292) 
Market share in sector (revenues) 0.8520 0.1203 
 (1.0297) (1.0360) 
Investment share in sector (assets) 4.0783*** 4.7860*** 
 (1.4553) (1.4140) 
Overall sector size (assets) 0.0092*** 0.0095*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0032) 
 
   
Firm - subcommittee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 564 564 564 
Number of groups 79 79 79 
Log likelihood -480.6 -447.7 -442.2 
Chi-square 24.49 276.1 302.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
MODELS 
VARIABLES (4) (5) (6) 
        
Technological network centrality -3.1755*** -3.7600*** 
 (1.0743) (1.1512) 
 
   
Strategic alliance network centrality 0.4710*** 0.4792*** 0.6497*** 
 (0.1364) (0.1375) (0.1731) 
 
   
Technological centrality  
X Alliance centrality 
  -1.0501** 
(0.4790) 
    
CONTROLS    
Balloting rate 0.0515*** 0.0479*** 0.0416*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0158) 
Proposals authored 0.0149 0.0093 0.0072 
 (0.0374) (0.0345) (0.0339) 
Tenure on Standards alliance -0.0852** -0.0515 -0.0783** 
 (0.0357) (0.0367) (0.0392) 
Total Patent stock 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0004** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Diversity of Patent stock 0.0084 0.0188 0.0154 
 (0.0222) (0.0197) (0.0197) 
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(Table  continued)                    MODELS 
VARIABLES (4) (5) (6) 
 
External Citations to Patent stock 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Diversity of Ext Citations to Patent stock -0.0052 -0.0005 0.0011 
 (0.0082) (0.0077) (0.0076) 
Knowledge insularity (Self-citations) -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Technological opportunity 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Density of patent network -1.3211 0.3663 0.5654 
 (2.4305) (2.5245) (2.5777) 
Alliances to firms outside standards -0.0068* -0.0048 -0.0044 
 (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Membership in competing standard -0.4005 -0.3084 -0.2180 
 (0.3001) (0.2923) (0.2914) 
Size in Assets -0.0142 -0.0185 -0.0155 
 (0.0141) (0.0137) (0.0136) 
Size in Revenues 0.0071 0.0085 0.0149 
 (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0177) 
Capital spend -0.1558 -0.1400 -0.1856 
        
 (0.0528) (0.0521) (0.0536) 
Financial slack in long term debt -0.0889 -0.1019 -0.1170* 
 (0.0652) (0.0643) (0.0670) 
Financial Performance (Net Income) 0.0043 0.0099 0.0152 
 (0.0304) (0.0315) (0.0321) 
Market share in sector (revenues) 1.2671 0.5105 0.1499 
 (1.0504) (1.0633) (1.1258) 
Investment share in sector (assets) 4.1807*** 4.9173*** 4.9187*** 
 (1.5042) (1.4781) (1.4864) 
Overall sector size (assets) 0.0119*** 0.0122*** 0.0118*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
    
Firm and subcommittee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 564 564 564 
Number of groups 79 79 79 
Log likelihood -442.8 -437.1 -435.2 
Chi-square 228.1 270.3 331.6 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 4: Essay One. Results for Hypothesis tests. Firm Fixed-effects Poisson models 
including disconnected nodes. 
Dependent variable is Rate of Firm’s voting against proceeding unconditionally with 
standard in a subcommittee in a given year. All models include disconnected nodes. 
VARIABLES Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
        
Technological  network centrality -3.2544*** -3.5031*** 
 (0.8027) (0.9425) 
Strategic alliance network centrality 0.8572*** 
 (0.1595) 
Technological centrality X Alliance centrality -1.8985*** 
 (0.3881) 
 
CONTROLS 
 
Balloting rate 0.0725*** 0.0720*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0143) 
Proposals authored 0.0379 0.0276 
 (0.0348) (0.0304) 
Tenure on Standards alliance -0.0112 0.0220 
 (0.0346) (0.0355) 
Total Patent stock 0.0003 0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Diversity of Patent stock 0.0190 0.0307 
 (0.0208) (0.0197) 
External Citations to Patent stock 0.0000*** 0.0000** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Diversity of Ext Citations to Patent stock -0.0111 -0.0079 
 (0.0071) (0.0070) 
Knowledge insularity (Self-citations) -0.0001** -0.0001* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Technological opportunity 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Density of patent network -0.5892 1.3279 
 (1.8534) (1.9131) 
Alliances to firms outside standards -0.0050 -0.0035 
 (0.0041) (0.0044) 
Membership in competing standard -0.0830 -0.0704 
 (0.2316) (0.2306) 
Size in Assets 0.0188 0.0096 
 (0.0146) (0.0145) 
Size in Revenues -0.0034 0.0021 
 (0.0169) (0.0175) 
Capital spend -0.1073 -0.1116 
 (0.1261) (0.1221) 
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(Table  continued)                    MODELS 
VARIABLES 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
Financial slack in Cash -0.1019** -0.1073** 
 (0.0469) (0.0466) 
Financial slack in long term debt -0.0191 -0.0097 
 (0.0385) (0.0433) 
Financial Performance (Net Income) 0.0182 0.0241 
 (0.0228) (0.0224) 
Market share in sector (revenues) 2.1243** 1.3135 
 (1.0827) (1.0165) 
Investment share in sector (assets) 1.9009 3.1459*** 
 (1.1659) (1.0745) 
Overall sector size (assets) 0.0024 0.0042** 
 (0.0021) (0.0019) 
Firm and sub-committee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industry (sector) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 792 792 792 
Number of groups 101 101 101 
Log likelihood -664.6 -621.2 -611.5 
Chi-square 35.19 165.8 203.2 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
VARIABLES Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 
Technological  network centrality -3.5709*** -3.9079*** 
 (0.9449) (0.9868) 
Strategic alliance network centrality 0.2954** 0.3182** 0.5421*** 
 (0.1226) (0.1276) (0.1873) 
Technological centrality X Alliance centrality -0.9360** 
 (0.4509) 
CONTROLS 
Balloting rate 0.0689*** 0.0681*** 0.0633*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
Proposals authored 0.0389 0.0285 0.0250 
 (0.0337) (0.0293) (0.0293) 
Tenure on Standards alliance -0.0260 0.0061 -0.0148 
 (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0364) 
Total Patent stock 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Diversity of Patent stock 0.0126 0.0240 0.0211 
 (0.0209) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
External Citations to Patent stock 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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VARIABLES Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
(Table continued) 
 
Diversity of Ext Citations to Patent stock -0.0090 -0.0054 -0.0035 
 (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0073) 
Knowledge insularity (Self-citations) -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Technological opportunity 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Density of patent network -0.6132 1.3445 1.4094 
 (1.7991) (1.8721) (1.9000) 
Alliances to firms outside standards -0.0070* -0.0055 -0.0050 
 (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Membership in competing standard -0.1823 -0.1818 -0.1301 
 (0.2407) (0.2373) (0.2311) 
Size in Assets 0.0152 0.0054 0.0093 
 (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0139) 
Size in Revenues -0.0085 -0.0033 0.0007 
 (0.0153) (0.0160) (0.0165) 
Capital spend -0.0511 -0.0527 -0.0853 
 (0.1227) (0.1211) (0.1176) 
Financial slack in Cash -0.1108** -0.1173** -0.1174** 
 (0.0475) (0.0474) (0.0486) 
Financial slack in long term debt -0.0133 -0.0028 -0.0128 
 (0.0368) (0.0409) (0.0429) 
Financial Performance (Net Income) 0.0235 0.0295 0.0337 
 (0.0240) (0.0238) (0.0246) 
Market share in sector (revenues) 2.3545** 1.5370 1.4170 
 (1.0826) (1.0224) (1.0129) 
Investment share in sector (assets) 1.9051 3.1876*** 3.0623*** 
 (1.1609) (1.0787) (1.0649) 
Overall sector size (assets) 0.0032 0.0050** 0.0047** 
 (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
 
Firm and sub-committee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industry (sector) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 792 792 792 
Number of groups 101 101 101 
Log likelihood -618.8 -608.9 -607.1 
Chi-square 170.0 222.6 268.7 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As the dependent variable is a yearly count of votes against unconditionally 
proceeding with the standard, a negative coefficient for a variable in a regression would 
indicate support for the standard and a positive coefficient for a variable would indicate 
opposition to the standard. Hypothesis 1 stated that the more central a focal firm is within 
the technological knowledge network of participating member firms, the lower its rate of 
opposition to the standard will be. The coefficient of the variable Technological network 
centrality is negative and strongly significant in all partial and full models indicating 
support for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 stated that the more central a focal firm is within 
the strategic alliance network of participating member firms, the higher its rate of 
opposition to the standard will be. The results show that the coefficient for the variable 
Strategic alliance network centrality is positive and strongly significant in all partial and 
full models, indicating that Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
Finally, Hypothesis 3 stated that the more central a focal firm’s technological 
knowledge network position, the less positive the effect of its strategic alliance network 
position on its rate of opposition to the standard. The coefficient for the interaction term 
Technological centrality X Alliance centrality is negative and significant in all partial and 
full models, indicating that Hypothesis 3 is well-supported.  
Figure 2 shows a graph depicting this interaction. The X-axis indicates the 
Technological network centrality and the Y-axis indicates Rate of opposition to the 
standard (dependent variable). Three separate plots are shown, corresponding to High, 
Mean and Low Alliance network centrality (the difference between Low and High in this 
case is taken as three standard deviations). Both the independent and joint effects of the 
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two networks are strongly manifested in the plots.  At low levels of Technological 
network centrality, the opposing effect of a firm with High Alliance network centrality on 
the coordination of the standard is almost five times the opposing effect of a firm with 
Low Alliance network centrality. However, at high levels of Technological network 
centrality there is barely any perceptible difference between these firms – in particular, 
the opposing effect of the High Alliance network centrality is almost completely nullified 
at High Technological network centrality levels. 
Figure 3: Interaction between technological & alliance centrality (Essay One) 
 
 
Robustness checks 
Since multicollinearity could be a potential concern, I evaluated the variance 
inflation factors (estat vif command in STATA) after executing an OLS regression and 
found that there were no independent variables that had a high inflation factor (>10). In 
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Alliance network position – both had VIF’s under five despite a moderate correlation 
between them. As an additional check, I also randomly omitted 20% of the observations 
in the sample and repeated this procedure 200 times to create 200 different subsamples. I 
then ran regressions on each of these subsamples to assess whether multicollinearity 
rendered the results sensitive to sampling changes. These sensitivity analyses provided 
strong support for the results and significantly alleviated multicollinearity concerns. I also 
checked for within-panel correlations using the xtserial command in STATA (Drukker, 
2003). The panel shows autocorrelation that justifies the use of clustered robust standard 
errors in the fixed-effects models. I carried out a number of additional robustness checks 
to test the sensitivity of my empirical assumptions. Table 5 shows the results of selected 
robustness regressions. These results validate that the main models are reasonably robust 
to changes in measures, model specifications and estimation techniques. Model 13 shows 
the results of a regression with the sample truncated at 2006 to assess sensitivity to the 
right-censoring of the NBER patent dataset. Model 14 shows the results of a regression 
with a double lag for Technological network centrality. In Model 15, the dependent 
variable is modeled as a proportion of firms’ votes against the standard instead of a 
simple count. This allows me to capture both the original dependent variable and 
Balloting rate in one measure and use a panel OLS model instead of a non-linear model. 
Models 16 and 17 assess sensitivity to missing financial data by omitting these variables 
and including public firm indicator variable. Finally, Model 18 shows the results of a 
random effects Poisson model with industry controls. This model includes the firms that 
drop out of the fixed effects regression either because they were present on the standards 
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body for exactly one year or because they had no variation in the dependent variable (for 
example if they never contested the standard in any ballot). 
TABLE 5: Essay One. Results for Hypotheses tests. Alternate models. 
VARIABLES Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Technological network centrality -4.1094*** -3.0018*** -0.4338*** 
 (1.2131) (0.9759) (0.1594) 
Strategic alliance network centrality 0.7354*** 0.8006*** 0.2036*** 
 (0.1839) (0.2084) (0.0593) 
Technological centrality X Alliance centrality -1.2335** -1.0684* -0.3138*** 
 (0.5186) (0.5582) (0.1197) 
CONTROLS 
Balloting rate 0.0435*** 0.0589*** -0.0069** 
 (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0027) 
Proposals authored 0.0060 -0.0035 -0.0083 
 (0.0333) (0.0403) (0.0100) 
Tenure on Standards alliance -0.0942** -0.0699* 0.0025 
 (0.0457) (0.0419) (0.0062) 
Total Patent stock 0.0005** 0.0005*** 0.0001** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
Diversity of Patent stock 0.0133 0.0195 0.0028 
 (0.0207) (0.0215) (0.0037) 
External Citations to Patent stock 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Diversity of Ext Citations to Patent stock 0.0040 -0.0073 -0.0019 
 (0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0016) 
Knowledge insularity (Self-citations) -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Technological opportunity -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Density of patent network 0.5930 -1.7252 0.3290 
 (3.0444) (2.7286) (0.3642) 
Alliances to firms outside standards -0.0057 -0.0101** -0.0011 
 (0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0010) 
Membership in competing standard -0.2720 0.0226 -0.0150 
 (0.3066) (0.2908) (0.0363) 
Size in Assets -0.0170 -0.0203 -0.0050 
 (0.0146) (0.0132) (0.0034) 
Size in Revenues 0.0187 0.0096 0.0051 
 (0.0192) (0.0172) (0.0035) 
Capital spend -0.1914 -0.2099* -0.0216 
 (0.1288) (0.1198) (0.0164) 
Financial slack in Cash -0.1120** -0.0697 0.0030 
 (0.0555) (0.0579) (0.0097) 
Financial slack in long term debt -0.1061 -0.1155** -0.0080 
 (0.0685) (0.0581) (0.0086) 
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VARIABLES Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
(Table 4 continued) 
  
      
Financial Performance (Net Income) 0.0137 0.0283 0.0042 
 (0.0333) (0.0347) (0.0053) 
Market share in sector (revenues) 0.1263 0.8792 -0.1599 
 (1.2112) (1.1323) (0.2039) 
Investment share in sector (assets) 4.7422*** 4.1082** 0.4960 
 (1.6178) (1.7114) (0.3194) 
Overall sector size (assets) 0.0118*** 0.0094** 0.0005 
 (0.0035) (0.0041) (0.0006) 
Constant 0.2331 
 (0.2129) 
 
Firm and sub-committee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (sector) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 541 490 566 
Number of groups 79 73 118 
Log likelihood -417.8 -376.6 N/A 
Chi-square 223.3 533.8 N/A 
R-squared N/A N/A 0.1453 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
MODELS 
VARIABLES Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
 
Technological network centrality -3.2822*** -3.0006*** -3.2085*** 
 (1.2052) (0.9419) (0.8381) 
Strategic alliance network centrality 0.4970*** 0.5121*** 0.4642*** 
 (0.1669) (0.1872) (0.1539) 
Technological centrality X Alliance centrality -0.9691** -0.9951** -0.7719* 
 (0.4900) (0.4853) (0.4566) 
 
CONTROLS 
 
Balloting rate 0.0642*** 0.0763*** 0.0637*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0154) (0.0114) 
Proposals authored 0.0176 0.0348 0.0412* 
 (0.0338) (0.0310) (0.0241) 
Tenure on Standards alliance -0.0351 0.0193 -0.0171 
 (0.0429) (0.0399) (0.0276) 
Total Patent stock 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0004*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Diversity of Patent stock 0.0198 0.0211 -0.0097 
 (0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0130) 
External Citations to Patent stock 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
63 
 
(Table continued)                                      MODELS Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
VARIABLES 
Diversity of Ext Citations to Patent stock 0.0012 -0.0072 0.0068 
 (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0046) 
Knowledge insularity (Self-citations) -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Technological opportunity -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Density of patent network 0.3773 1.1584 0.9619 
 (2.6242) (1.8350) (1.2127) 
Alliances to firms outside standards -0.0047 -0.0042 -0.0046 
 (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0033) 
Membership in competing standard -0.0635 -0.1162 -0.2594 
 (0.2860) (0.2295) (0.2048) 
Size in Assets -0.0166 
 (0.0156) 
Size in Revenues 0.0147 
  
      
 (0.0139) 
Capital spend -0.1210 
 (0.0801) 
Financial slack in Cash -0.0828* 
 (0.0466) 
Financial slack in long term debt -0.1089** 
 (0.0542) 
Financial Performance (Net Income) -0.0143 
 (0.0325) 
Market share in sector (revenues) 1.0544 
 (1.0836) 
Investment share in sector (assets) 2.5144** 
 (1.1995) 
Overall sector size (assets) 0.0094*** 
 (0.0029) 
Constant -3.3322*** 
 (1.2733) 
 
Firm and sub-committee fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Industry (sector) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 564 792 714 
Number of groups 79 101 138 
Log likelihood -452.7 -623.1 -675.9 
Chi-square 126.7 114.9 190.9 
R-squared N/A N/A N/A 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 In addition to these robustness checks, I also compared the values of the 
dependent and control variables for high alliance network centrality vs. low alliance 
network centrality firms, and then again for high technological network centrality vs. low 
technological network centrality firms. The sub-samples corresponding to these were 
defined as >75th percentile for high centrality and < 25th percentile for low centrality 
(peripheral), and means were calculated for the measures corresponding to these sub-
samples. Table 6 illustrates the results of the t-test comparing the sub-samples across 
these measures. Column 3 gives the results of comparison between column 1 and column 
2 (high vs. low alliance centrality firms), and column 6 gives the results of comparison 
between column 4 and column 5 (high vs. low tech. centrality firms).  
TABLE 6: Essay One. Comparing the quadrants 
Measure  Alliance 
Central 
(1) 
Alliance 
Peripheral 
(2) 
T-
test 
(3) 
Tech 
Central 
(4) 
Tech 
Peripheral 
(5) 
T-
test 
(6) 
Votes against (per year) 1.2 0.63 *** 0.65 1.05 *** 
Balloting rate 7.1 5.7 ** 6.3 6.8 ns 
Number of technical 
proposals 
0.99 0.42 *** 0.66 0.65 ns 
Number of engineers sent 2.1 1.41 *** 1.75 1.65 ns 
Year of joining 1994 1996 *** 1994 1997 *** 
Patent stock (#) 4337 574 *** 2655 288 *** 
Firm size ($bn) 51.1 6.8 *** 30.2 4.6 *** 
Firm performance ($bn) 3.15 0.15 *** 1.24 0.14 *** 
Market share 35.9% 15.4% *** 25.4% 10.1% *** 
Industry size ($bn) 137.8 71.4 *** 119.8 86.8 *** 
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 As the results in Column 6 show, there was no statistically significant difference 
between the  technologically central and the technologically peripheral firms in either the 
rate at which they attend ballots, the level of their technical contributions in the standards 
committees or the number of engineers they assigned to serve on these committees. This 
alleviates the concern that perhaps the technologically peripheral players were 
represented less or that they chose to contribute less to the committee because they lacked 
the necessary knowledge. On the other hand, as the regression results had already 
established, technologically peripheral firms showed a significantly higher rate of 
opposition to the standard.  
 The converse is true for the comparisons between the high centrality alliance 
network firms and the low centrality alliance network firms. As Column 3 shows, 
although the central firms in the alliance network actually contributed a significantly 
higher number of proposals, sent more engineers and joined these standards bodies 
earlier, they still showed a significantly higher rate of opposition to the standard.  
 
Discussion 
A central concern in strategic management and organization theory research has 
been to understand how firms compete in highly uncertain environments characterized by 
technological flux (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Anderson and Tushman, 1990). 
Responding to this concern, one promising research direction has highlighted “dynamic 
capabilities” as a source of competitive advantage for firms that need to continually adapt 
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and modify their resource bases in response to frequent technological shifts (Teece et al, 
1997; Helfat et al, 2007; Winter, 2003). However, the ability of firms to systematically 
control or direct technological change in order to sustain or even enhance the value of 
their current resources and capabilities has not received similar attention (cf. Teece, 
2007). This paper explores the characteristics of firms that are able to shape such change 
and the strategic choices they make in attempting to control change.  
The standards consortia in this study are multi-firm organizational bodies where 
firms come together to draft industry standards, with a shared objective of reducing 
uncertainty around the nature of technological change. These standards constitute rules 
that prescribe how different components of a technical system should interact, and in the 
process also demarcate the functional behavior of specific components. Studying firm-
level decision making within these settings allows the elaboration of the fundamental 
tension that firms have to manage in continuously changing environments. On the one 
hand, a firm needs to manage technological uncertainty by cooperatively participating in 
these multi-firm alliances, which equip it with essential knowledge to assess the direction 
of technological change. But the nature of change endorsed by the technical committee 
may increase the firm’s risk for capability obsolescence if the standard does not build on 
the firm’s knowledge or if it does not allow the firm to continue to exploit its 
complementary assets.  Such tensions may be further aggravated if the mandated standard 
simultaneously enhances the value of competitors’ capabilities. The results from this 
study show that these different considerations that affect firms’ strategic decisions on 
whether to support or oppose the consensus standard are crucially affected and jointly 
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determined by firms’ resource positions in two salient strategic networks. Moreover, the 
findings suggest that each of the inter-organizational networks operates differently in the 
standards-setting context, thus emphasizing the importance of considering both the type 
of tie and the context when theorizing about the effect of networks on firms’ conduct. 
These results have several important implications. First, these results re-
emphasize the importance of network structure in understanding firms’ strategic choices 
in settings of technological uncertainty and change. Firms are embedded in structures of 
relationships that arise out of a series of path-dependent choices made by themselves as 
well as their competitors and complementors. These positions determine the extent of 
influence firms can wield directly or indirectly in such inter-firm deliberations. In this 
particular technological change setting, there is sufficient evidence that the pattern of 
linkages between firms’ prior technological knowledge investments determines which 
firms can advantageously shape the standard. Firms will need to examine their positions 
in such networks vis-à-vis their peers before committing to the standards-setting process.  
Second, the study brings to light how these decisions are shaped by firms’ 
positions in multiple such structures, and more importantly how they are shaped by the 
interaction between these positions. Most network studies focus on a single structural 
context such as alliance networks and ignore the pluralism that firms embody (Shipilov 
and Li, 2010). In this standards-setting context, when only the alliance network is 
considered, centrality is found to have an opposing effect on the coordinated outcome.  
However, when both the alliance and the technological network centrality are considered, 
firms’ actions suggest that they are more supportive of a coordinated outcome.  
68 
 
Third, the arguments and findings from this paper suggest that central players in 
networks may not be able to orchestrate decisions concerning the network in a technical 
standards context, where deliberations are rooted on technical excellence and conflicts 
are resolved around the core of technological knowledge. It thus highlights the 
importance of considering technological knowledge interdependencies when looking at 
how firms are likely to make choices in such alliances.  
Finally, these findings highlight both the challenges and opportunities for firms in 
controlling technological change. Incumbent firms that are already central in the 
technological knowledge network begin with an advantage in standards discussions, but 
their ability to forge a consensus will also depend upon the technological knowledge 
network position of the firms who are more central in the strategic alliance network. On 
the other hand, the incumbent firms that have an advantageous alliance network resource 
need to carefully consider the shifts in the technological landscape as well – if these firms 
are not also embedded in the technological knowledge network, they may not be able to 
sustain the complementary asset advantages arising from their alliance network position. 
Although voting against the standard may delay its emergence and allow such firms to 
continue to exploit their complementary assets, this may devalue the social capital 
advantages of their network position as mistrust and haggling within the network increase 
with self-serving actions of firms.  
For technologically peripheral firms in the network, their tangential knowledge 
puts them at a disadvantage in standards discussions. However, they may be able to 
leverage the need for the more central firms to expeditiously agree to a coordinated 
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standard. As Garud et al (2002) point out with the example of Sun Microsystems, 
technologically central firms may face a ‘legitimacy trap’ if they attempt to push the 
standard through – they may be thus willing to make concessions with peripheral firms to 
achieve a broader consensus that enhances the legitimacy of the standards-setting 
process. Future studies could explore the nature of such concessions. 
This study is not without limitations. This paper considers only two salient 
strategic networks as influencing firms’ conduct – in reality there even more inter-
organizational relationships that firms are embedded in (e.g. the interpersonal networks 
of engineers who participate in the standards bodies) that may have some bearing in this 
context.  
 
Contributions, Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study makes several important theoretical and empirical contributions to 
research on technological change, alliances and alliance networks. First, this paper 
contributes to an emerging stream of literature which suggests that the conduct of a firm 
is derived in part from the networks it participates in (Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000; 
Kogut, 2000). While prior studies have looked individually at implications of a firm’s 
position in a technological network (e.g. Stuart and Podolny, 1996) or its embeddedness 
in a relational network (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; Uzzi, 1997), this study proposes that firms’ 
strategic decisions in settings of technological change are enabled or constrained by the 
effects of its positions in both of these networks.  
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Second, this study attempts to shed light on an intriguing phenomenon, that in 
spite of the lack of a hierarchical governance structure to manage divergent private 
interests, multi-partner alliance consortia have emerged as the preferred mode for 
structuring an industry-wide response to the challenges of technological change. 
Additionally, this paper makes an empirical contribution by investigating a setting where 
firms have opportunities to shape change instead of adapting to change (Teece, 2007), 
and argues that these opportunities are in part driven by capabilities at the network level 
(Rothaermel and Hess, 2007).  
Third, this paper contributes to our understanding of the decision-making 
dynamics within multi-firm alliances. Prior studies of alliances and alliance networks 
have focused on the formation and implications of dyadic ties, and this study builds upon 
this research by looking at how these ties influence firms’ strategic choices in more 
complex settings that involve multiple firms. This paper also provides insights into how 
firms handle the conflicting pressures of cooperation and appropriation in multi-firm 
settings. Multi-firm standards consortia are settings which are inherently characterized by 
conflict as firms with divergent interests seek to forge common ground.  
 Finally, this paper establishes several promising avenues for future research. One 
such avenue to explore is the relationship between structural asymmetry of member firms 
and the extent of consensus across different multi-firm standards consortia - i.e. whether 
consortia that consist of member firms with wide variations in network positions are 
marked by less conflict than consortia where member firms are more structurally 
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homogenous. Similarly, researchers could investigate whether the density of network ties 
influences consensus formation across different networks.  
 Second, an important question from a strategy standpoint is how firms benefit 
from their participation in these multi-firm alliances and in particular, what drives the 
heterogeneity of such benefits (e.g. Lavie et al, 2007). In this vein, it would be insightful 
to uncover the strategies less favored firms (on the technological network periphery for 
example) can undertake within these committees to improve their participation outcomes 
or network positions. For example, the mobility of engineers between firms that 
participate in these committees (Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2010), may affect the extent of 
interpersonal influence and the outcome of standards deliberations. Similarly, a nascent 
stream of research in strategy and entrepreneurship that has begun to explore ways by 
which firms that are at the periphery of a strategic network can form ties that make them 
more central (e.g. Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008; Ahuja, Polidoro and Mitchell, 2009), 
despite powerful effects of structural homophily and preferential attachment (Barabasi 
and Albert, 1999; Gulati, 1995b). The standards-setting context offers a rich venue to 
study how inter-firm interactions may shape such strategies of peripheral firms.  
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CHAPTER 4: ESSAY TWO - GIVE AND TAKE? 
 In Essay One, I found that peripheral firms in the technological knowledge 
network opposed the emerging standard while central firms supported it. Clearly 
contestation has one likely effect of delaying the emergence of the standard - as Simcoe 
(2012) points out, even small levels of conflict are enough to cause substantial delays in 
the productivity of voluntary standards-setting committees. Although technologically 
central firms that stand to benefit the most by the quick passage of the standard could 
ignore minority opposition, the process of resolution in voluntary standards committees 
mandates that member firms make all possible efforts to reach a consensus. This essay 
explores how such consensus-building efforts might take the shape of inter-firm 
relationship formation, as central firms look to increase the support and involvement of 
the peripheral players to build consensus and legitimacy for the standard, while the 
peripheral players attempt to offset the technological disadvantages that the standard 
poses by gaining strategic collaborations with central firms.  
 
Background and motivation 
 With the last two decades witnessing substantial growth in alliance formation (cf. 
Gulati, 2007; cf. Gulati, Lavie and Singh, 2009), a substantial body of research has also 
evolved around studying both the causes and consequences of these inter-firm 
collaborations.  
 On the benefits side, this research has found that strategic alliances allow firms to 
overcome some of the challenges of technological change (Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel, 
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2001). Firms may use these boundary-spanning relationships to counter local search 
tendencies and  incorporate distant knowledge (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003), which 
may in turn improve their technical and financial performance (Ahuja, 2000; McEvily 
and Zaheer, 1999) and allow them to shape technological evolution (Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001). Alliances may also be construed as a form of legitimacy-enhancing 
endorsement in high-velocity environments, especially when startups are the beneficiaries 
of collaborative relationships with established and prominent partner firms (e.g. Stuart, 
Hoang and Hybels, 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003).  
 On the causes side, broadly two streams of research have developed. The first 
stream asks why some firms undertake more alliances either relative to other corporate 
development strategies (e.g. Robertson and Gatignon, 1998; Vanhaverbeke et al, 2002; 
Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) or relative to other firms (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1996; Gulati, 1999; Baum et al, 2000; Stuart, 2000). Several explanations including 
transaction cost theory, social capital, strategic uncertainty and technological resources 
have been proposed and tested. The second stream explores the specific characteristics of 
pairs of firms that increases their likelihood of entering into a collaborative relationship 
(e.g. Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Chung, Singh and Lee, 2000; Rosenkopf et al, 2001; 
Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008; Ahuja, Polidoro and Mitchell, 2009).  This research has 
also postulated and tested several dyadic characteristics such as prior partnering 
experience (relational capital), resource complementarities (technological capital) and 
status or prominence (social capital) as drivers of alliance formation. 
 My arguments in this paper advance these research streams by investigating the 
drivers of alliance formation, both at the firm level and at the dyad level, as a 
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consequence of firms' involvement in standards-setting committees. I build on a prior 
study by Rosenkopf et al (2001) who show that interactions between engineers in a 
standard-setting context may be a bottom-up driver of alliance formation. They show that 
these contexts function as social venues where firms' representatives can identify both 
opportunities and partners for collaboration. I take their findings a level deeper by 
exploring the heterogeneity of these ties amongst the member firms that are active in the 
standards committees. The large number of firms participating in these organizations, the 
divergence in member interests and consequently the challenges in governing these 
bodies all point towards potential asymmetries in how relational opportunities may 
accrue to these firms (Das and Teng, 2002; Lavie et al, 2007), and I build theory to 
identify the nature of these asymmetries.   
 While prior research has demonstrated that participation by firms in standard-
setting committees does in fact lead to future alliances (Rosenkopf et al, 2001), it has not 
explored whether and how the nature and extent of participation within these committees, 
affects the heterogeneity of such opportunities, and particularly on the ability of a firm to 
forge relationships with central players in the alliance network (e.g. Ahuja, Polidoro and 
Mitchell, 2009). Research has also not considered how a firm’s participation over time 
affects its ability to garner benefits. Since most large technical consortia are multi-year 
joint efforts where consensus evolves gradually with successive versions of standards 
being drafted and debated, analyzing these settings using a longitudinal lens is likely to 
be insightful.  
 My arguments in this paper are motivated by a nascent stream of research in 
strategic networks that has begun to explore ways by which firms that are at the periphery 
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of a network can form ties that make them more central (e.g. Ahuja, 2000;Rosenkopf et 
al, 2001; Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008; Ahuja, Polidoro and Mitchell, 2009), despite the 
powerful effects of structural homophily and preferential attachment that work toward 
reproducing the current structure of relationships (Barabasi and Albert, 1999; Gulati, 
1995b; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Stuart, 1998). In 
contrast with prior studies that have explored whether and how relationally peripheral 
firms can move towards the center of the alliance network, I hypothesize across network 
structures about how technologically peripheral firms can gain relational advantages by 
their involvement in the standards committee, in order to offset their growing 
technological disadvantage.  
  
Theoretical arguments 
In Essay One, I discussed how a firm’s technological knowledge position amongst 
committee members indicates the extent to which other member firms have built upon the 
firm’s technology, and thus the extent to which the firm’s technology is regarded as 
foundational or fundamental within the committee. As I have argued, because 
technologically central firms will be able to exercise greater influence in shaping the 
standard, there is a greater likelihood that the standard’s rules will continue to build on 
such firms’ technologies. Thus, the standard will technologically favor firms with a more 
central position in the technological network of member firms, relative to firms with a 
more peripheral technological position. This is also consistent with the nature of 
technological change that follows the emergence of dominant design (Tushman and 
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Anderson, 1986). Firms that are central in the technological network of member firms in 
the committee are clearly foundational in the existing dominant design and their efforts 
will be to control the nature of change such that this design is preserved, refined and 
elaborated, while opposing those proposals that may result in major reconfigurations and 
potential competence erosion (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008).  
But, why might such technological advantages or disadvantages translate into 
collaboration opportunities for member firms and into ties amongst specific pairs of 
firms? There are broadly two rationales for linking firms' technological network positions 
to their opportunities for tie formation in the alliance network. Firstly, even in a post-
dominant design era, the direction of technological change may not be fully pre-
determined. As the technical complexity of the underlying system increases with 
component and interface innovations, and as both core and peripheral firms are involved 
in shaping the nature of technological change, sociopolitical dynamics are likely to have a 
greater impact on the evolution of these communities (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; cf. 
Tushman and Murmann, 1998). The focal empirical setting is a prototypical example of a 
complex technical system where the locus of innovation is distributed across the several 
different modules and subsystems that constitute the larger system (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000). Second, economists studying standard-setting have discussed the idea of side-
payments or concessions as mechanisms of compromise within voluntary standards-
setting organizations (Simcoe, 2012). One potential such outcome of the sociopolitical 
dynamics and the divergence of interests within standards-setting committees could be a 
strategic collaboration agreement between the conflicted firms.  
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Keeping these rationales in mind, I first develop firm-level hypotheses that predict 
the likelihood of collaboration opportunities and then develop a dyad-level hypothesis 
that predicts the characteristics of pairs of firms that are likely to forge these alliances.  
 
Technological position and relational advantages 
With the emergence of the standard, the structure of the technological network 
linking the inventions of the participating member firms continues to evolve, as firms 
continue to build on each other’s inventions (cf. Stuart and Podolny, 1996). These links 
reflect, in part, the degree of technological importance and influence a firm wields within 
the technical standards committee.  
Firms that are central in this technological network will also stand to attract 
greater relational advantages than the peripheral firms. First, a firm’s technological 
centrality amongst standards committee member firms is likely to attract potential 
partners who are looking to develop products on the standard and thus attracted to such 
firms to tap their technical capital. A high number of technological linkages (citations) to 
a particular firm's technological invention indicates that more firms are building on that 
invention and reflects the importance of a firm's invention relative to its peers on the 
standards committee. Thus, in part, it reveals the path of technological progress by 
identifying technologies that are foundational and stable. This may be a compelling 
signal for firms in technologically uncertain but path-dependent environments that need 
to make irreversible technological bets. Second, firms may be able reduce obsolescence 
risk by recombining knowledge from foundational technologies. However, while the 
technological network reveals stable technologies, and while the underlying patents 
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disclose the technological design, they do not fully disclose the complexity of the 
underlying technology (cf. Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). As interdependence between 
technologies increases, recombination becomes more complex, and the technologies that 
develop on the stable core may decline in usefulness (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). One 
reason for this is that patents don't include the tacit knowledge and idiosyncratic 
processes that transform the invention into a successful commercial product. The 
patenting firm may also choose to strategically maintain secrecy of critical portions of the 
technology. For firms that intend to build on these knowledge foundations, formal 
strategic alliances may allow for a more fine-grained, accurate and comprehensive 
knowledge transfer of this technological capital. Finally, by virtue of their increasing 
technological prominence, central firms are also in better bargaining positions to 
favorably negotiate the contractual terms of these potential collaborations (Stuart, 1998).  
Thus, I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher (lower) a firm's technological network centrality 
amongst member firms, the higher (lower) the likelihood that it will form 
alliances with these firms  
 
Involvement in the committee and relational advantages 
Prior research has established that standards-setting organizations are important 
venues for the fostering of new inter-organizational ties (Rosenkopf et al, 2001; 
Rosenkopf and Schleicher, 2008). However, firms may face substantial uncertainty about 
these collaborations before the standard is eventually set and agreed upon. With the 
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standard still evolving, there may be significant technological uncertainty about the 
ultimate specification and direction of investment that firms need to make. Similarly, 
given that some firms who are members of the committee may not be in favor of the 
standard there may be additional uncertainty with regard to which firms might be 
trustworthy collaborative partners to build on the standard. A factor that may make firms 
more or less attractive as alliance partners is their extent of involvement in drafting the 
standard and supporting its emergence. 
Internal involvement in a standards committee can be conceptualized at different 
levels. Firms have to make a decision with regard to how many engineers they should 
commit to attending standards-setting meetings. Firms also need to assess how much time 
and effort should be devoted in drafting technical contributions (proposals) for the 
standards committee. Finally, firms have to make strategic decisions on whether they 
should support or contest the emergence of the proposed standard.  
The level of a firm’s support for the standard reveals critical information not only 
about a firm’s technological viewpoints but also about its commitment to the passage of 
the standard, and its inclination to collaborate with other firms to build products on the 
standard. These types of information about a firm’s involvement are signals (Spence, 
1973) that serve to reduce uncertainty about it as a potential alliance partner. As prior 
work has posited, uncertainty is an important factor that affects consideration of future 
alliance partners (Gulati, 1999). As uncertainty about a firm reduces, its attractiveness as 
a potential partner should increase. For instance, from these commitments, firms can infer 
whether other firms are able to advance a joint agenda based on collaborative technical 
principles or whether common interests are superseded by private organizational goals 
80 
 
(Rosenkopf et al, 2001). Similarly, involvement also signals the level of effort that firms 
are likely to exert in exploring and exploiting opportunities that arise from the standard 
(Lavie et al, 2007). For instance, firms that are do not contribute technical ideas or 
consistently vote against proceeding unconditionally with the standard on ballot 
measures, are less likely to dedicate resources to building products and technologies 
based on the standard. When a firm is technically involved in the committee and aligns 
with the consensus by voting to support the standard, it becomes increasingly attractive 
for potential partners who are looking to build on the standard, and thus will have a 
greater tendency to form alliances with peer firms. Thus, I hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher (lower) a firm's involvement in the standards committee, 
the higher (lower) the likelihood that it will form alliances with other member 
firms in the committee. 
 
Give and take? Relational advantages of technologically peripheral firms’ involvement 
As both increasing technological centrality and increasing involvement in the 
standards committee positively affect a firm’s alliance formation rate, the question arises 
as to which firms end up forming alliances with each other. A large body of work in 
social networks has argued that network ties are subject to the principle of preferential 
attachment (Barabasi and Albert, 1999) and structural or status homophily (Chung, Singh 
and Lee, 2000). In other words, a firm that is already central in an alliance network has a 
greater ability to attract partners by virtue of the advantages stemming from its network 
position (Gulati, 1995; Gulati, 1999). Ties may also be realized between structurally 
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similar firms, either to reduce uncertainty or to mitigate appropriation hazards (Chung, 
Singh and Lee, 2000).  
However, there is an emerging body of work that suggests that firms that are 
disadvantaged structurally may act strategically to offset their structural disadvantage. 
This work proposes that structural constraints can be overcome through firms’ actions, 
causing the structure of the network to shift endogenously. For instance, Ahuja (2000b) 
shows that one mechanism for peripheral firms to form linkages is to achieve a radical 
technological breakthrough and disrupt the cycle of dominance by incumbent central 
players. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) also suggest that the possession of a path-breaking 
invention or a new technology may lead to central firms’ linkages with peripheral firms. 
Closer to my context, Rosenkopf et al (2001) find that alliance benefits from technical 
committee participation seem to be higher for firms that ex-ante have fewer alliances.  
I propose that the asymmetry in the technological network of member firms in the 
committee incentivizes firms that are more central to reach out to firms that are more 
technologically disadvantaged (peripheral) in order to form a stable consensus. This is 
revealed in the rate of alliance ties between technologically central and technologically 
peripheral firms. Central firms have greater incentives to see that a consensus standard is 
adopted, and is done so expeditiously so that their technological prominence within the 
consortium can be transformed into industry-wide technology adoption (and 
consequently firm performance). However, central firms also need to build the legitimacy 
of the standard, by ensuring that participation in drafting the standard is broad and not 
confined to those central firms who would obviously benefit from it. As Garud, Jain and 
Kumaraswamy (2002) illustrate in the case of Sun Microsystems, firms that attempt to 
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exercise overt control on the standard suffer from the ‘sponsor’s legitimacy trap’ which 
ultimately deters the adoption of the standard. Sun spent three years attempting to 
establish Java as a standard that was de-jure but still remained under its control (West, 
2003). This approached backfired and ultimately Sun was forced to relinquish control 
over the technology and adopt a hybrid open-standards approach (West, 2003). Similarly, 
the example of IBM 360 illustrates how IBM attempted to (unsuccessfully) control the 
evolution of its open architecture (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Thus, there is a great 
disincentive for central firms to assert themselves in these committees and try to force a 
consensus by fiat.  
Further, even from a technical systems design standpoint, a small number of 
modules in the system under consideration can lead to high levels of product complexity 
that mixing and matching different combinations of these modules entails, thus making it 
difficult for any one firm to control how the technology evolves (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000). Thus, there may be a necessity even for central, advantaged firms to invest in 
wide-ranging relational capital to counter this uncertainty or possible loss of architectural 
control.  
From a coalition formation standpoint, a two-thirds majority is sufficient in most 
technical committees to proceed with a proposal. However, in consensus-based 
committees, outstanding objections and comments are usually given due consideration 
(INCITS policies and procedures, 2012). The greater the number of objections, the 
greater the time taken to reach a consensus – as Simcoe (2012) shows, this is more often 
than not a problem that plagues voluntary standards setting organizations. From Essay 
One, these objections are more likely to come from the technologically peripheral firms 
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who view the standard to be disadvantageous. Unresolved objections can lead to more 
adverse consequences for the proposed standard if disadvantaged firms decide to opt out 
of membership altogether or decide to focus their efforts in a competing alliance (as I 
discuss in Essay Three).  
One important way that technologically central firms can mitigate such opposition 
from disadvantaged firms is by offering dyadic relational benefits. Prior research has 
explored how managers use alliances as a technique for behind-the-scenes coalition 
building, in particular when there is power asymmetry between different actors or 
stakeholders (e.g. Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Similarly, in a case study of an inter-
firm network, Elg and Johansson (1997) suggest that power asymmetry in an inter-firm 
network may result in central firms offering rewards to non-central firms to achieve 
network stability. These relational rewards with central firms may be very valuable for 
technologically peripheral firms. These firms are likely to be the smaller startup firms 
that need legitimacy to ensure capital inflow and liquidity. Prior research has also shown 
that variation in startups’ ability to form alliances with prominent firms has significant 
consequences on both the likelihood of liquidity events and their innovative performance 
(Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999; Baum et al, 2000; Gulati and Higgins, 2003).  
In particular, in the face of increasing technological disadvantages from the 
evolving industry standard, the potential for forming alliances with technologically 
central players may act to offset these disadvantages. Beyond endorsement, as I posit in 
the first hypothesis, these linkages may also function as fine-grained knowledge transfer 
mechanisms that allow these peripheral firms to reconfigure their technologies to build on 
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the foundational knowledge of the emerging standard that is localized within the central 
firms.  
Probing this mechanism further, the question still remains whether any 
technologically peripheral firm  will be the beneficiary of such a relationship or whether 
specific firms are likely to be targeted by the central players. If enhancing the legitimacy 
of the standard and accelerating its acceptance amongst member constituents is truly the 
underlying motive for the technologically central firms, then they are likely to be 
judicious in conferring these advantages so that these goals are achieved. Therefore, they 
are likely to seek out the specific firms that are not only increasingly technologically 
peripheral but also more disengaged in terms of their involvement in the workings of the 
committee. While the increasing asymmetry in the technological network positions 
indicates the extent of disparity in potential technological benefits, the increasing 
asymmetry in the involvement of these firms indicates which collaborations may provide 
the greatest legitimacy enhancements, should they form. Thus, I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Among potential dyadic combinations of member firms, the greater 
the asymmetry between firms in a focal dyad in both the technological network 
position and in involvement in the technical standards committee, the greater the 
rate of alliance formation between them. 
 
Empirical Approach 
Data Sources 
 All data sources were identical to those used in Essay One.  
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Measures 
Dependent variables: Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are about alliance formation at the 
firm level. I use a binary variable Alliance with member firms to measure this - this 
variable is set to 1 if a firm entered into any alliance with any one of the member firms in 
the standard, and 0 otherwise. Both the focal firm and at least one of the firm's alliance 
partners (if any) in that year, had to be on the membership roster for the same standards 
sub-committee in the same year for the variable to be set to 1. I also tested the robustness 
of this measure using a count of alliances instead of an indicator variable.  
  Hypothesis 3 is about alliance formation at the dyad level. I first created all the 
potential dyadic combinations by year based on standards sub-committee membership. In 
other words, if there were 'n' firms in a particular subcommittee in a particular year, then 
n*(n-1)/2 dyads were created for that sub-committee. Then I defined a variable 
corresponding to each of these dyads called # of Alliances between firms in dyad. This 
variable was calculated as the count of the number of ties between the two firms in the 
dyad in a particular year. 
 All alliances reported on Factiva (described in Essay One) including research and 
development, licensing and manufacturing agreements were considered for calculation of 
these dependent variables.  
 
Independent variables  
 The independent variable to test Hypothesis 1 is Tech. network centrality and is 
measured identical to the way I describe the equivalent variable in Essay One. The 
independent variable to test Hypothesis 2 is Involvement - Proposals submitted and is 
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measured as the yearly count of all technical proposals in the standards committee's 
electronic file database, where at least one of the authors is a representative of the focal 
firm. In order to facilitate this aggregation, I created a separate yearly mapping of firm 
representatives to firms, based on the standard's yearly membership roster.  
 To test Hypothesis 3, I needed to create an interaction variable of the asymmetry 
of any two member firms' technological network positions and the asymmetry of their 
involvement in the standards committees. This is a dyadic network measure, and as 
Ahuja, Polidoro and Mitchell (2009) discuss, merely creating a combined centrality score 
measure that is a product of each firm's centrality score does not accurately distinguish 
the asymmetric dyads from the symmetric dyads. This is because an asymmetric dyad - 
where one firm is central and the other firm is peripheral - may have a combined 
centrality score that is equivalent to a symmetric dyad where both firms have moderate 
centrality scores (e.g. 2x10 = 4x5). I therefore followed their approach  and defined two 
indicator variables for each of the variables of interest- one for a low centrality dyad 
which is set to 1 if both firms in the dyad had a centrality score below the mean centrality 
score for that year, and the other for an asymmetry dyad which is set to 1 if one firm in 
the dyad had a centrality score greater than the mean and the other had a centrality score 
less than the mean.  
 Using this approach, I created two indicator variables to reflect the technology 
network position asymmetry in the dyad, namely Low tech network centrality dyad,  and, 
Asymmetry in tech network position dyad. I then measured firms' involvement, and  the 
asymmetry of this involvement in a dyad in two different ways. First, I used the count of 
times each firm voted in opposition to the standard and created two asymmetry indicator 
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variables to reflect this at the dyad level - namely, Low opposition to standard dyad and 
Asymmetry in opposition to standard dyad. Second, I used a count of a firm's 
contributions in the standards committee and similarly created two asymmetry indicator 
variables to reflect the asymmetry at the dyad level - namely Low contribution to 
standard dyad and Asymmetry in contribution to standard. The contribution itself was 
measured in three alternate ways - (i) the total contributions, measured as the yearly 
count of all documents recorded under one of the firm's representatives names,  (ii) the 
total technical contributions, measured as the difference of the total contributions and 
other non-technical documents such as notes, meeting minutes, schedule updates etc, and 
(iii) the total technical proposal contributions, measured as a count of only those 
documents that had proposal in the title or subject of the document.  
 
Controls 
 Since alliance formation may be influenced by factors other than the hypothesized 
predictors, I used a number of controls to rule out these effects. I first discuss the controls 
for the models used to test Hypothesis 1 and 2, and then discuss the additional controls 
used to test Hypothesis 3. 
 Prior research on alliance formation has found significant effects for preferential 
attachment - in other words the more central a firm already is in the alliance network, the 
higher the likelihood that it will form additional alliances (Gulati, 1995b). I control for 
this with the measure Alliance network centrality which uses the same formulation as the 
equivalent measure discussed in Essay One. I also control for the relational prominence 
of a firm in the larger community of firms outside the standards body by including the 
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measure External alliances (non-members) which is a count of alliances with non-
member firms. I control for Opposition to standard which is measured as a count of 
ballot votes against proceeding unconditionally with the standard. I also control for the 
fact that levels of social interaction (that influences alliance formation) may be affected 
by the number of firm representatives attending meetings (e.g. Rosenkopf et al, 2001), by 
including the measure # of Member engineers. Similarly, I include a variable 
Admin/Leadership tracker that measures a count of administrative documents 
communicated to the committee by the firm's representatives (e.g. meeting minutes, 
agenda, announcement of ballot measures, results of ballot measures, call for patents 
letters etc.) to the committee, in order to control for leadership effects. I include a 
measure for Tenure on standards committee that may proxy for the level of knowledge 
about the standard arising purely from being on the committee for a longer duration. I 
include an indicator variable Member in USB standard to control for competitive effects 
from participating in an overlapping standards body. To control for a firm's technological 
resource base that may be a source of diversification and alliance opportunities, I include 
two measures - Breadth of firm's technologies that is a Herfindahl index of the primary 
technological classes of the firm's patents, and Breadth of technologies building on firm's 
technology that is a Herfindahl index of the primary technological classes of the patents 
of firms that cite the focal firm's patents. Finally,  control for a host of firm financial 
measures that may all influence alliance formation opportunities, including - Firm size 
(assets), Firm capital exp, Firm resources (cash), Firm leverage (long term debt), Firm 
performance (Sales). Firm performance (ROA) and Size of firm's sector (measured as the 
total cumulative assets of all publicly listed firms that operate in the same four digit SIC 
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code as the firm). Logged versions of the firm financial variables were used in all the 
models. 
 For the models used to test Hypothesis 3, an equivalent set of controls was 
included with the difference being that there was a separate variable for each of the two 
firms in the dyad, for the same measure - for example, Firm 1 Assets and Firm 2 Assets 
were two variables (reflecting the firm size for each of the two firms )that were 
simultaneously included in these models. In addition, several dyad-level controls that 
have been known to predict alliance formation were included.  Both Alliance network low 
centrality dyad and Alliance network position asymmetry dyad were included to control 
for the endogenous effects of the alliance network position on future alliance formation 
opportunities. Prior alliances between Firm 1 and Firm 2, which is a count of the prior 
strategic relationships between the two firms in the dyad, captures the effect of repeated 
ties and relational capital on future collaborations (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999). Product-market similarity for Firm 1 & 2  is an indicator variable to measure the 
similarity in the resource bases of the two firms in the dyad. It is set to 1 if the two firms 
in the dyad belonged to the same four digit SIC code.  
  
Method 
I model the data as an unbalanced panel as membership in the INCITS standards 
committees varies over the years. For Hypothesis 1 and 2, I use firm fixed-effects models 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity, but show equivalent results with random-effects 
models as well. By using firm-fixed effects models, I can control for unobserved firm 
characteristics to the extent that they are time-invariant. However, for Hypothesis 3, I was 
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restricted to using random-effects models because a very large proportion of the dyads do 
not experience any alliances and they would drop out altogether from the fixed-effects 
models, thus reducing the sample by more than 90%. Most dyad level studies of alliance 
formation have followed a similar approach of using random-effects models (e.g. 
Rosenkopf et al, 2001; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999).  
I also lag all the independent variables and controls by one year to mitigate 
simultaneity and reverse-causality concerns. Since I postulated a causal relationship 
between a firm's network positions and its opposition to the standard in Essay One, the 
measures relating to technological and alliance network centrality are lagged by an 
additional year. In other words, the dependent variable is measured at time 't', the 
involvement variables are measured at time 't-1' and the network variables are measured 
at time 't-2'. For Hypothesis 1 and 2, as the dependent variable is a binary outcome, I 
model alliance formation using logistic regression models. I also show equivalent results 
with probit models and GLS regression models where the dependent variable is a log of 
the count of alliances. 
 
Results 
 Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample used to test Hypothesis 1 
and Hypothesis 2. The high correlations between the Technological network centrality 
measure and some of the control variables indicates that multicollinearity could be a 
concern. However, multicollinearity diagnostics revealed that the variance inflation 
factors were within acceptable limits. The bi-variate correlations between the dependent 
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variable and the two independent variables are modest (0.55 with the Technological 
network centrality and 0.23 with the Involvement variable).  
TABLE 7: Essay Two. Descriptive statistics and correlations for Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Alliance with 
member firms 
(Indicator variable) 
0.4 0.49 1        
2 Tech. network 
centrality 
0.44 0.29 0.55 1       
3 Involvement - 
Proposals 
submitted 
0.41 1.28 0.23 0.09 1      
4 Alliance network 
centrality 
0.81 1.41 0.3 0.44 0.05 1     
5 External alliances 
(non-members) 
4.23 20.06 0.25 0.3 0.11 0.64 1    
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
6 Opposition to 
standard 
0.57 1.27 0.19 0.05 0.35 0.09 0.12 1   
7 # of Member 
engineers 
1.51 1.2 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.03 0.1 0.18 1  
8 Admin/Leadership  5.24 16.15 0.23 0.05 0.57 0.08 0.11 0.45 0.18 1 
9 Tenure on 
standards 
committee 
5.67 4.2 0.32 0.43 0.06 0.37 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.22 
10 Member in USB 
standard 
0.25 0.43 0.36 0.45 0.01 0.38 0.24 0.04 0.08 0.05 
11 Breadth of firm's 
technologies 
(Herfindahl) 
0.7 0.28 0.44 0.56 0.11 0.29 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.1 
12 Breadth of 
technologies 
building on firm's 
tech. (classes) 
90.5 85.25 0.49 0.85 0.07 0.41 0.34 0.03 0.17 0.03 
13 Firm size (assets) 8.09 2.25 0.45 0.68 0.08 0.48 0.31 0.04 0.13 0.05 
14 Firm capital exp 0.48 0.6 0.36 0.58 0.04 0.45 0.32 0.02 0.12 -0.03 
15 Firm resources 
(cash) 
0.69 0.76 0.44 0.63 0.08 0.6 0.37 0.06 0.13 0.04 
16 Firm leverage 
(long term debt) 
0.68 0.87 0.3 0.52 0.02 0.3 0.23 -0.01 0.11 -0.01 
17 Firm performance 
(Sales) 
11.61 20.39 0.38 0.57 0.1 0.6 0.49 0.08 0.16 0.07 
18 Firm performance 
(ROA) 
0 0.24 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.14 0.1 0.03 0.05 0.01 
19 Size of firm's 
sector 
10.78 1.38 0.35 0.38 0.07 0.3 0.21 0 -0.01 0.1 
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(Table continued) 
 Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
9 Tenure on standards 
committee 
1           
10 Member in USB 
standard 
0.6 1          
11 Breadth of firm's 
technologies  
0.15 0.21 1         
12 Breadth of 
technologies building 
on firm's tech.  
0.36 0.41 0.54 1        
13 Firm size (assets) 0.35 0.38 0.51 0.74 1       
14 Firm capital exp 0.27 0.32 0.41 0.74 0.79 1      
15 Firm resources (cash) 0.35 0.39 0.47 0.7 0.82 0.83 1     
16 Firm leverage (long 
term debt) 
0.22 0.25 0.38 0.73 0.74 0.82 0.72 1    
17 Firm performance 
(Sales) 
0.33 0.34 0.36 0.73 0.7 0.81 0.82 0.76 1   
18 Firm performance 
(ROA) 
0.14 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.11 1  
19 Size of firm's sector 0.15 0.2 0.52 0.37 0.4 0.45 0.46 0.37 0.38 0.04 1 
  
 Table 8 shows the results of the firm fixed effects logistic regression models to 
test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Model 1 is the controls-only model and in Models 2, 
3 and 4, I add the hypothesized variables of interest sequentially. Hypothesis 1 stated that 
the higher a firm's technological network centrality amongst member firms, the higher the 
likelihood that the firm will enter into alliances with these firms. The coefficient for the 
variable Technological network centrality is positive and highly significant (p < 0.01) in 
Model 2 and in Model 4, providing strong support for this hypothesis. A one standard 
deviation increase in this variable increases the likelihood of alliance formation by 29%.  
 Hypothesis 2 stated that higher involvement in the standards committee will be 
associated with a higher likelihood of alliance formation with firms in the committee. The 
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coefficient for the variable Involvement - Proposals submitted is positive and significant 
(p < 0.1) in Model 3 and in Model 4, providing support for this hypothesis. A one 
standard deviation increase in this variable increases the likelihood of alliance formation 
by 73%. 
 Table 9 shows the results for alternate models used to test these hypotheses. 
Model 5 shows the results of a random-effects logistic regression model, Model 6 shows 
the results of a probit regression model and Model 7 shows the results of a GLS 
regression model with the dependent variable as the log-count of alliances for a firm. The 
results from these models are consistent with the earlier results using firm-fixed effects 
logistic regression models. Notably, the significance of the coefficient for Involvement - 
Proposals submitted increases in all these three models (from p < 0.1 to p < 0.05).  
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TABLE 8: Essay Two. Results for Hypothesis 1 and 2. Firm fixed-effects logistic 
regression models. 
Dependent variable is 1 if firm enters into an alliance with a member firm and 0 
otherwise. 
MODELS (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Tech. network centrality 8.0532*** 8.1822*** 
(2.4934) (2.5291) 
Involvement - Proposals submitted 0.3013* 0.3147* 
(0.1699) (0.1764) 
CONTROLS 
Opposition to standard -0.0047 0.0053 -0.0185 -0.0159 
(0.1300) (0.1347) (0.1309) (0.1343) 
# of Member engineers 0.0959 0.0733 0.0668 0.0395 
(0.1415) (0.1437) (0.1417) (0.1454) 
Alliance network centrality 0.2770 0.3099 0.2542 0.2474 
(0.7400) (0.7566) (0.7380) (0.7469) 
# of External alliances (non-members) 0.3122*** 0.3562*** 0.3154*** 0.3591*** 
(0.1073) (0.1127) (0.1061) (0.1112) 
Admin/Leadership tracker -0.0248** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0153 
(0.0116) 
-0.0363** 
(0.0147) 
-0.0267* 
(0.0141) 
Member in USB standard 1.1023 1.0776 1.1045 1.0838 
(0.7043) (0.7366) (0.7087) (0.7429) 
Breadth of firm's technologies 
(Herfindahl index of patents/classes) 
-0.3603 
(2.0035) 
-1.1027 
(2.0682) 
0.1555 
(2.0958) 
-0.6047 
(2.1411) 
Breadth of technologies building on 
firm's tech. (# of patent classes) 
0.0135 
(0.0168) 
-0.0034 
(0.0182) 
0.0107 
(0.0169) 
-0.0076 
(0.0185) 
Firm size (assets) 0.3481 0.0864 0.3016 0.0226 
(0.3368) (0.3511) (0.3387) (0.3527) 
Firm capital exp 0.0395 0.5844 -0.1070 0.3836 
(1.1931) (1.2014) (1.1829) (1.1937) 
Firm resources (cash) -1.0776 -1.4015 -1.1378 -1.4381* 
(0.8183) (0.8521) (0.8111) (0.8456) 
Firm leverage (long term debt) 0.5129 0.3974 0.4570 0.3855 
(0.7751) (0.7953) (0.7741) (0.7930) 
Firm performance (Sales) 0.0057 -0.0023 0.0007 -0.0071 
(0.0403) (0.0411) (0.0403) (0.0411) 
Firm performance (ROA) -0.3592 -0.1357 -0.3291 -0.1202 
(0.9668) (0.9822) (0.9715) (0.9810) 
Size of firm's sector -0.7932 -2.3540** -0.6041 -2.1230** 
(0.7326) (0.9295) (0.7465) (0.9356) 
Observations 428 428 428 428 
Firms 60 60 60 60 
Log-likelihood -125.3 -119.3 -123.7 -117.6 
Chi-square 73.04 85.02 76.34 88.40 
Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 9: Essay Two. Results for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Alternate models. 
 MODELS (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Logit (RE) Probit (RE) Xtreg RE 
        
Tech. network centrality 2.4199** 1.3096** 0.4920** 
(1.1849) (0.6563) (0.2209) 
Involvement - Proposals submitted 0.2829** 0.1654** 0.0363** 
(0.1224) (0.0701) (0.0174) 
Opposition to standard 0.1535 0.0907 0.0355** 
(0.1039) (0.0596) (0.0172) 
# of Member engineers 0.0243 0.0184 0.0104 
(0.1014) (0.0579) (0.0185) 
Alliance network centrality 2.8095*** 1.5118*** 0.1262*** 
(0.6854) (0.3661) (0.0299) 
External alliances (non-members) 0.1909*** 0.1073*** 0.0101*** 
(0.0712) (0.0400) (0.0012) 
Admin/Leadership tracker -0.0149 -0.0076 0.0007 
(0.0094) (0.0054) (0.0016) 
Year of Joining the Committee -0.0450 -0.0246 0.0056 
(0.0631) (0.0358) (0.0130) 
Member in USB standard 0.2006 0.1033 0.0167 
(0.4660) (0.2645) (0.0897) 
Breadth of firm's technologies  0.4952 0.3638 0.5164** 
(1.0622) (0.5997) (0.2103) 
Breadth of technologies building on 
firm's tech. (classes) 
-0.0021 
(0.0048) 
-0.0011 
(0.0027) 
0.0007 
(0.0009) 
Firm size (assets) 0.0052 0.0105 0.0841** 
(0.1761) (0.0996) (0.0360) 
Firm capital exp 0.4858 0.2280 0.0833 
(0.7173) (0.3936) (0.1111) 
Firm resources (cash) 0.4404 0.2770 0.2751*** 
(0.4942) (0.2739) (0.0772) 
Firm leverage (long term debt) 0.1929 0.0916 -0.2141*** 
(0.4084) (0.2301) (0.0636) 
Firm performance (Sales) -0.0068 -0.0032 -0.0007 
(0.0215) (0.0119) (0.0030) 
Firm performance (ROA) 0.9161 0.5345 0.1028 
(0.7160) (0.4070) (0.1209) 
Size of firm's sector 0.4046** 0.2276** 0.0130 
(0.1973) (0.1114) (0.0417) 
Constant -7.6325*** -4.3959*** -1.0962** 
(2.5306) (1.4291) (0.5285) 
Observations 858 858 858 
Firms 156 156 156 
Log likelihood -298.5 -298.8 NA 
R-Square (Overall) NA NA 0.67 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables to test Hypothesis 3. The 
dependent variable # of Alliances between firms in dyad has a mean of 0.03 indicating 
that very few dyads had any alliances between their constituent firms. Table 11 shows the 
correlations between the variables. The high correlations for the paired indicator variables 
measuring dyadic asymmetry are expected by the nature of their construction. 
TABLE 10: Essay Two. Descriptive statistics for Hypothesis 3. 
Variables Mean S.D. 
1 # of Alliances between firms in dyad 0.03 0.33 
2 Tech. network position asymmetry dyad 0.48 0.5 
3 Asymmetry in opposition to standard  0.36 0.48 
4 Asymmetry in contribution to standard 0.21 0.41 
5 Low tech network centrality dyad 0.19 0.39 
6 Low opposition to standard dyad 0.56 0.5 
7 Low contribution to standard dyad 0.78 0.42 
8 Alliance network low centrality dyad 0.11 0.31 
9 Alliance network position asymmetry dyad 0.41 0.49 
10 Prior alliances between Firm 1 and Firm 2 0.07 0.25 
11 Product-market similarity for Firm 1 & 2 0.16 0.37 
12 Documents by Firm 1 10.54 27.23 
13 Documents by Firm 2 6.63 20.13 
14 Firm 1 Assets 7.98 2.29 
15 Firm 2 Assets 7.87 2.28 
16 Firm 1 R&D 5.46 2.1 
17 Firm 2 R&D 5.43 2.06 
18 Firm 1 Capital Exp 5 2.31 
19 Firm 2 Capital Exp 4.96 2.34 
20 Firm 1 Resources in Cash 5.73 2.3 
21 Firm 2 Resources in Cash 5.72 2.15 
22 Firm 1 Performance (income) 571.94 3205 
23 Firm 2 Performance (income) 467.49 3228.78 
24 Firm 1 Leverage (debt) 4.79 3.3 
25 Firm 2 Leverage (debt) 4.84 3.24 
26 Firm 1 Mkt Share 1.16 0.21 
27 Firm 2 Mkt Share 1.13 0.19 
28 Firm 1 Patent stock (5yr) 960.53 2160.4 
29 Firm 2 Patent stock (5yr) 879.9 1933.95 
30 Citations to firm 1's patents (5yr) 9304.3 22811.9 
31 Citations to firm 2's patents (5yr) 7724.2 19198.6 
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TABLE 11: Essay Two. Correlations for Hypothesis 3. 
# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 1 
2 -0.05 1 
3 0.02 0 1 
4 0.06 0 0.3 1 
5 -0.04 -0.46 -0.03 -0.03 1 
6 -0.06 0 -0.86 -0.38 0.04 1 
7 -0.09 0 -0.29 -0.96 0.03 0.4 1 
8 0 -0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 1 
9 0 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.29 1 
10 0.29 -0.1 0.06 0.12 -0.09 -0.13 -0.16 0.12 0.07 1 
11 -0.02 0 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.05 -0.18 -0.03 1 
12 0.1 0 0.21 0.56 0 -0.31 -0.62 0.07 0.04 0.16 -0.06 
13 0.07 0 0.15 0.43 -0.03 -0.25 -0.51 0.09 0.05 0.16 -0.05 
14 0.11 -0.06 0.06 0.07 -0.24 -0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.06 0.21 -0.06 
15 0.11 -0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.23 -0.07 -0.07 0.06 0.08 0.22 -0.08 
16 0.11 -0.07 0.09 0.1 -0.27 -0.12 -0.11 0.05 0.08 0.23 -0.03 
17 0.12 -0.07 0.06 0.08 -0.25 -0.09 -0.1 0.09 0.09 0.24 -0.06 
18 0.1 -0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.25 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.18 -0.06 
19 0.11 -0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.23 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.05 0.2 -0.08 
20 0.11 -0.06 0.08 0.1 -0.26 -0.11 -0.11 0.05 0.07 0.23 -0.03 
21 0.11 -0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.23 -0.08 -0.08 0.08 0.08 0.24 -0.06 
22 0.1 -0.02 0.04 0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 0.13 -0.02 
23 0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.12 -0.03 
24 0.05 -0.04 0.02 0 -0.17 -0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.12 -0.07 
25 0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.17 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.13 -0.09 
26 0.09 -0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.15 -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.16 -0.15 
27 0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.15 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.14 -0.1 
28 0.18 -0.06 0.09 0.18 -0.22 -0.12 -0.2 -0.02 0.02 0.21 -0.09 
29 0.19 -0.07 0.05 0.11 -0.23 -0.08 -0.14 0.02 0.05 0.25 -0.1 
30 0.19 -0.06 0.09 0.15 -0.21 -0.11 -0.16 -0.03 0.01 0.21 -0.09 
31 0.18 -0.06 0.06 0.11 -0.21 -0.09 -0.13 0.02 0.04 0.25 -0.09 
 
# 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12 1 
13 0.03 1 
14 0.1 0 1 
15 0.03 0.11 0.01 1 
16 0.15 0 0.94 0.01 1 
17 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.94 0.01 1 
18 0.07 -0.02 0.95 -0.01 0.91 0 1 
19 0.01 0.08 0 0.95 -0.01 0.92 0 1 
20 0.15 0 0.91 0.02 0.92 0.03 0.85 -0.01 1 
21 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.93 0.02 0.92 0 0.88 0.04 1 
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# 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
22 0.08 0 0.23 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.35 0.01 0.21 0.02 1 
23 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.2 0 0.19 -0.01 0.31 0.01 0.18 0.04 
# 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
24 0 -0.01 0.71 -0.01 0.61 0 0.68 -0.01 0.59 0 0.11 
25 0.01 0.05 0 0.78 0 0.7 -0.01 0.76 0 0.68 0 
26 0.08 0.02 0.65 0.01 0.54 0.02 0.62 0 0.54 0.02 0.23 
27 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.58 -0.01 0.5 -0.02 0.56 -0.01 0.5 0 
28 0.25 -0.02 0.49 -0.01 0.5 -0.01 0.49 -0.02 0.45 -0.01 0.3 
29 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.53 0 0.54 0 0.54 0.01 0.5 0 
30 0.21 -0.02 0.48 -0.01 0.47 0 0.48 -0.01 0.45 -0.01 0.27 
31 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.49 0 0.5 -0.01 0.48 0.01 0.46 -0.01 
 
# 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
23 1 
24 0 1 
25 0.09 -0.01 1 
26 0 0.45 0 1 
27 0.17 -0.02 0.47 0 1 
28 -0.01 0.39 -0.02 0.31 -0.02 1 
29 0.25 -0.01 0.44 0.01 0.36 0.01 1 
30 0 0.41 -0.02 0.37 -0.02 0.89 0.01 1 
31 0.23 -0.01 0.41 0.01 0.37 0 0.89 0.01 1 
Hypothesis 3 posited that among potential dyadic combinations of member firms, the 
greater the asymmetry between firms in a focal dyad in both the technological network 
position and in involvement in the technical standards committee, the greater the rate of 
alliance formation between them. I predict a positive coefficient for the interaction 
between the dyadic asymmetry in the technological network and the dyadic asymmetry in 
the involvement.  Tables 12 through 17 show the results of the panel Poisson random-
effects regression models for testing hypothesis 3. In Table 12, involvement is 
operationalized as voting opposition, while simultaneously controlling for the number of 
documents contributed as an alternate measure of involvement. The coefficient for 
Asymmetry in opposition to standard X Tech. network position asymmetry is positive and 
significant (p < 0.05) thus providing support for this hypothesis.  
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TABLE 12: Essay Two. Results for Hypothesis 3. Involvement as opposition, controlling 
for total contributions. 
Dependent variable is Number of alliances between firm i and firm j in a year. Random 
effects panel data Poisson regression models. 
MODELS (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES 
Tech. network position asymmetry 
dyad 
-0.2018** 
(0.0900) 
-0.2138** 
(0.0899) 
-0.2419*** 
(0.0912) 
Asymmetry in opposition to standard -0.2043*** -0.1382* 
(0.0657) (0.0732) 
Asymmetry in opposition to standard 
X Tech. network position asymmetry 
0.2506** 
(0.1222) 
CONTROLS 
Tech. network low centrality dyad -0.0695 -0.2464 -0.2574 -0.2613 
(0.1545) (0.1737) (0.1737) (0.1738) 
Low opposition to standard dyad -0.1536** -0.1563** -0.3199*** -0.3163*** 
(0.0657) (0.0656) (0.0836) (0.0838) 
Alliance network low centrality dyad 0.0542 0.0454 0.0499 0.0520 
(0.1026) (0.1026) (0.1024) (0.1024) 
Alliance network position 
asymmetric dyad 
-0.1249* 
(0.0681) 
-0.1226* 
(0.0681) 
-0.1210* 
(0.0680) 
-0.1172* 
(0.0680) 
Prior alliances between 
 Firm 1 & 2 
0.5825*** 
(0.1040) 
0.5588*** 
(0.1043) 
0.5525*** 
(0.1041) 
0.5509*** 
(0.1041) 
Product-market similarity  
Firm 1 & 2 
0.4245*** 
(0.1390) 
0.4212*** 
(0.1390) 
0.4198*** 
(0.1386) 
0.4190*** 
(0.1387) 
Documents by Firm 1 0.0057*** 0.0060*** 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Documents by Firm 2 0.0025** 0.0026** 0.0023** 0.0024** 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Firm 1 Assets 0.2447*** 0.2474*** 0.2489*** 0.2486*** 
(0.0903) (0.0902) (0.0902) (0.0903) 
Firm 2 Assets -0.1398 -0.1298 -0.1299 -0.1310 
(0.0914) (0.0917) (0.0917) (0.0917) 
Firm 1 R&D 0.2471*** 0.2409*** 0.2340*** 0.2346*** 
(0.0739) (0.0739) (0.0739) (0.0739) 
Firm 2 R&D 0.2203** 0.2000** 0.1922** 0.1916** 
(0.0900) (0.0905) (0.0905) (0.0906) 
Firm 1 Capital Exp 0.0531 0.0537 0.0562 0.0552 
(0.0497) (0.0497) (0.0496) (0.0497) 
Firm 2 Capital Exp 0.2729*** 0.2714*** 0.2679*** 0.2665*** 
(0.0516) (0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0518) 
Firm 1 Resources in Cash -0.1452*** -0.1581*** -0.1540*** -0.1547*** 
(0.0334) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0340) 
Firm 2 Resources in Cash 0.0298 0.0283 0.0374 0.0417 
(0.0495) (0.0496) (0.0499) (0.0499) 
Firm 1 Performance (income) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
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(Table continued)              MODELS (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Performance (income) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 1 Leverage (debt) -0.1498*** -0.1507*** -0.1496*** -0.1499*** 
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
Firm 2 Leverage (debt) -0.1355*** -0.1378*** -0.1344*** -0.1344*** 
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Firm 1 Mkt Share -0.7170*** -0.7486*** -0.7910*** -0.8001*** 
(0.2510) (0.2514) (0.2512) (0.2515) 
Firm 2 Mkt Share -0.4181 -0.4517* -0.4483* -0.4372* 
(0.2584) (0.2589) (0.2579) (0.2580) 
Firm 1 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 1's patents (5yr) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 2's patents (5yr) -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant -5.7702*** -5.4055*** -5.2084*** -5.2324*** 
(0.4544) (0.4815) (0.4848) (0.4852) 
Observations 20807 20807 20807 20807 
Number of dyads 5678 5678 5678 5678 
Log likelihood -4490 -4487 -4483 -4481 
Chi-square 1374 1379 1394 1393 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
It is also worth noting that the coefficients for the base variables Tech. network position 
asymmetry dyad and Asymmetry in opposition to standard are negative and significant - 
although I did not theorize on the base variables, this shows that there are fewer alliances 
between firms that either had divergent technological network positions or divergent 
opinions about supporting the standard . In Table 13, involvement is operationalized as 
the number of documents contributed in the standard by the firm's representatives. The 
coefficient for Asymmetry in contrib. to standard X Tech. network position asymmetry is 
positive and significant (p < 0.05) thus providing additional support for this hypothesis 
using an alternative formulation for involvement.   
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TABLE 13: Essay Two. Results for Hypothesis 3. Involvement as total contribution,  
controlling for opposition. 
Dependent variable is Number of alliances between firm i and firm j in a year. Panel 
Poisson regression models with random effects. 
MODELS (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES 
Tech. network position asymmetry 
dyad 
-0.1559* 
(0.0902) 
-0.1790** 
(0.0898) 
-0.2553*** 
(0.0963) 
Asymmetry in contribution (all docs.) 
to standard 
 -0.4641*** 
(0.0894) 
-0.3893*** 
(0.0953) 
Asymmetry in contrib. to standard X 
Tech. network position asymmetry 
   0.3068** 
(0.1319) 
CONTROLS     
Tech. network low centrality dyad -0.0204 -0.1566 -0.1837 -0.1966 
(0.1549) (0.1740) (0.1740) (0.1741) 
Low contribution dyad -0.4712*** -0.4806*** -0.9087*** -0.8943*** 
(0.0752) (0.0754) (0.1111) (0.1118) 
Alliance network low centrality dyad 0.0765 0.0707 0.0721 0.0731 
(0.1034) (0.1034) (0.1032) (0.1033) 
Alliance network position asymmetric 
dyad 
-0.1017 
(0.0685) 
-0.0996 
(0.0684) 
-0.0936 
(0.0683) 
-0.0876 
(0.0685) 
Prior alliances between Firm 1 & 2 0.5516*** 0.5335*** 0.5104*** 0.5014*** 
(0.1044) (0.1048) (0.1041) (0.1044) 
Product-market similarity Firm 1 & 2 0.4264*** 0.4232*** 0.4287*** 0.4229*** 
(0.1419) (0.1419) (0.1402) (0.1407) 
Opposition to standard Firm 1 0.0497*** 0.0515*** 0.0413*** 0.0408*** 
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0147) 
Opposition to standard Firm 2 0.0007 0.0013 -0.0072 -0.0064 
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
Firm 1 Assets 0.2113** 0.2118** 0.2341** 0.2345** 
(0.0914) (0.0913) (0.0912) (0.0914) 
Firm 2 Assets -0.1497 -0.1419 -0.1425 -0.1377 
(0.0926) (0.0928) (0.0925) (0.0927) 
Firm 1 R&D 0.2726*** 0.2688*** 0.2724*** 0.2720*** 
(0.0751) (0.0751) (0.0748) (0.0750) 
Firm 2 R&D 0.2197** 0.2040** 0.2139** 0.2115** 
(0.0913) (0.0918) (0.0915) (0.0917) 
Firm 1 Capital Exp 0.0447 0.0450 0.0262 0.0260 
(0.0505) (0.0505) (0.0503) (0.0504) 
Firm 2 Capital Exp 0.2823*** 0.2817*** 0.2678*** 0.2636*** 
(0.0522) (0.0523) (0.0523) (0.0524) 
Firm 1 Resources in Cash -0.1265*** -0.1355*** -0.1398*** -0.1397*** 
(0.0336) (0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0341) 
Firm 2 Resources in Cash 0.0335 0.0319 0.0385 0.0392 
(0.0499) (0.0500) (0.0499) (0.0500) 
Firm 1 Performance (income) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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(Table continued)                   MODELS (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES 
Firm 2 Performance (income) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 1 Leverage (debt) -0.1566*** -0.1577*** -0.1534*** -0.1543*** 
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
Firm 2 Leverage (debt) -0.1358*** -0.1376*** -0.1339*** -0.1332*** 
(0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Firm 1 Mkt Share -0.5956** -0.6163** -0.6251** -0.6280** 
(0.2532) (0.2536) (0.2518) (0.2524) 
Firm 2 Mkt Share -0.3876 -0.4138 -0.4049 -0.3989 
(0.2618) (0.2623) (0.2599) (0.2604) 
Firm 1 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 1's patents (5yr) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 2's patents (5yr) -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000* 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant -5.5717*** -5.2831*** -4.9766*** -4.9910*** 
(0.4576) (0.4862) (0.4867) (0.4879) 
Observations 20807 20807 20807 20807 
Number of dyads 5678 5678 5678 5678 
Log likelihood -4497 -4495 -4482 -4479 
Chi-square 1315 1317 1354 1349 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
In the above formulation as well, significant effects are observed for the base variables 
thus making the opposing significant effect for the hypothesized interaction variable even 
more compelling. Tables 14-17 provide results from equivalent regression models where 
I studied the effect of using alternate formulations for firms' contributions to the standard 
- as number of technical proposals (in Table 14 as a control and Table 15 as a predictor) 
and as number of technical contributions (in Table 16 as a control and Table 17 as a 
predictor). All these models provide consistent and robust results supporting Hypothesis 
3.  
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TABLE 14: Essay Two. Results for Hypothesis 3. Involvement as opposition, controlling 
for proposals. 
Dependent variable is Number of alliances between firm i and firm j in a year. Panel 
Poisson regression models with random effects. 
MODELS (16) (17) (18) (19) 
VARIABLES 
          
Tech. network position asymmetry 
dyad 
-0.1010 
(0.0901) 
-0.1155 
(0.0899) 
-0.1382 
(0.0911) 
Asymmetry in opposition to standard  -0.2107*** 
(0.0656) 
-0.1559** 
(0.0732) 
Asymmetry in opposition to standard 
X Tech. network position asymmetry 
  0.2078* 
(0.1224) 
 
CONTROLS 
Tech. network low centrality dyad 0.0314 -0.0559 -0.0730 -0.0757 
(0.1542) (0.1728) (0.1726) (0.1727) 
Low opposition to standard dyad -0.2115*** -0.2147*** -0.3819*** -0.3796*** 
(0.0645) (0.0645) (0.0824) (0.0826) 
Alliance network low centrality dyad 0.1149 0.1111 0.1121 0.1134 
(0.1042) (0.1042) (0.1039) (0.1040) 
Alliance network position 
asymmetric dyad 
-0.0802 
(0.0687) 
-0.0785 
(0.0687) 
-0.0797 
(0.0685) 
-0.0766 
(0.0686) 
Prior alliances between Firm 1 & 2 0.5662*** 0.5547*** 0.5517*** 0.5508*** 
(0.1044) (0.1048) (0.1046) (0.1046) 
Product-market similarity Firm 1 & 2 0.4434*** 0.4414*** 0.4382*** 0.4374*** 
(0.1425) (0.1425) (0.1418) (0.1419) 
Proposals authored by Firm 1 0.0656*** 0.0660*** 0.0626*** 0.0619*** 
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
Proposals by Firm 2 0.0309** 0.0306** 0.0277** 0.0274* 
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
Firm 1 Assets 0.2345*** 0.2349*** 0.2380*** 0.2372*** 
(0.0902) (0.0902) (0.0902) (0.0902) 
Firm 2 Assets -0.1357 -0.1303 -0.1308 -0.1315 
(0.0928) (0.0931) (0.0929) (0.0929) 
Firm 1 R&D 0.2541*** 0.2515*** 0.2440*** 0.2450*** 
(0.0747) (0.0747) (0.0746) (0.0746) 
Firm 2 R&D 0.2098** 0.1991** 0.1901** 0.1893** 
(0.0911) (0.0917) (0.0915) (0.0916) 
Firm 1 Capital Exp 0.0187 0.0188 0.0222 0.0213 
(0.0505) (0.0505) (0.0504) (0.0504) 
Firm 2 Capital Exp 0.2647*** 0.2641*** 0.2616*** 0.2604*** 
(0.0523) (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0524) 
Firm 1 Resources in Cash -0.1230*** -0.1289*** -0.1259*** -0.1263*** 
(0.0336) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0341) 
Firm 2 Resources in Cash 0.0449 0.0441 0.0532 0.0566 
(0.0499) (0.0500) (0.0502) (0.0502) 
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(Table continued) 
MODELS (16) (17) (18) (19) 
VARIABLES 
 
Firm 1 Performance (income) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Performance (income) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 1 Leverage (debt) -0.1584*** -0.1591*** -0.1577*** -0.1579*** 
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
Firm 2 Leverage (debt) -0.1379*** -0.1391*** -0.1354*** -0.1353*** 
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
Firm 1 Mkt Share -0.5042** -0.5151** -0.5751** -0.5824** 
(0.2525) (0.2528) (0.2526) (0.2529) 
Firm 2 Mkt Share -0.3640 -0.3814 -0.3844 -0.3749 
(0.2621) (0.2627) (0.2613) (0.2615) 
Firm 1 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 1's patents (5yr) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 2's patents (5yr) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant -5.9566*** -5.7726*** -5.5453*** -5.5614*** 
(0.4611) (0.4888) (0.4924) (0.4927) 
Observations 20807 20807 20807 20807 
Number of dyads 5678 5678 5678 5678 
Log likelihood -4506 -4505 -4500 -4498 
Chi-square 1296 1297 1316 1314 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 15: Essay Two. Results for Hypothesis 3. Involvement as proposals, controlling 
for opposition. 
Dependent variable is Number of alliances between firm i and firm j in a year. Panel 
Poisson regression models with random effects. 
MODELS (20) (21) (22) (23) 
VARIABLES 
          
Tech. network position asymmetry 
dyad 
-0.1322 
(0.0903) 
-0.1344 
(0.0903) 
-0.2177** 
(0.0950) 
Asymmetry in contribution 
(proposals) to standard 
 -0.1518* 
(0.0834) 
-0.0452 
(0.0905) 
 
Asymmetry in contrib. to standard X 
Tech. network position asymmetry 
  0.3783*** 
(0.1229) 
 
CONTROLS 
Tech. network low centrality dyad -0.0326 -0.1481 -0.1560 -0.1735 
(0.1546) (0.1737) (0.1738) (0.1739) 
Low contribution dyad -0.1770*** -0.1827*** -0.3157*** -0.2946*** 
(0.0610) (0.0612) (0.0951) (0.0956) 
Alliance network low centrality dyad 0.0687 0.0643 0.0684 0.0707 
(0.1036) (0.1036) (0.1035) (0.1035) 
Alliance network position asymmetric 
dyad -0.0999 -0.0977 -0.0959 -0.0893 
(0.0686) (0.0686) (0.0686) (0.0686) 
Prior alliances between Firm 1 & 2 0.5716*** 0.5563*** 0.5469*** 0.5456*** 
(0.1053) (0.1057) (0.1058) (0.1057) 
Product-market similarity Firm 1 & 2 0.4327*** 0.4302*** 0.4283*** 0.4309*** 
(0.1420) (0.1420) (0.1416) (0.1417) 
Opposition to standard Firm 1 0.0636*** 0.0653*** 0.0661*** 0.0652*** 
(0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) 
Opposition to standard Firm 2 0.0144 0.0152 0.0154 0.0137 
(0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0178) 
Firm 1 Assets 0.2065** 0.2073** 0.2241** 0.2319** 
(0.0921) (0.0921) (0.0925) (0.0927) 
Firm 2 Assets -0.1437 -0.1369 -0.1328 -0.1317 
(0.0928) (0.0931) (0.0930) (0.0932) 
Firm 1 R&D 0.2636*** 0.2600*** 0.2492*** 0.2377*** 
(0.0752) (0.0752) (0.0753) (0.0752) 
Firm 2 R&D 0.2128** 0.1994** 0.2009** 0.2010** 
(0.0911) (0.0916) (0.0915) (0.0915) 
Firm 1 Capital Exp 0.0481 0.0483 0.0424 0.0473 
(0.0510) (0.0510) (0.0510) (0.0511) 
Firm 2 Capital Exp 0.2862*** 0.2858*** 0.2800*** 0.2728*** 
(0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0526) (0.0527) 
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(Table continued) 
MODELS (20) (21) (22) (23) 
VARIABLES 
          
Firm 1 Resources in Cash -0.1242*** -0.1319*** -0.1324*** -0.1354*** 
(0.0338) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0342) 
Firm 2 Resources in Cash 0.0261 0.0245 0.0269 0.0288 
(0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0501) 
Firm 1 Performance (income) 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Performance (income) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 1 Leverage (debt) -0.1612*** -0.1621*** -0.1605*** -0.1623*** 
(0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
Firm 2 Leverage (debt) -0.1420*** -0.1437*** -0.1437*** -0.1419*** 
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
Firm 1 Mkt Share -0.5693** -0.5861** -0.5944** -0.5987** 
(0.2544) (0.2547) (0.2543) (0.2544) 
Firm 2 Mkt Share -0.3391 -0.3606 -0.3750 -0.3682 
(0.2616) (0.2621) (0.2617) (0.2619) 
Firm 1 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0001** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 1's patents (5yr) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 2's patents (5yr) -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant -5.7308*** -5.4893*** -5.4051*** -5.4158*** 
(0.4574) (0.4855) (0.4874) (0.4879) 
Observations 20807 20807 20807 20807 
Number of dyads 5678 5678 5678 5678 
Log likelihood -4512 -4511 -4509 -4505 
Chi-square 1284 1286 1292 1296 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 16: Essay Two. Results for Hypothesis 3. Involvement as opposition,  
controlling for technical documents. 
Dependent variable is Number of alliances between firm i and firm j in a year. Panel 
Poisson regression models with random effects. 
MODELS (24) (25) (26) (27) 
VARIABLES 
          
Tech. network position asymmetry dyad -0.1255 -0.1418 -0.1684* 
(0.0905) (0.0903) (0.0915) 
Asymmetry in opposition to standard -0.2388*** -0.1754** 
(0.0656) (0.0732) 
Asymmetry in opposition to standard X 
Tech. network position asymmetry 
0.2390* 
(0.1223) 
 
CONTROLS 
Tech. network low centrality dyad -0.0163 -0.1267 -0.1433 -0.1473 
(0.1540) (0.1735) (0.1733) (0.1733) 
Low opposition to standard dyad -0.2290*** -0.2313*** -0.4199*** -0.4157*** 
(0.0650) (0.0650) (0.0825) (0.0827) 
Alliance network low centrality dyad 0.0543 0.0489 0.0536 0.0554 
(0.1035) (0.1035) (0.1032) (0.1033) 
Alliance network position asymmetric 
dyad 
-0.1138* 
(0.0686) 
-0.1125 
(0.0686) 
-0.1113 
(0.0684) 
-0.1078 
(0.0685) 
Prior alliances between Firm 1 & 2 0.5919*** 0.5784*** 0.5740*** 0.5730*** 
(0.1052) (0.1055) (0.1052) (0.1052) 
Product-market similarity Firm 1 & 2 0.4269*** 0.4241*** 0.4217*** 0.4210*** 
(0.1421) (0.1421) (0.1413) (0.1414) 
Tech. Documents by Firm 1 0.0039** 0.0042** 0.0042** 0.0043** 
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Tech. Documents by Firm 2 0.0018 0.0018 0.0012 0.0012 
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Firm 1 Assets 0.2039** 0.2043** 0.2087** 0.2085** 
(0.0909) (0.0909) (0.0908) (0.0909) 
Firm 2 Assets -0.1248 -0.1183 -0.1193 -0.1204 
(0.0923) (0.0926) (0.0924) (0.0925) 
Firm 1 R&D 0.2818*** 0.2788*** 0.2683*** 0.2690*** 
(0.0749) (0.0749) (0.0748) (0.0748) 
Firm 2 R&D 0.1957** 0.1832** 0.1730* 0.1725* 
(0.0908) (0.0913) (0.0911) (0.0912) 
Firm 1 Capital Exp 0.0443 0.0452 0.0485 0.0475 
(0.0506) (0.0505) (0.0504) (0.0505) 
Firm 2 Capital Exp 0.2724*** 0.2714*** 0.2669*** 0.2653*** 
(0.0520) (0.0522) (0.0521) (0.0522) 
Firm 1 Resources in Cash -0.1334*** -0.1413*** -0.1374*** -0.1382*** 
(0.0335) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0341) 
Firm 2 Resources in Cash 0.0316 0.0304 0.0419 0.0462 
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(Table continued) 
MODELS (24) (25) (26) (27) 
VARIABLES 
(0.0498) (0.0499) (0.0502) (0.0502) 
Firm 1 Performance (income) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Performance (income) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 1 Leverage (debt) -0.1579*** -0.1585*** -0.1567*** -0.1568*** 
(0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
Firm 2 Leverage (debt) -0.1358*** -0.1373*** -0.1332*** -0.1331*** 
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
Firm 1 Mkt Share -0.5939** -0.6134** -0.6756*** -0.6867*** 
(0.2546) (0.2550) (0.2544) (0.2547) 
Firm 2 Mkt Share -0.4094 -0.4299 -0.4249 -0.4130 
(0.2624) (0.2628) (0.2612) (0.2614) 
Firm 1 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 1's patents (5yr) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 2's patents (5yr) -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant -5.6507*** -5.4188*** -5.1787*** -5.1989*** 
(0.4581) (0.4869) (0.4898) (0.4900) 
Observations 20807 20807 20807 20807 
Number of dyads 5678 5678 5678 5678 
Log likelihood -4517 -4516 -4509 -4507 
Chi-square 1279 1282 1304 1304 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 17: Essay Two. Results for Hypothesis 3. Involvement as technical documents,  
controlling for opposition. 
Dependent variable is Number of alliances between firm i and firm j in a year. Panel 
Poisson regression models with random effects. 
 MODELS (28) (29) (30) (31) 
VARIABLES 
          
Tech. network position asymmetry 
dyad: 
-0.1400 
(0.0899) 
-0.1525* 
(0.0896) 
-0.2297** 
(0.0952) 
Asymmetry in contribution (tech. 
docs.) to standard 
 -0.3346*** 
(0.0867) 
-0.2423*** 
(0.0939) 
 
Asymmetry in contrib. to standard X 
Tech. network position asymmetry 
  0.3345*** 
(0.1289) 
 
CONTROLS 
Tech. network low centrality dyad -0.0232 -0.1452 -0.1561 -0.1667 
(0.1545) (0.1733) (0.1732) (0.1732) 
Low contribution dyad -0.3009*** -0.3080*** -0.6158*** -0.5953*** 
(0.0712) (0.0713) (0.1065) (0.1072) 
Alliance network low centrality dyad 0.0616 0.0562 0.0589 0.0629 
(0.1034) (0.1034) (0.1031) (0.1033) 
Alliance network position asymmetry 
dyad -0.1036 -0.1017 -0.1002 -0.0952 
(0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0683) (0.0684) 
Prior alliances between Firm 1 & 2 0.5768*** 0.5610*** 0.5483*** 0.5386*** 
(0.1047) (0.1050) (0.1046) (0.1048) 
Product-market similarity Firm 1 & 2 0.4349*** 0.4321*** 0.4302*** 0.4313*** 
(0.1416) (0.1416) (0.1405) (0.1408) 
Opposition to standard Firm 1 0.0578*** 0.0594*** 0.0552*** 0.0550*** 
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
Opposition to standard Firm 2 0.0068 0.0074 0.0022 0.0022 
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0181) (0.0181) 
Firm 1 Assets 0.2001** 0.2005** 0.2074** 0.2070** 
(0.0915) (0.0914) (0.0913) (0.0914) 
Firm 2 Assets -0.1461 -0.1391 -0.1368 -0.1360 
(0.0926) (0.0929) (0.0927) (0.0930) 
Firm 1 R&D 0.2611*** 0.2574*** 0.2593*** 0.2567*** 
(0.0751) (0.0751) (0.0748) (0.0749) 
Firm 2 R&D 0.2128** 0.1987** 0.2006** 0.1987** 
(0.0910) (0.0915) (0.0913) (0.0915) 
Firm 1 Capital Exp 0.0605 0.0611 0.0518 0.0535 
(0.0506) (0.0506) (0.0505) (0.0506) 
Firm 2 Capital Exp 0.2881*** 0.2877*** 0.2778*** 0.2760*** 
(0.0522) (0.0523) (0.0522) (0.0524) 
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(Table continued) 
 MODELS (28) (29) (30) (31) 
VARIABLES 
Firm 1 Resources in Cash -0.1213*** -0.1294*** -0.1341*** -0.1342*** 
(0.0336) (0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0341) 
Firm 2 Resources in Cash 0.0313 0.0297 0.0404 0.0431 
(0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0501) 
Firm 1 Performance (income) 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Performance (income) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 1 Leverage (debt) -0.1582*** -0.1592*** -0.1527*** -0.1531*** 
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0141) 
Firm 2 Leverage (debt) -0.1380*** -0.1397*** -0.1380*** -0.1376*** 
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0156) 
Firm 1 Mkt Share -0.5788** -0.5969** -0.5582** -0.5567** 
(0.2534) (0.2537) (0.2526) (0.2533) 
Firm 2 Mkt Share -0.3939 -0.4175 -0.4295* -0.4221 
(0.2616) (0.2622) (0.2608) (0.2613) 
Firm 1 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0001** 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000* 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm 2 Patent stock (5yr) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 1's patents (5yr) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to firm 2's patents (5yr) -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000* 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant -5.6377*** -5.3794*** -5.1661*** -5.1840*** 
(0.4574) (0.4857) (0.4865) (0.4877) 
Observations 20807 20807 20807 20807 
Number of dyads 5678 5678 5678 5678 
Log likelihood -4507 -4506 -4499 -4495 
Chi-square 1298 1300 1325 1322 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Graphical interpretation of results 
 Figure 4 and Figure 5 below graphically show the results of the hypotheses tests. 
In Figure 4, Technological network centrality (Hypothesis 1) and Involvement 
(Hypothesis 2) are plotted against the likelihood of alliance formation for three different 
values of the respective independent variables - Low (Mean minus 1.5 standard 
 deviations), Average (Mean) and High (Mean plus 1.5 standard deviations). The figure 
reiterates the results discussed above, showing that the likelihood of alliance formation 
more than doubles as Technological network centrality 
increases by about 50% as 
 In Figure 5, Asymmetry in 
Alliance formation rate first for different categories of 
for different categories of 
alliance formation rate between firms is higher as the asymmetry between them increases 
in both the technological network position and opposition/ involvement in the standard.
Figure 4: Graphical representation of results from Hypothesis 1 and 2
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goes from Low to High, and 
Involvement goes from Low to High.  
Technological network position is plotted against 
Asymmetry in opposition 
Asymmetry in proposals contribution. The plots show that the 
 (Essay Two)
 
and then 
 
 
 
 Figure 5: Graphical representation of results from Hypothesis 3
Discussion and Contributions
 In this paper, I investigated the factors leading to strategic collaboration ties 
between member firms that participate together in standards
attempted to understand why some firms might be more attractive, i
partners for other member firms. 
are the creators of the foundational technologies within the community of member firms 
in the standards-setting committee, are also more attract
Specifically, I find that firms that are more central in the technological knowledge 
network of member firms, as measured by patent citations between the inventions of 
these firms, also experience a higher likelihood of alliance f
the committee. This result is consistent with prior studies that have established a link 
between technological centrality
 My subsequent emphasis was on developing a more nuanced understanding of 
how the technological asymmetries precipitated by an emerging standards agreement 
might create a compelling rationale for strategic relationships to form. 
amongst all the possible combinations of alliance ties that might form  (between firms 
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-setting committees. I first 
n general, as alliance 
Here, my results support the hypothesis that
ive as alliance partners. 
ormation with other firms in 
 and collaboration opportunities (e.g. Stuart , 2000)
Here, 
 
 
 firms that 
.   
I find that 
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that are concurrent members), those between firms that are divergent in their 
technological knowledge relative to peer firms in the committee and divergent in their 
involvement within the committee are more likely. Specifically, the asymmetry between 
their technological network centrality positions and the asymmetry in their nature of 
involvement in the committee together predict higher rates of alliance formation. This 
finding is robust to several alternate measures of involvement, including support 
(opposition to) for the standard on ballot measures, technical contributions, proposal 
contributions and overall documents submitted into the standard. 
 These findings are important because while they in part reiterate findings from 
prior work on alliance formation in related contexts (e.g. Rosenkopf et al, 2001; Stuart, 
2000), they also suggest an entirely new mechanism or motive behind these 
collaborations. While research has discussed resource-based motives (financial and 
technological capital as resource drivers) and sociological motives (social capital, 
relational capital) of alliance formation, the mechanism or motive behind alliance 
formation in this context may be considered as one of "political" capital. On the one hand 
technologically central firms in the standards committee are more influential in driving 
the specifications of the standard as the knowledge they possess is at the core of the 
community of firms that is attempting to negotiate a shared technical agreement. But, on 
the other hand, arriving at a standards agreement is not necessarily the "end-game" in 
contexts of technological change where network externalities drive the eventual success 
of the standard. Merely achieving the minimum majority required to formally channel a 
standard through the committee may result in the quick passage of the standard, but may 
also irreversibly affect its legitimacy (cf. Garud et al, 2002). This may have detrimental 
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effects on the adoption of the standard by affecting the investments that other firms make 
in complementary products and technologies. Thus, these firms may be particularly 
incentivized to boost the legitimacy of the standard by creating bridging ties with the 
peripheral players.  
 The findings also reveal that it is not merely the asymmetry in the technological 
network that drives these connections but also the divergence in the involvement - in 
other words central firms create these linkages with other members that are not only 
disadvantaged by the standard but are also actively opposing it or limiting their technical 
involvement. This finding is also consistent with prior work that has proposed that 
alliances may form when firms are in vulnerable strategic positions or when they are 
attempting pioneering technical strategies (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Firms 
that are disadvantaged technologically because of the emerging standard may perceive 
their positions to be increasingly vulnerable as the standard-setting process progresses, 
and this might spur their collaboration-seeking behavior with the more central players on 
the standards committee. 
 These findings offer several important implications and insights for research on 
alliances, technological change and strategic networks.  
 First, this study contributes to the nascent literature on heterogeneity of benefits 
and opportunities that accrue to firms participating in multi-partner alliances (Lavie et al, 
2007). Further, by linking these opportunities to asymmetries in firms' involvement and 
their technological positions, this study also provides evidence that dynamic capabilities 
can encompass not just adaptation to technological change but also control of the change 
itself (Teece, 2007).  
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Second, this study makes a contribution to the alliance formation literature. An 
emerging body of work (e.g. Ahuja et al, 2009) has begun to investigate how firms at the 
periphery of a network can form linkages with the core.  But this work has not explicitly 
discussed the mechanisms or the incentives undergirding such outcomes. For example, 
Stuart (1998) notes that alliance data in high technology industries contain many 
associations between high technological prestige and low technological prestige firms, 
but does not explicate the mechanisms that lead to such asymmetric ties being formed. 
Similarly, Stuart and Podolny (1996) note that alliances are possible strategies for firms 
to bring about significant shifts in technological focus – using the example of Mitsubishi 
that moved towards the technological core in the semiconductor industry by formulating 
alliances with firms in the core, they call for future research that investigates the effect of 
alliance strategies on the amount and direction of firms’ search. By highlighting that the 
heterogeneity in benefits to participation in standards committees may arise from both 
firms’ structural positions and the nature of firms’ involvement in these alliances, this 
study provides both the conceptual logic explicating such mechanisms and an empirical 
test of these propositions.  
Further, in contrast with prior studies, the arguments and findings in this paper 
operate across two different network structures, and thus emphasize the importance of 
considering the multiplicity of ties across these structures when studying inter-
organizational relations (Gulati, Kilduff, Li, Shipilov and Tsai, 2011). These findings also 
underscore a more subtle point that one way to conceptualize multiplicity may be to look 
at the relationship between the disparities between actors in one relational structure on tie 
formation between the same set of actors in a parallel relational structure.  
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Finally, at a broader level, this study provides evidence on how networks may 
learn to coordinate in the absence of authority (Kogut, 2000). Technical standards setting 
committees provide a context where although the structure or landscape of firms’ 
technologies may still largely determine technological benefits and relational 
opportunities, the importance of achieving a timely consensus may create endogenous 
opportunities for tie formation in the network.  
 
Limitations 
 The above findings and related discussion points must be interpreted keeping in 
mind the limitations of this study. While this paper provides robust empirical evidence of 
tie formation to support the theoretical arguments, it does not actually measure the effect 
of such ties on future consensus formation efforts in the committee. In other words, it 
does not look at whether the disadvantaged firms that were induced into collaborations by 
the central players actually reduced their opposition and increased their involvement in 
the committee.  
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CHAPTER 5: ESSAY THREE - CLOSING THE DOOR ON OPEN STANDARDS? 
While Essay One and Essay Two explore strategic choices and outcomes within a 
particular technological standards organization, this essay examines how firms might 
strategize across two different committees that develop overlapping technological 
standards. In particular, using an inter-organizational conceptual lens, this paper 
investigates which firms are likely be members in both these multi-firm standards 
organizations and, further, how they might make decisions around products and 
technologies based on these standards.  
 
Background and motivation 
Many competitive settings are characterized by the simultaneous presence of 
numerous multi-firm organizational arrangements, often with overlapping and even 
competing interests. The limited academic research on these multi-firm arrangements has 
referred to them variably - as competing alliance networks, constellations, strategic 
blocks, alliance groups, multipartner alliances or simply as consortia (Nohria and Garcia-
Pont, 1991; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Das and Teng, 2002; Sakakibara, 2002; Lavie et al, 
2007; Lazzarini, 2007).  Depending upon the specific setting, these types of arrangements 
may be constituted either by mutually exclusive or by overlapping member firms. For 
example, in the airline industry, the two major operating alliances – Star Alliance and 
One World – have mutually exclusive memberships and these alliances directly compete 
with one another. In contrast, especially in environments characterized by frequent 
technological change, arrangements with overlapping firm memberships have become 
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increasingly common. For example, in the wireless telecommunications setting, the 
CDMA Development Group, the Wi-Fi Alliance and the WiMax Forum are three 
different organizational groups that have overlapping member firms, all focused on the 
development of wireless technology, but each based on different assumptions. Table 18 
shows a partial list of such multi-firm initiatives which Intel Corporation is a part of 
(Source: Intel website). 
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TABLE 18: Essay Three. Participation in multi-firm technology alliances - Intel example 
Computing and consumer electronics standards  
– 4C, Advanced Access Content System (AACS), Association of Radio Industries and 
Businesses (ARIB), China DRM Forum, Consumer Electronics Association, 
Consumer Electronics Linux Forum (CELF), Digital Living Network Alliance 
(DLNA), Digital Video Broadcasting Project (DVB), Digital Transmission Content 
Protection (DTCP), Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF), DVD Forum, 
High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP), High-Definition Multimedia 
Interface (HDMI),  HomeGrid Forum, IBIS Open Forum , Intel® High Definition 
Audio Specification, The Linux Foundation , PCI Industrial Computer 
Manufacturers Group (PICMG), SCSI TA, Serial ATA International Organization 
(SATA-IO), Trusted Computing Group,  USB Implementers Forum  (USB-IF), 
UPnP* Forum 
Silicon and semiconductor standards  
– Association of Super-Advanced Electronics Technologies, Focus Center Research 
Program,  SEMATECH, Interuniversity Microelectronics Center, JEDEC Solid 
State Technology Association,  National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), 
International Electronics Manufacturing Initiative(iNEMI), Semiconductor 
Equipment and Materials International* (SEMI), Semiconductor Research 
Corporation 
Software and Web standards  
– The Linux Foundation, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), OASIS, Web 
Services Interoperability Organization, World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 
Networking and communications standards  
– IEEE 802.3, IEEE 802.17, InfiniBand Trade Association, The Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), PCI-SIG, Serial ATA, Storage Networking Industry Association 
(SNIA), UPnP Forum, Bluetooth SIG, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16, WiMAX, Wi-Fi 
Alliance Telecommunications, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), Alliance 
for Telecommunications Industry Solutions, European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI), GSM Association, International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), Open Mobile Alliance (OMA), PCI Industrial Computers 
Manufacturing Group (PICMG), SCOPE Alliance, Telcordia 
  
These multi-firm organizations in technological change settings are further 
marked by varying development processes and governance mechanisms (cf. Aldrich and 
Sasaki, 1995; cf. Borys and Jemison, 1989). Whereas some committees develop 
technology standards openly through a voluntary, consensus-driven process with 
decentralized committee-level governance and without a vested sponsor's backing 
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(example of INCITS in Essay One and Essay Two), others restrict the definition and 
maintenance of the standard’s core technology to a few sponsor firms while only 
allowing non-sponsors to augment the core to implement certified products on the 
standard (example of USB standard owned by Intel or the AAC audio format standard 
owned by AT&T and others).  
A powerful incumbent firm may see a distinct competitive advantage in 
sponsoring an organization that develops a standard based on its proprietary technology. 
In a dynamic environment, timing and speed are essential for an incumbent firm to 
appropriate returns on its R&D investment (Teece, 1986). Sponsor or promoter-backed 
technology organizations may be able to diffuse the standard at a faster rate than 
voluntary standards committees. As sponsor-backed standards are tightly coupled with 
the sponsor's technology, they tend to have a narrower scope that is circumscribed by the 
technological capabilities of the sponsor firm. In other words, the objective of  the 
standard is not necessarily to achieve the best technologically  possible solution by 
evaluating the merits of alternative solutions across several firms, but to create an 
industry standard around the sponsor's proprietary technology. Further, these 
organizations do not need to form a consensus around what constitutes the standard - the 
sponsor firms set the technical agenda and  timelines for the release standard. In contrast, 
a large number of conflicted firms need to arrive at a consensus on the standards' 
specifications in voluntary standards committees, often causing delays and slowdowns in 
the adoption of the standard (Simcoe, 2012).  
However, sponsor backing may also cause a standard to suffer from legitimacy 
problems (e.g. Garud et al, 2002). Perceptions may arise amongst industry participants 
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that the specifications have been manipulated opportunistically to merely consolidate or 
enhance the market positions of the sponsors (Garud et al, 2002). The potential for 
disproportionate value appropriation by sponsor firms (cf. Teece, 1986; West, 2003) may 
stymie the adoption of such standards, as other firms may not readily commit to 
developing standard-compliant products. Thus, the critical network externality benefits to 
adopting the technology (Katz and Shapiro, 1986) may be hindered by limited product 
variety and availability, and the standard may fail to become widely accepted. In contrast, 
although voluntary committees take a longer time to reach a consensus (Simcoe, 2012), 
their open development processes bolster the legitimacy of the developed standard and 
facilitate adoption and diffusion. Thus, ultimately, the market success of a particular 
standard may arise not because of its technological superiority, but from the level of 
organizational support that the technology attracts (cf. Wade, 1995). 
An important question then is how is a sponsor-backed technology standards 
organization, able to orchestrate a network of firms that build on the standard (Dhanaraj 
and Parkhe, 2006)? In this essay, I explore this question by studying firm-level decisions 
to contribute to a sponsor-backed standard. I specifically look at an empirical setting (as 
described in Chapter 2) where firms are overlapping members in an existing voluntary 
standards committee in the same technological area. This allows me to simultaneously 
explore the dynamics of competition between different types of standards organizations 
(West, 2003) and coordination within a particular standards organization, both of which I 
argue are closely linked.  
My hypotheses, developed below, argue that firms' decisions across standards 
organizations are driven by two types of inter-organizational considerations: (1) A firm's 
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prior linkages with the sponsor firms - technological and relational - which reveals the 
extent to which a firm's capabilities and incentives align with the sponsor's developing 
technological trajectory, and (2) A firm's position in the technological knowledge 
network of member firms in the voluntary standards committee, which indicates the 
extent to which a firm stands to benefit from a competing technological trajectory. 
  
Theoretical Arguments 
I hypothesize about the antecedents of three different decisions firms make with 
regard to a competing sponsor-backed standard: the decision to join the sponsor backed 
standards organization (membership), the decision to introduce standard compliant 
technology components (products) and the decision to claim exclusive rights on 
technologies that are based on the standard (patents). While membership allows us to 
understand the drivers behind network orchestration, investigating product development 
and patenting decisions provides a richer understanding of the adoption and diffusion of 
the standard.  
 
 
 
(1) Overlapping membership in the sponsor-backed standards organization 
At the dyadic level, a large body of research on alliance formation has suggested 
that firms are brought together in collaborative relationships because of strategic 
interdependence reasons (e.g. Oliver, 1990; Gulati, 1995), complementarity motives (e.g. 
Chung, Singh and Lee, 2000) or similarities in status or network positions (Podolny, 
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1994; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Standards bodies are multilateral collaborations that 
operate differently from dyadic relationships. With dyadic ties, matching of resources is a 
reasonable conceptualization of network tie formation (e.g. Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009). 
But the size of the standards organization, which in itself is a large affiliation network 
(e.g. the USB Implementers Forum has over 800 member firms), makes large-scale 
resource matching or homophily-based matching less likely. Further, sponsor firms are 
unlikely to be seek particular technological complementarities with potential firms to 
develop the standard. Sponsors solicit the participation of outside firms primarily to 
encourage the adoption of the standard and not to develop it. In other words, sponsor 
firms are unlikely to discriminate on membership based on the characteristics of specific 
firms - the greater the number of firms that join and adopt the standard, the higher the 
chances of its adoption and subsequent success for the sponsors.  
It is therefore essential to consider which of the firms that are in the voluntary 
standards committee would actually be attracted to joining a competing sponsor-backed 
standard. As the technology of a sponsor-backed standard does center around the 
technology of the sponsor firms, the linkages between a focal firm's technology and the 
sponsor firms' technologies are likely to have an important bearing on any firm's 
membership decision to join the sponsor-backed standard. These linkages reveal the 
extent to which a firm’s technological knowledge is closely tied with that of the sponsor 
firms (e.g. Stuart and Podolny, 1996). A large body of research has argued that firms' 
strategic choices are path-dependent (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and that a firm's prior 
technological knowledge provides options for future growth (Kogut and Zander, 1992). A 
firm’s direction of technological search is thus strongly constrained and driven by its 
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prior technological competencies (Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; 
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). Thus, the extent to which a firm’s technological 
competencies have built on sponsor firms’ technological knowledge is likely to weigh in 
on its decision to participate in a standards organization controlled by these sponsor 
firms.  
The more a firm’s technological competencies utilize the sponsor firms’ technologies 
as a foundation, the more likely that a new technological standard developed by these 
sponsor firms will materially affect the future value of these competencies. The new 
sponsor-backed standard may reveal important architectural shifts that could render such 
a firm’s competencies obsolete if it does not make the necessary investments to 
incorporate these changes (Henderson and Clark, 1990). By joining the standards body,  
the firm may be able to obtain early access to the knowledge needed to make these 
strategic changes. Beyond accessing early versions of this knowledge, it may also be 
exposed to discussions that reveal the tacit knowhow required to successfully develop 
and certify products on the standard. These benefits make a firm that is closer 
technologically to the sponsor firms to be more likely to seek membership in the sponsor-
backed technology alliance, relative to a firm whose knowledge is decoupled or distant 
from those of the sponsor firms. Thus, I hypothesize:  
 
 Hypothesis 1: Higher (lower) technological linkages to the sponsor firms will 
 increase (decrease) the likelihood of membership in the sponsor-backed 
 standards organization. 
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Firms with prior strategic alliance ties to the sponsor firms are also more likely to join the 
sponsor-backed standards body. Research on alliances and networks has consistently 
shown that prior alliances are a predictor of future collaborations between firms (e.g. 
Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati, 1995b). Prior relationships lead to the development of 
trust (Gulati, 1995a) which allows firms to mitigate appropriation concerns in future 
collaborations (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Firms that have accumulated relational capital 
with the sponsor firms will therefore be less concerned that the standard will lead to 
disproportionate value capture by the sponsors. Furthermore,  partner-specific experience 
in the form of routines, assets and tacit knowledge may be a source of competitive 
advantage that can be leveraged through future repeated relationships (Gulati, Lavie and 
Singh, 2009; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Membership in the sponsor-backed standards 
alliance may be a route to obtaining these future collaborations as the sponsor firms enter 
into contractual agreements to license the standard's technologies. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 2: Higher (lower) relational linkages to the sponsor firms will 
increase (decrease) the likelihood of membership in the sponsor-backed 
standards organization. 
 Beyond technological and relational linkages with the sponsors, a firm also needs 
to consider whether supporting the sponsor-backed standard would lead to an erosion of 
its current position. From Essay One, firms that are more central in the technological 
knowledge network of the competing voluntary standards committee are more committed 
to supporting that standard. The foundational nature of their knowledge in the voluntary 
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standards committee ensures that the rules that emerge from this committee build upon 
their knowledge, thus strengthening their technological position. Building on Essay Two, 
their strategies to accelerate consensus formation and broaden the involvement of firms in 
the committee indicate commitments to the success of that standard. Thus, the more 
technologically central the firm is in the voluntary standards committee, the more likely 
its focus is likely to be on ensuring the success of this standard relative to other 
competing standards. Given the nature of network externalities and the bandwagon effect 
membership can have, by joining the sponsor-backed standard such a firm only risks 
increasing the chances that the competing standard will succeed at the expense of the 
voluntary standard.  
 In contrast, technologically peripheral firms in the voluntary standards committee 
will be more inclined to explore membership in the competing sponsor-backed standard. 
Building on Essay One, the tangential nature of their knowledge and consequently their 
limited influence in the competing standards committee may dilute their commitment to 
the success of the voluntary standard. Recent research has also found evidence that 
peripheral players in the network are more likely to seek membership in such multi-firm 
organizations (Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008), potentially looking to increase the 
likelihood of liquidity events (Waguespack and Fleming, 2009). Peripheral firms are 
more likely to be startups with novel, exploratory ideas that are tangential to the 
voluntary standards committee. They may seek external visibility to develop and market 
their technology. Sponsor-backed standards may provide such opportunities where these 
firms can showcase their technologies to many potential partners or leverage the media 
publicity provided to certified products (Lavie et al, 2007). Thus: 
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Hypothesis 3: Higher (lower) technological knowledge network centrality in the 
voluntary standards committee will be associated with a lower (higher) likelihood 
of membership in the sponsor-backed standards organization.  
 
 (2) Product development on the sponsor-backed standard 
 Firms also need to make strategic decisions about developing products based on 
the standard. Product development on the standard indicates both the capability to 
understand the technological knowledge associated with the standard in order to build a 
compliant product, and a substantial organizational commitment towards diffusing the 
standard. Firms that have a history of strategic alliance partnerships with the sponsor 
firms - i.e. extensive business linkages by virtue of technology licensing agreements, 
joint research partnerships or sole-sourcing contracts - will possess both the capabilities 
and the strategic incentives to make such a commitment. First, prior alliances provide for 
a fine-grained mechanism to access sponsor firms' technological knowledge (Grant and 
Baden-Fuller, 2004), especially the tacit aspects of this knowledge that are difficult to 
transfer (Szulanski, 1996). Thus, a firm with a past history of ties to sponsors is likely to 
have a more nuanced understanding of the sponsor firms' foundational knowledge. 
Second, these relationships also increase a firm's partner-specific absorptive capacity 
with the sponsor firms (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Zaheer, 
Hernandez and Banerjee, 2010), which enhances its ability to understand and apply the 
new knowledge from the technical standard, also a sponsor firm creation. Finally, by 
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taking advantage of established sponsor-specific organizational routines (Zollo, Reuer 
and Singh, 2002), such a firm will also be able to obtain faster access to such knowledge.  
 A higher incidence of prior strategic alliances with sponsor firms also increases 
the firm's strategic incentives to introduce products supporting the standard. First, these 
relationships increase the likelihood that subsequent products will be high-performing 
(Soh, 2003), thus providing a return-on-investment motive for firms. Second, the 
concentration of a firm’s relational capital amongst sponsor firms suggests that these 
firms control both access and affiliation benefits for the focal firm in the network (Koka 
and Prescott, 2008). In other words, the sponsor firms control not only tangible resource 
flows (such as technology licenses) to the focal firm, but also intangible resources, 
including information about potential business opportunities, awareness of the quality of 
other partners in their network, and knowledge about technology trends. As Lavie et al 
(2007) note, organizationally involved partners that engage in product certification 
demonstrate genuine interest in and commitment to the activities and agenda of the multi-
partner alliance. By demonstrating such commitment, firms that are relationally 
dependent on the sponsor firms will continue to obtain  the benefits of their prior 
relationships. On the other hand, by not implementing the standard, such a focal firm 
could jeopardize both current and future sources of revenue and limit opportunities to 
expand its inter-firm network beyond these sponsor firms,  thus leaving it vulnerable to 
unforeseen technological shocks (Uzzi, 1997). It is important to note that even though the 
sponsor-backed standard may not be entirely favorable technologically to the firm, it may 
still need to develop certified products based on the standard to ensure a continued flow 
of these resources. The nature of these strategic pressures is consistent with prior research 
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on technological change that has shown how existing external commitments often 
supersede technological considerations (e.g. Christensen and Bower, 1996). Thus: 
 
 Hypothesis 4: Higher (lower) relational linkages to the sponsor firms will be 
 associated with a higher (lower) rate of products supporting the sponsor-backed 
 standard 
 In contrast with the effect of prior relational ties with sponsor firms, the more 
central a firm is in the voluntary standards committee, the lower incentives it has to 
introduce standard compliant products on the sponsor-backed standard. Although the 
product contribution of any firm benefits the alliance sponsors by augmenting network 
externality effects of the underlying technology, those of technologically prominent firms 
from the competing voluntary standard may accelerate adoption. Their decision to make 
substantial contributions to a competing standard may signal an important technological 
shift to the other (less central) firms in the voluntary standards committee, potentially 
triggering a bandwagon effect (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993; Westphal, Gulati and 
Shortell, 1997). The prominence of these firms may further serve as an endorsement to 
the sponsors (cf. Gulati and Higgins, 2003) thus bolstering the legitimacy of the standard. 
All these factors increase the likelihood that the sponsor-backed standard will become 
dominant at the expense of the voluntary standard.  
 On the other hand, firms that are the most technologically peripheral in the 
voluntary standards committee will have the greatest incentives to develop and certify 
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products that support the sponsor standard. The peripheral nature of their knowledge in 
the competing standard suggests that the rules that emerge from this standard are unlikely 
to favor their technology and thus these firms are more prone to orchestration efforts by 
the sponsor firms (cf. Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). Thus:  
 Hypothesis 5: Higher (lower) technological knowledge network centrality in the 
 voluntary standards committee will be associated with a lower (higher) rate of 
 products supporting the sponsor-backed standard 
(3) Patenting the sponsor-backed standard's technologies 
 While increasing membership and new product introductions both contribute the 
success of the sponsor-backed standard, the extensive patenting of technologies related to 
the sponsor-backed standard may have an opposing effect. Patenting may discourage 
development and adoption of the technology, especially by smaller firms and startups that 
have limited resources to battle intellectual property lawsuits or to redesign products 
around patents in order to avoid patent infringement problems. Recent research on IP law 
has extensively discussed how technology standards consortia are increasingly witnessing 
holdups due to such infringement claims and unreasonable royalty requests (Shapiro, 
2001; Lemley, 2002; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; Farrell et al, 2007). Although patents 
have an important function of providing intellectual property protection to firms 
developing products and technologies on the standard, sponsor firms need to balance it 
with the network externality benefits they stand to gain when the standard diffuses 
widely, creating a lock-in for suppliers and consumers (Arthur, 1989). For example, in 
the personal computer industry, the IBM-Wintel architecture by virtue of being open and 
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easily replicable, quickly became dominant while other proprietary and patented 
architectures lost out. Relinquishing royalties on intellectual property has been 
documented as one of the cornerstones of Intel's successful platform leadership strategy 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). Similarly, Khazam and Mowery (1994) discuss, with the 
example of the Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) architecture, how the 
innovator may gain significant advantages by "giving away" important intellectual 
property.   
 Thus, it follows that sponsor firms backing the standard are likely to discourage 
excessive patenting of technologies based on the standard. It further follows that firms 
that are more tied technologically with the sponsors would similarly be more judicious 
about patenting and risking the slowdown of the standard. Firms' abilities to develop 
technologically similar inventions reveal similar underlying innovative capabilities and 
the clustering of strategic groups (Stuart and Podolny, 1996). These will be firms who 
have a shared technological interest in the adoption of the standard as the overlap in their 
technological capabilities with those of the sponsors suggests that the standard's success 
will confer them with spillover benefits. On the other hand, firms that are not linked (or 
less tied) with the sponsor firms have technological capabilities that are divergent and at 
the extreme, these capabilities could be rendered obsolete by the diffusion of the 
sponsors' standard. Patenting on the sponsor-backed standard may function not only as an 
option to slow down its emergence but also as a hedge and potential royalty stream if the 
standard succeeds. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
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 Hypothesis 6: Higher (lower) technological linkages with the sponsor firms will 
 be associated with a lower (higher) rate of patenting on the sponsor-backed 
 standard 
Similarly, firms that are more technologically central in the competing voluntary 
standards committee will have higher incentives to patent. For these firms, patenting on 
the sponsor-backed standard may endow them with bargaining power to negotiate 
favorably with the sponsors (cf. Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Reitzig, 2003; 
Ziedonis, 2003; Ziedonis, 2004).  These negotiations may be about the nature of the 
standard’s technical specifications (which are tightly controlled by the sponsors), its 
certification and testing processes, as well as future licensing and technology 
development opportunities based on the standard. The recent patent battles in wireless 
technologies indicate the increasing importance for firms to invest in intellectual property 
rights as a defense mechanism to obtain leverage in such negotiations (Rusli and Miller, 
2011; Womack and Tracer, 2011; Crovitz, 2011).  
Greater technological centrality in a competing standards committee also makes 
these firms more attractive for the sponsors from a coalition orchestration standpoint. 
Patenting by these firms is therefore less likely to be met with retaliation or litigation than 
patenting by technologically peripheral firms. Technologically central firms may also use 
patents to hedge against the uncertainty that either standard could succeed, thus deriving 
influence and benefits if one succeeds and accumulating royalties and bargaining power 
if the other achieves dominance (Hatfield, Tegarden and Echols, 2001). Thus: 
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 Hypothesis 7: Higher (lower) technological knowledge network centrality in the 
 voluntary standards committee will be associated with a higher (lower) rate of 
 patenting on the sponsor-backed standard 
Empirical Approach 
 As described in Chapter 2, I test the above arguments by analyzing the 
membership, product introduction and patenting decisions of firms from the INCITS 
voluntary standards committee, on the USB Implementers Forum - an overlapping 
sponsor-backed standards body.  
Data Sources and Measures 
 In addition to the data sources for the INCITS standards committees participation 
measures (INCITS electronic resources), technological network and patent measures 
(NBER), alliance information (Factiva) and firm financials (Compustat and others) that I 
have described in Essays One and Two, I collected detailed data on the USB 
Implementers Forum standards body using Wayback machine and the standards 
organization's online resources at www.usb.org.  Due to technical limitations with the 
Wayback Machine, membership data was only available from 1999 to 2005 and then 
2009 onwards - I treat the intervening years as missing data.  The USB-IF provides 
information on all standard compliant product introduction by its member firms. This 
information includes the name of the firm, category of the product and the date of 
introduction. I manually matched the names of the member firms in the membership 
roster and in the product introduction list, with the names of the member firms in the 
INCITS standards committee to get an integrated sample.  
134 
 
 I used the Derwent database (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994) to obtain information 
on firms' patenting activities on both the USB and the INCITS standards. Derwent 
facilitated keyword-driven searching of the patent database as opposed to the NBER 
patent dataset. Derwent also provided current year patent data in contrast with NBER that 
has the parsed patent dataset only up until 2006. I used various combinations of keywords 
related to the USB and INCITS technologies to retrieve the patents associated with these 
standards. For example, the search string for the USB patent retrieval was coded as: 
 "USB-IF" OR "Universal Serial Bus Implementors Forum" OR "Universal Serial 
 Bus Implementor Forum" OR "USBIF" OR "USB Implementors Forum" OR 
 "USB-Implementors Forum" OR "USB Implementor Forum" OR "USB-
 Implementor Forum" OR "Universal Serial Bus-IF" OR "Universal Serial Bus 
 Implementers Forum" OR "Universal Serial Bus Implementer Forum" OR "USB 
 Implementers Forum" OR "USB-Implementers Forum" OR "USB Implementer 
 Forum" OR "USB-Implementer Forum" OR "USB-certified" OR "USB certified" 
 OR "Universal Serial Bus" 
 I used a combination of automated and manual matching techniques to map the patent 
assignees from these patents to the member firms of the INCITS standards committee in 
order to obtain the set of patent claims from the overlapping member firms.  
Dependent variables: I hypothesize on three different dependent variables and they are 
operationalized as follows: 
(i) Membership in USB standard (Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3) - This is a binary variable that is 
set to 1 if an INCITS member firm became a member of the USB standard in a particular 
year and 0 otherwise. Firms enter the risk set when they become members of the INCITS 
standards committee and either leave the risk set when they become members of the USB 
standard or are included (as right-censored data) up until the final observation year.  
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 (ii) Product contribution in USB standard  (Hypothesis 4 and 5) - Products were reported 
under several categories including Systems, Embedded Hosts, Device Wire Adapters, 
Host Wire Adapters, Hubs, Cable Assemblies and Connectors, Hubs, Hubs Silicon, 
Peripherals, Peripheral Silicon, OTG Device and OTG IP Building Blocks. Each of these 
categories were further reported under several sub-categories - for instance Cable 
Assemblies and Connectors consisted of Receptacle, Plug and Cable Assembly . The 
product contribution variable was calculated by summing up the count of all the 
compliant products introduced by an INCITS member firm on the USB standard, across 
all categories and sub-categories.  
 (iii) Patent claims on USB standard (Hypothesis 6 and 7)  - This is a yearly count of all 
approved patent claims for an INCITS member firm on the USB standard. 
 
Independent variables: 
There are three main independent variables and they are operationalized as follows: 
 (i) Technological linkages with the USB sponsor firms - This is operationalized as the 
yearly proportion of all backward citations made to patents owned by one of the sponsor 
firms of the USB standard (e.g. Song, Almeida and Wu, 2003).  
 (ii) Relational linkages with the USB sponsor firms - Similar to technological linkages, 
this is measured as the proportion of all strategic alliance relationships in the preceding 
year that are with one or more sponsor firms. 
 (iii) Technological centrality in the competing voluntary standards committee - The 
technological network centrality was calculated in identical fashion to Essay One and 
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Essay Two. If a firm was a member in more than one INCITS sub-committee, then its 
average centrality score across these sub-committees was included.  
 Using a proportion rather than a count measure to calculate the linkages to 
sponsor firms allows me to normalize for firm size considerations as well as create 
constructs that truly reflect the degree to which a focal firm's technological knowledge or 
relational capital is tied with the sponsor firms. Robustness checks using a count of the 
number of linkages provided substantively similar results. 
Controls: 
 There can be a number of different factors affecting membership, product and 
patenting activity on a particular technological standard and I attempt to explicitly control 
for a host of these factors. I include a control for Technical proposals contribution in 
voluntary standard which measures the number of technical proposal documents that 
were recorded as authored by one of the firm's representatives, in order to measure 
existing commitment to the voluntary standard that may arise independent of a firm's 
network position in that committee. Similarly, I also include Opposition within voluntary 
standard to control for the number of firm votes against proceeding unconditionally with 
the INCITS standard. I control for Patents applied for on voluntary standard which is a 
simple count of the patents listed on Derwent that matched one of the INCITS technology 
standard's keywords. This may indicate competing intellectual property and royalty 
considerations independent of the hypothesized inter-organizational motives. I also 
control for both Patent stock and Citations to patent stock that together are measures of a 
firm's technological capabilities (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005) - since firms with 
better technological capabilities are more innovative, they may patent more and /or 
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introduce more new products than firms with inferior technological capabilities. Finally, I 
control for several firm size, performance and strategy indicators, including Firm size 
(assets), Firm R&D, Firm resources (cash), Firm leverage (long term debt) and  Firm 
Capital expenditure, and also for a firm's industry (sector) using indicator variables for 
the 4-digit SIC codes. All the firm financial measures are logged. 
Method 
I model the data as an unbalanced panel as membership, product involvement and 
patent claims in the USB standards varies over the years. I alternatively use both random 
and firm fixed-effects models to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Random-effects 
models make a stronger assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated 
with the variables of interest. This assumption may not be tenable if there are invariant, 
unobserved firm characteristics which are correlated with the firm’s technological 
network position, its linkages with sponsor firms and its activities in the USB standard. 
By using firm-fixed effects models, I can control for these unobserved characteristics to 
the extent that they are time invariant. However, as firm fixed-effects models condition 
on within-firm variation only and drop firms that have no variation across time, I also 
show results with random-effects models also. Finally, I lag all the independent variables 
and controls by one year to mitigate simultaneity and reverse-causality concerns.  
For Hypothesis 1-3, the nature of the dependent variable suggests that the data are 
censored beyond the observation period. A hazard model is particularly useful in dealing 
with censoring and time-varying explanatory variables and the necessary estimation 
procedures to calculate censoring are built into programs such as stcox in STATA 
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(Allison, 1995). Thus, I use a hazard model to estimate the likelihood of membership. 
The hazard function is defined as: 
   	


    Or equivalently 
log     	  log 
 
 
Here hi is the hazard at time ‘t’ for firm ‘i’ to join the USB standard body., xi is a 
vector of covariates for firm ‘i’ measured at time ‘t’ and  log λ0 is a function of time that 
is treated as invariant across the sample cross-section. β is the vector of covariates of 
interest to be estimated for the firms in the sample. For my dataset, I defined each 
calendar year to be a distinct time interval. All the independent variables, controls and the 
dependent variable were measured at the beginning of each calendar year. I use a Cox 
proportional hazards model that has the advantage of being able to condition out the time-
dependent component of the hazard without needing to specify any kind of functional 
form  (Allison, 1995).  
For Hypotheses 4 -7, the nature of the dependent variables (yearly count of 
products and count of patents) implies a Poisson process. However, over-dispersion 
(standard deviation is more than seven times the mean for products and more than five 
times the mean for patents) implies that a negative binomial specification is more 
appropriate to model the data (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984). However, a 
conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model is not a true fixed-effects model since 
it fails to control for all its predictors (Allison & Waterman, 2002; Hilbe, 2011). For 
fixed-effects models, I therefore use conditional fixed-effects quasi-maximum likelihood 
Poisson regressions. Negative binomial regression models with random and firm-fixed 
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effects yielded substantively similar results. The underlying econometric specification for 
the fixed-effects Poisson models is as follows: 
     μ      
Here yit,  is the dependent variable, measured as a count of products introduced by firm 'i' 
in year 't'(Hypotheses 4 & 5) and a count of patents applied for by firm 'i' in year 
't'11(Hypotheses 6 & 7). This dependent variable follows a Poisson distribution with 
parameter µ that varies across firms and across time, and is a log-linear function of δ and 
β . δ is the firm-fixed effect that is time-invariant and firm-variant and β is the vector of 
coefficients that needs to be estimated for the independent variables xit. The Cox 
proportional hazard models (Hypotheses 1-3) are estimated using the stcox command and 
the Poisson models (Hypotheses 4-7) are estimated using the xtpoisson (fe) command. 
 
Results 
 Table 19 illustrates the descriptive statistics and correlations for the sample. There 
appear to be no significant concerns of multicollinearity amongst the variables of interest 
(i.e. between Technological linkages to USB standard sponsors, Relational linkages to 
USB standard sponsors and Technological network position in voluntary standards 
committee) - the highest pairwise correlation is 0.31. Nevertheless, I estimated the 
variance inflation factors after the main regressions to confirm that VIFs were within 
limits. The high correlations between the financial variables and amongst the patent 
variables are expected and do not affect the results for the hypothesized predictors. 
  
                                                          
11
 Only eventually approved patents are considered 
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TABLE 19: Essay Three. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Member in USB 
standard 0.05 0.21 1       
2 Number of products on USB standard 0.66 4.27 0.19 1      
3 Number of patent 
claims on USB standard 0.91 5.05 0.36 0.4 1     
4 Relational linkages to USB standard sponsors 0.04 0.2 0.13 0.23 0.28 1    
5 Tech. linkages to USB 
standard sponsors 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.1 0.19 1   
6 Tech.network position in voluntary standard 0.05 0.16 0.3 0.16 0.3 0.3 0.31 1  
7 
Tech. proposals 
contribution in 
voluntary standard 
0.07 0.53 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.23 1 
8 Opposition within 
voluntary standard 0.12 0.69 0.06 0 0.04 0.15 0.19 0.31 0.4 
9 Patents applied for on 
voluntary standard 0.19 1.25 0.12 0.1 0.27 0.28 0.15 0.36 0.15 
10 Patent stock 356.76 989.02 0.25 0.29 0.54 0.36 0.05 0.39 0.03 
11 Citations to patent stock 2586.1 7993.1 0.2 0.25 0.43 0.37 0.12 0.44 0.04 
12 Firm size (assets) 7.18 2.45 0.12 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.03 0.3 0.05 
13 Firm R&D 4.73 2.11 0.15 0.22 0.3 0.29 0.08 0.33 0.09 
14 Firm resources (cash) 5.03 2.31 0.1 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.04 0.31 0.07 
15 Firm leverage (long term debt) 4.14 3.29 0.07 0.19 0.23 0.19 
-
0.03 0.22 0.02 
16 Firm Capital exp. 4.19 2.39 0.15 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.06 0.31 0.05 
 
 
Variable 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
8 Opposition within voluntary 
standard 1         
9 Patents applied for on voluntary 
standard 0.3 1        
10 Patent stock 0.04 0.3 1 
      
11 Citations to patent stock 0.07 0.36 0.78 1 
     
12 Firm size (assets) 0.05 0.19 0.4 0.38 1 
    
13 Firm R&D 0.09 0.21 0.43 0.4 0.93 1 
   
14 Firm resources (cash) 0.07 0.21 0.38 0.37 0.92 0.89 1 
  
15 Firm leverage (long term debt) 0 0.13 0.33 0.32 0.8 0.7 0.68 1 
 
16 Firm Capital exp. 0.05 0.19 0.43 0.4 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.78 1 
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 Table 20 shows the results for the Cox proportional hazard model regressions to 
test Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. Model 1 is a controls-only model and the variables of interest 
are added sequentially in Models 2-4. The results are shown in failure time format where 
a negative (positive) coefficient implies a decrease (increase) in the hazard.  
 Hypothesis 1 posited that higher technological linkages to the sponsor firms will 
increase the likelihood of membership in the sponsor-backed standards organization. The 
coefficient for the measure Technological linkages to USB standard sponsors is positive 
and highly significant in both Models 3 and 4 (p < 0.01) supporting this hypothesis. A 
one standard deviation increase in this variable increases the likelihood of membership in 
the USB standard by about 27%.  
 Hypothesis 2 posited that higher relational linkages to the sponsor firms will 
increase the likelihood of membership in the sponsor-backed standards organization. The 
coefficient for the measure Relational linkages to USB standard sponsors is not 
significant in any of the models - 2, 3 or 4. Thus, I do not find any support for this 
hypothesis. 
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TABLE 20: Essay Three. Results for Hypotheses 1-3. Cox Proportional Hazard Models.  
Dependent variable is membership in the USB standard. 
MODELS (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
          
Relational linkages to USB standard 
sponsors 
 -0.1426 
(0.5933) 
-0.2134 
(0.6153) 
-0.2506 
(0.5138) 
Tech. linkages to USB standard sponsors   2.9050*** 
(0.7921) 
2.5951*** 
(0.9350) 
Tech.network position in voluntary standard    2.1174** 
 
CONTROLS 
   (0.8951) 
Tech. proposals contribution in voluntary 
standard 0.2010** 0.2075** 0.1876** 0.1655** 
(0.0879) (0.0879) (0.0885) (0.0806) 
Opposition within voluntary standard 0.0302 0.0280 0.0181 -0.0241 
(0.0872) (0.0858) (0.0884) (0.0904) 
Patents applied for on voluntary standard -0.0929 -0.0899 -0.1171* -0.1570** 
(0.0653) (0.0608) (0.0652) (0.0708) 
Patent stock -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Citations to patent stock 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm size (assets) 0.3279 0.3403 0.5137 0.6471* 
(0.3458) (0.3399) (0.3272) (0.3313) 
Firm R&D 0.2584 0.2633 0.1421 -0.0526 
(0.3593) (0.3573) (0.3563) (0.3573) 
Firm resources (cash) 0.0495 0.0467 0.0375 0.0138 
(0.1565) (0.1568) (0.1540) (0.1589) 
Firm leverage (long term debt) -0.0050 -0.0077 0.0091 -0.0406 
(0.0621) (0.0639) (0.0648) (0.0595) 
Firm Capital exp. -0.3359 -0.3455* -0.4019* -0.3860** 
(0.2121) (0.2087) (0.2151) (0.1962) 
Observations 1546 1546 1546 1546 
Firms 173 173 173 173 
Log likelihood -163.8 -163.8 -160.2 -156.6 
          
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Hypothesis 3 posited that higher technological knowledge network centrality in 
the voluntary standards committee will be associated with a lower likelihood of 
membership in the sponsor-backed standards organization. The expected sign for the 
coefficient of the measure Technological network position in the voluntary standard is 
therefore negative. However, from Model 4 results, it appears that the coefficient for this 
measure is positive and significant, thus giving us results that are opposite to what was 
predicted. A one standard deviation from the mean for this measure actually increases the 
likelihood that a firm will become a member in the USB standard by about 19%. 
 Table 21 and Table 22 show the results of the Poisson regressions used to test 
Hypotheses 4 and 5. Table 21 shows the results of random-effects models and Table 22 
shows the results of firm fixed-effects models. Model 5 is a controls-only model and in 
Models 6 and 7 I sequentially add the hypothesized variables. Similarly, for the fixed-
effects estimations, Model 8 is the controls-only model and in Models 9 and 10 I 
sequentially add the hypothesized variables.  Hypothesis 4 posited that higher relational 
linkages to the sponsor firms will be associated with a higher rate of products supporting 
the sponsor-backed standard. The coefficient for the measure Relational linkages to USB 
standard sponsors is positive and highly significant (p < 0.01) in both Models 6 and 7 in 
the random-effects case and also in both Models 9 and 10 in the fixed-effects case, thus 
demonstrating strong support for this hypothesis. There is very little change in the size of 
this coefficient or its statistical significance across all these models. A one standard 
deviation increase from the mean for this variable results in an increase of about 6% in 
the rate of yearly standard-compliant product introductions. 
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TABLE 21: Essay Three. Results for Hypotheses 4 & 5. Random-effects Panel data 
Poisson models. Dependent variable is number of products introduced on USB standard. 
MODELS (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
        
Relational linkages to USB standard sponsors 0.2868*** 0.2819*** 
(0.0651) (0.0650) 
Tech.network position in voluntary standard -0.9243*** 
(0.1466) 
CONTROLS 
Tech. proposals contribution in voluntary standard -0.2592*** -0.2698*** -0.2571*** 
(0.0603) (0.0610) (0.0604) 
Opposition within voluntary standard 0.0323 0.0283 0.0412 
(0.0396) (0.0397) (0.0391) 
Patents applied for on voluntary standard -0.1174*** -0.1227*** -0.1130*** 
(0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0156) 
Patent stock -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Citations to patent stock 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm size (assets) 0.2978* 0.3315** 0.1180 
(0.1537) (0.1545) (0.1582) 
Firm R&D -0.1189 -0.1581 0.0959 
(0.1200) (0.1202) (0.1275) 
Firm resources (cash) 0.5870*** 0.5914*** 0.5434*** 
(0.0608) (0.0612) (0.0621) 
Firm leverage (long term debt) -0.0848*** -0.0823*** -0.0655*** 
(0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0233) 
Firm Capital exp. -0.0651 -0.0665 -0.0149 
(0.0812) (0.0816) (0.0820) 
Constant -29.8686 -29.7912 -29.1001 
(73353.55) (67759.75) (56583.6) 
Sector (industry) effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1412 1412 1412 
Firms 175 175 175 
Log likelihood -1355 -1345 -1325 
Chi-square 2217 2145 2169 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 22:  Essay Three. Results for Hypotheses 4 & 5. Fixed-effects Panel data Poisson 
models.  
Dependent variable is yearly number of products on USB standard. 
MODELS (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES 
        
Relational linkages to USB standard sponsors 0.2840*** 0.2794*** 
(0.0651) (0.0651) 
Tech.network position in voluntary standard -0.9453*** 
(0.1474) 
CONTROLS 
Tech. proposals contribution in voluntary standard -0.2618*** -0.2722*** -0.2604*** 
(0.0605) (0.0611) (0.0605) 
Opposition within voluntary standard 0.0331 0.0290 0.0416 
(0.0397) (0.0398) (0.0392) 
Patents applied for on voluntary standard -0.1185*** -0.1238*** -0.1138*** 
(0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0157) 
Patent stock -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Citations to patent stock 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm size (assets) 0.2864* 0.3210** 0.1039 
(0.1552) (0.1561) (0.1597) 
Firm R&D -0.1276 -0.1667 0.0939 
(0.1209) (0.1211) (0.1285) 
Firm resources (cash) 0.5847*** 0.5888*** 0.5392*** 
(0.0609) (0.0613) (0.0622) 
Firm leverage (long term debt) -0.0851*** -0.0826*** -0.0651*** 
(0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0233) 
Firm Capital exp. -0.0662 -0.0679 -0.0156 
(0.0815) (0.0820) (0.0823) 
Sector (industry) effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 337 337 337 
Firms 34 34 34 
Log likelihood -1118 -1109 -1088 
Chi-square 493.8 499.0 525.6 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Hypothesis 5 posited that higher technological knowledge network centrality in 
the voluntary standards committee will be associated with a lower rate of products 
supporting the sponsor-backed standard. The coefficient for the measure Technological 
network position in voluntary standard is negative and highly significant (p < 0.01) in 
Model 7 in the random-effects case and in model 10 in the fixed-effects case, providing 
strong support for this hypothesis. A one standard deviation increase in this measure from 
its mean decreases the rate of standard compliant product introductions by more than 
12%.  It is also worth noting that Technical proposals contributed on the voluntary 
standard is significant and negative in these regressions suggesting that firms that are 
more and involved in the competing standard are less likely to support the sponsor-
backed standard.  
 Table 23 and Table 24 show the results of the Poisson regressions used to test 
Hypotheses 6 and 7. Table 23 shows the results of random-effects models and Table 24 
shows the results of firm fixed-effects models. Model 11 is a controls-only model and in 
Models 12 and 13, I sequentially add the hypothesized variables. Similarly, for the fixed-
effects estimations, Model 14 is the controls-only model and in Models 15 and 16, I 
sequentially add the hypothesized variables. Hypothesis 6 posited that higher 
technological linkages with the sponsor firms will be associated with a lower rate of 
patenting on the sponsor-backed standard. The coefficient for the measure Tech. linkages 
to USB standard sponsors is negative and highly significant (p < 0.01) in all models.  
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TABLE 23: Essay Three. Results for Hypotheses 6 & 7. Random-effects Panel data 
Poisson models.  
Dependent variable is yearly number of patent claims on USB standard. 
MODELS (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES 
        
Tech. linkages to  USB standard sponsors -0.5402*** -0.5693*** 
(0.2083) (0.2082) 
Tech.network position in voluntary standard 0.6258*** 
(0.1131) 
CONTROLS 
Tech. proposals contribution in voluntary standard -0.0412 -0.0417 -0.0475 
(0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
Opposition within voluntary standard 0.0426* 0.0492** 0.0430* 
(0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0233) 
Patents applied for on voluntary standard -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0071 
(0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
Patent stock -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to patent stock 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm size (assets) 0.3143*** 0.3148*** 0.3222*** 
(0.1124) (0.1126) (0.1128) 
Firm R&D 0.2996*** 0.2821*** 0.2379** 
(0.1049) (0.1053) (0.1062) 
Firm resources (cash) 0.0978*** 0.0946*** 0.0756** 
(0.0357) (0.0359) (0.0365) 
Firm leverage (long term debt) -0.0855*** -0.0842*** -0.0858*** 
(0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
Firm Capital exp. -0.1156** -0.1041* -0.0728 
(0.0564) (0.0565) (0.0567) 
Constant -5.3884*** -5.2696*** -5.3546*** 
(1.5071) (1.5227) (1.5088) 
Sector (industry) effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1330 1330 1330 
Firms 172 172 172 
Log likelihood -1774 -1771 -1755 
Chi-square 652.1 658.7 682.9 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 24: Essay Three. Results for Hypotheses 6 & 7. Fixed-effects Panel data Poisson 
models.  
Dependent variable is yearly number of patent claims on USB standard. 
MODELS (14) (15) (16) 
VARIABLES 
        
Tech. linkages to USB standard sponsors 
-0.6764*** -0.7009*** 
 (0.2140) (0.2138) 
Tech. network position in voluntary standard 0.5986*** 
 (0.1136) 
CONTROLS 
Tech. proposals contribution in voluntary standard -0.0417 -0.0424 -0.0473 
 (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
Opposition within voluntary standard 0.0442* 0.0524** 0.0466** 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0237) 
Patents applied for on voluntary standard 
-0.0010 -0.0019 -0.0073 
 (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0071) 
Patent stock 
-0.0001** -0.0001* -0.0001** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Citations to patent stock 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm size (assets) 0.3056*** 0.3116*** 0.3138*** 
 (0.1181) (0.1182) (0.1186) 
Firm R&D 0.3116*** 0.2811** 0.2414** 
 (0.1117) (0.1122) (0.1133) 
Firm resources (cash) 0.0964*** 0.0920** 0.0733** 
 (0.0359) (0.0360) (0.0366) 
Firm leverage (long term debt) 
-0.0892*** -0.0873*** -0.0885*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188) 
Firm Capital exp. 
-0.1296** -0.1157** -0.0819 
 (0.0589) (0.0589) (0.0592) 
 
Sector (industry) effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 921 921 921 
Firms 97 97 97 
Log likelihood 
-1344 -1339 -1325 
Chi-square 523.7 537.1 558.7 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 There is little change in the size or significance of the coefficient across models. 
Thus, there is strong and consistent support for Hypothesis 6 across these models. A one 
standard deviation increase of this measure from its mean is associated with 
approximately a 5% decrease in patent claims on the USB standard. 
 Finally, Hypothesis 7 posited that higher technological knowledge network 
centrality in the voluntary standards committee will be associated with a higher rate of 
patenting on the sponsor-backed standard. The coefficient for the measure Technological 
network centrality in the voluntary standard is positive and highly significant in Model 
13 in the random-effects case and in Model 16 in the fixed-effects case. Again, there is 
little change in the size or significance of the coefficient across models. Thus, there is 
strong and consistent support for Hypothesis 7 across these models. A one standard 
deviation increase of this measure from its mean is associated with approximately a 8% 
increase in patent claims on the USB standard. 
Graphical view of the results 
 Figures 6, 7 and 8 below show the plots for the results from the hypotheses tests. 
Figure 6 plots the independent variables for Hypothesis 1 (Tech Linkages to sponsors) 
and 3 (Tech network centrality in INCITS standard) against the hazard of membership in 
the USB standard. Figure 7 plots the independent variables for Hypothesis 4 (Relational 
linkages to sponsors) and 5 (Tech network centrality in INCITS standard) against the 
yearly rate of product introductions on the USB standard. Figure 8 plots the independent 
 variables for Hypothesis 6 (
INCITS standard) against the yearly rate of patent claims based on t
Figure 6: Graphical representation of results from Hypothesis 1 and 3 (Essay Three)
 
 
Figure 7: Graphical representation of results from Hypothesis 4 and 5 (Essay Three)
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 Figure 8: Graphical representation of results from 
 
 
Robustness and alternative explanations
 As with most research in strategy, one possible concern is endogeneity 
results are driven by unobserved factors that correlate with the predictors and the 
dependent variables observed. However, to the extent that most of these unobserved 
factors are time-invariant, the strong results in the fixed
sample in some of the regressions (see Table 
As network scholars have suggested, one way to alleviate concerns around the 
endogeneity of network measures is to use time
structures and the incorporation of fixed
Sorenson, 2007) - this paper takes that approach. Further, 
random-effects models as well 
out in the fixed-effects models if 
there is only 1 year of participation 
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Hypothesis 6 and 7 (Essay Three)
 
-effects models, in spite of a small 
22 for instance), alleviate these concerns. 
-varying data that allow the use of lag 
-effects in the regression models (Stuart and 
I provide the results using 
because a large proportion of the firms in the sample 
there is either no variation in the dependent variable or 
data available. Results across both these sets of 
 
 
- that the 
drop 
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models are consistent showing that using both within-firm and cross-sectional variation 
finds support for the hypothesized arguments.  
 Additionally, I also control for a variety of observed firm-specific and standards-
specific time-varying factors that have been hypothesized in prior research on coalition 
formation and firms' actions in multi-firm alliances (e.g. Axelrod et al, 1995). The above 
results are also robust to changes in measures (e.g. using a count rather than a proportion 
for the independent variables) and assumptions of lag structure. I also tested the models 
without including the financial controls to test for the inclusion of smaller private firms 
(these are excluded automatically when financial measures are included in the 
regressions) and the results were in fact stronger.  
 Finally, I also separated the alliance data into technology licensing and 
technology development alliances and ran the regression models for Hypotheses 4 and 5 
by calculating the Relational linkages to USB standard sponsors measure first for the 
licensing alliances only and then for the development alliances. The results are much 
stronger when only the technology development alliances are included and they are weak 
when only the licensing alliances are included. This suggests that the mechanism 
underlying Hypotheses 4 and 5 is driven more by the knowledge access and inter-firm 
routine considerations (capability drivers) that are likely to be stronger in the technology 
development alliances relative to the licensing alliances. 
 
Discussion 
 In this paper, I study how firms might navigate competing multi-firm 
technological alliances. I use longitudinal data from  two technologically overlapping 
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standards bodies in the computer industry. My results support the hypotheses that a firm's 
inter-organizational ties in both these rival alliances are crucial determinants of its 
strategic choices within an alliance. Specifically, I find that the more technologically 
central a firm is within a network of peer firms in a competing standards body, the less it 
is likely to support the adoption of an alternate technological standard. This tendency is 
revealed by two different strategic decisions by firms in these positions  -  to introduce 
fewer standard compliant products but, at the same time, also make more intellectual 
property claims on the standard they favor less. I also find that the opposite behavior 
holds to the extent a firm is linked with a standard's sponsor firms - firms introduce more 
standard compliant products but make fewer intellectual property claims when they are 
"closer" relationally (products) and technologically (patents) to these sponsors. These 
findings are important because they provide large scale empirical evidence that firms' 
actions in a multi-organizational alliance may be strategically driven by its inter-
organizational ties both within the alliance and its inter-organizational position in 
competing alliances.  
 Finally, in addition to product introduction and patenting decisions, I also 
explored how these linkages affect the likelihood of membership.  I find only partial 
support that linkages to sponsor firms increases the likelihood that a firm might join an 
alliance backed by these firms. I also find an effect opposite to what I hypothesize with 
regard to a firm's position in a competing standards body. Contrary to my prediction, 
firms that are technologically central in a competing standard have a higher likelihood of 
joining the sponsor backed standards alliance. It may be that in dynamic environments, a 
firm needs to balance the competitive pressure of slowing the competing standard with 
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the pressures of incorporating the technology from that standard if it succeeds, and that in 
this particular empirical setting, the latter may be a more important influence on the 
firm's decision.  
 This paper has several important additional implications for research and practice. 
Taken together, the findings on firms' product and patenting decisions, suggest that firms 
may view these as strategically different levers in environments of technological change. 
Firms that introduce new products on the sponsor's technological standard to bolster the 
standard's success and strengthen their relational position in the sponsor's network, may 
also make fewer patent claims on that standard for the same reason. In other words, the 
same underlying mechanism may drive both these decisions but in opposite ways. 
Although the firms that have capabilities to develop new products presumably also have 
capabilities to patent the technologies underlying those products, it appears that in the 
context of a sponsor-backed technological standard, they choose to invest in the former 
while eschewing the latter. It is important to note that prior research has tended to use 
both new products (e.g. Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Lavie, Lechner and Singh, 2007) and 
patents (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; Joshi and Nerkar, 2011) as measures of technological 
innovation and performance, and the theories that predict innovation behavior do not 
clearly distinguish between the two (or implicitly treat both as equivalent measures). This 
paper provides a critical insight into when the same firm characteristics might predict 
these two outcomes in opposite ways.  
 Further, this paper's findings contrast with prior research that has found 
involvement in multiple standards alliances to increase contributions within a particular 
alliance (Lavie, Lechner and Singh, 2007; Leiponen, 2008). The reason for the different 
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finding may be that beyond measuring involvement as just membership in the competing 
standards body (as in Lavie, Lechner and Singh, 2007), I decompose it into four different 
variables - a network position variable, a patent variable, an opposition variable and a 
technological contributions variable. The resulting model provides a much more granular 
measure of involvement that reflects both the level of commitment a firm has made to a 
competing alliance as well as the benefits that it stands to gain from that alliance.  
 For firms that need to continuously manage the challenges of technological 
change, this paper provides several important insights. Even considering the costs of 
joining multiple standards bodies, it may still be a valuable strategy to be part of these 
overlapping alliances (Lavie, Lechner and Singh, 2007). For a firm that stands to benefit 
from an existing standards body, joining a competing alliance early may allow it gain the 
necessary knowledge to claim intellectual property rights on that standard. This may be a 
valuable negotiating chip in future discussions with the sponsors. As Ziedonis (2004) 
notes, if technologies are held by a more disparate set of firms, then the strategic value of 
patenting for use in licensing transactions is higher. As recent events in several high-
technology industries such as wireless telecommunications, software development and 
computers indicate, patenting is fast becoming a preferred defensive strategy for firms.  
 From a sponsor firm's standpoint, the finding of opposing effects for product 
introduction and patenting actions of member firms from an alternate standard is 
remarkably powerful and informative. Although it is important for the sponsor firms to 
maintain the balance between protecting their intellectual property (by keeping it secret 
or heavily patented) and orchestrating a standard (by revealing the technology to spur the 
development of complementary products), these findings indicate that some member 
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firms that join the standard may act in strategic ways that are not aligned with the sponsor 
firms' objectives.  
 These findings are also important for firms that need to understand the conditions 
under which open standards are likely to lead to widespread adoption (West, 2003). In 
this particular case, because the existing INCITS standards body was open and 
consensus-based, firms were able to seek simultaneous memberships in both the INCITS 
and the USB alliances. Had the existing standards body been closed and sponsor-backed, 
then conflicts between the two alliances may have been more pervasive to the extent that 
overlapping memberships may have been prevented. From a sponsor firm's standpoint, 
while overlapping memberships aid in building up the roster, it might be a wise strategy 
to limit participation in the standards body, at least initially, to technologically and 
relationally close firms that do not have conflicting interests. In other words, between 
making the technology "open-source" at one extreme versus keeping it proprietary and 
closed at the other extreme, hybrid technology development arrangements that allow for 
some kind of a phased development of the sponsor's standard may be a more valuable 
option (West, 2003).  
 
Contributions and Limitations 
 This paper makes several contributions to research at the intersection of 
organization theory, strategy and technological change. Prior research on strategic 
alliances has devoted a lot of attention to firms might enter into collaborations and what 
the benefits of such collaborations may be. However, most of these studies are at the 
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dyadic level (e.g. Gulati, 1995b, Stuart, 2000; Chung, Singh and Lee,2000) and we know 
little about why firms might join multi-firm alliances and what the antecedents of their 
strategic actions in these alliances might be. The few studies on multi-firm network and 
alliance orchestration have been predominantly theoretical (Das and Teng, 2002; 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Axelrod et al, 1995), with empirical work being 
predominantly case-based (e.g. Funk and Methe, 2001; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Axelrod 
et al, 1995), with Lavie et al (2007) being a notable exception. In dynamic high-
technology environments, the proliferation of overlapping and competing multi-firm 
standards alliances has resulted in a critical gap between managerial practice and research 
- the example of Intel's numerous multi-firm technological standards initiatives in an 
earlier section of the paper clearly underscores the importance of not just focusing the 
research spotlight on these kinds of organizational arrangements, but also understanding 
their competitive aspects.  
 This paper also departs from prior research that has typically used a community or 
network lens to study the evolution of standards and technological designs (e.g. Wade, 
1995; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998), by exploring 
firm-level strategic choices to contribute within these communities. Further, while prior 
studies on network and technological evolution limit their focus to memberships in 
communities or alliance networks (e.g. Axelrod et al, 1995), I distinguish membership 
from the contributions of participating firms in the alliance. Although membership may 
be an important precursor to the success of a multi-firm alliance, the products and 
technologies that member firms introduce are more direct measures of the successful 
evolution of the standard in a technological change setting with network externalities and 
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multiple competing standards. By decoupling these strategic decisions, the essay provides 
insights into which firms may seek membership in the sponsor-backed standard, yet in 
principle oppose its adoption. In doing so, it makes an important contribution to firm 
strategy in a technological change context, by identifying tradeoffs that firms face in 
making commitments to competing alliance relationships. Finally, this paper contributes 
to the literature on network evolution by explicating mechanisms that enable or constrain 
orchestration efforts by sponsor firms (Doz, Olk and Ring, 2001; Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 
1996).  
 The above contributions must be seen in light of the limitations of the study. 
Although the study does offer robust evidence from a sample of more than 150 firms, it is 
important to note that it does not study firms' actions beyond the two standards bodies 
discussed. While INCITS and USB were certainly the dominant peripheral interface 
standards organizations during the period of study, there were other standards in related 
technologies such as semiconductors, communications and consumer electronics. Clearly 
firms may be strategizing across a range of these related technologies (as the Intel 
example illustrates) but the scope of this study and hence its findings must be viewed 
with a narrower lens.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
Overview of dissertation findings 
 The objective of this dissertation was to shed light on firm behavior within and 
between technology standards-setting committees, with a view to understanding the 
broader dynamics of multi-organizational arrangements in technological change contexts. 
I used an inter-organizational conceptual lens to study five distinct actions of firms within 
two leading standards-setting bodies in the computer industry: (i) voting on the standards 
committee (Essay One), (ii) forming bi-lateral relationships with other member firms 
(Essay Two),  (iii) joining a competing standards organization (Essay Three),  (iv) 
introducing standard-compliant products on the competing standard (Essay Three),  and, 
(v) making intellectual property claims on the competing standard (Essay Three). Taken 
together, the findings from these essays, summarized in Table 25,  provide robust 
evidence using longitudinal data from the large number of firms that participated in the 
leading standards bodies in the computer industry, that existing inter-organizational ties 
greatly influence firm strategy in multi-organizational settings. Additionally, reflecting 
the reality that firms are connected to each other in different ways, the importance of 
considering multiplicity in these relationships is highlighted in the conceptual framework 
of the dissertation. These findings offer several important insights for both research as 
well as managerial practice, on the challenges and opportunities of competing while 
attempting to coordinate a shared direction for technological change.  
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 In Essay One (Chapter 3), I show how firms’ positions in technological (patent-
based) and relational (alliance-based) networks affect progress towards the coordinated 
standard. I study the influence of two relationships – technological linkages and strategic 
alliance ties – on the voting behavior of firms in an information technology standards 
committee. I find that centrally positioned firms in the technological network exhibit 
lower opposition to the standard as their knowledge is foundational in developing the 
standard. In contrast, I find that central firms in the alliance network are more likely to 
contest the standard - such firms already possess advantageous complementary 
capabilities that they can continue to exploit without agreeing to the change imminent in 
a standard. Thus, the influence of network resources on coordination is contingent upon 
the type of inter-organizational tie. Furthermore, when these relationships are considered 
jointly, technological centrality moderates the opposing effect of alliance centrality – 
when firms are in central positions in both networks, they stand to benefit more from the 
emergence of a technical standard, and thus exhibit greater support for coordination. 
 In Essay Two (Chapter 4), I examine how divergence in member firms' interests 
may drive new inter-organizational relationships. I find that although firms that are 
peripheral in the technological network may be disadvantaged with regard to knowledge 
relevance in the standard-setting process, they can obtain relational benefits from 
technologically central firms. To enhance the standard’s legitimacy by soliciting wide-
ranging participation from firms, central firms may be motivated  to forge such alliances. 
 In Essay Three (Chapter 5), I explore how firms navigate two competing 
standards - a voluntary standards committee and a sponsor-backed consortium. I examine 
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and contrast firms' product introduction and patenting decisions on the sponsor-backed 
standard, arguing that while products accelerate the standard's adoption, patents hinder it. 
I find that while firms that possess prior technological and relational linkages with the 
sponsor firms tend to introduce more products but fewer patents, the opposite is observed 
for firms that are technologically central in the competing voluntary standards committee. 
TABLE 25: Essays One, Two and Three. Summary of hypotheses and empirical results 
E
# 
H
# 
Dependent variable Independent variable Proposed 
relationship 
Result 
1 1 Votes against standard Technological network centrality Negative Supported 
1 2 Votes against standard Alliance network centrality Positive Supported 
1 3 Votes against standard Technological network centrality & 
Alliance network centrality 
Negative Supported 
2 1 Likelihood of alliance Technological network centrality Positive Supported 
2 2 Likelihood of alliance Involvement Positive Supported 
2 3 Number  of alliances Asymmetries in technological 
network centrality & involvement 
Positive Supported 
3 1 Membership Technological linkages to sponsor 
firms 
Positive Supported 
3 2 Membership Relational linkages to sponsor firms Positive Not 
supported 
3 3 Membership Technological network position on 
voluntary stand. 
Negative Not 
supported 
3 4 Count of products Relational linkages to sponsor firms Positive Supported 
3 5 Count of products Technological network position on 
voluntary stand. 
Negative Supported 
3 6 Count of patents Technological  linkages to sponsor 
firms 
Negative Supported 
3 7 Count of patents Technological network position on 
voluntary stand. 
Positive Supported 
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Scope and limitations 
 The theory and the findings of this dissertation need to be bounded by six 
important considerations - three conceptual and three empirical.  
 First, conceptually, this dissertation makes an assumption that relevant 
technological knowledge for setting the standard is both distributed between several firms 
and interwoven amongst them. This is a tenable assumption only in industries such as the 
focal empirical setting, where technological innovation is decentralized (Bresnahan and 
Greenstein, 1999). In such industries, products are modular (Schilling, 2000; Baldwin 
and Clark, 2000), innovation in the different underlying subsystems progresses at 
different rates, and network externalities influence technology adoption (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1986). These assumptions may not hold in process-based industries (e.g. oil & 
natural gas, cement manufacturing) where production activity is sequential and tightly 
coupled and network externalities are limited or non-existent. However, the properties of 
most industries that undergo continuous technological change tend to be similar to those 
of the industry selected for study in this dissertation. Certainly the implications and 
findings of the dissertation should be limited to technological change contexts.  
 Second, this dissertation makes an assumption that the critical complementary 
capabilities to profit from innovations are generally extra-mural (Teece, 1986; Lee, Lee 
and Pennings, 2001).  This is also a tenable assumption to make in vertically 
disaggregated industries - in vertically integrated industries such an assumption may be 
inappropriate.  
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 Third, although my level of analysis is the firm or the dyad, involvement and 
interaction in standards-setting committees really occurs at the individual person 
(engineer) level. In aggregating individual behavior up to the firm, the important 
underlying assumption is that firms' representatives act to reflect their corresponding 
firms' interests. While this may be true in a majority of multi-organizational settings, it is 
important to note that there may be instances where individual participation is 
independent of private organizational interests.  
 Empirically, my arguments assume that decision-making is consensus-based, that 
there are no barriers to membership and that all participating firms have equal rights on 
the standard-setting committees. Thus, these arguments are valid only to those types of 
multi-firm organizations with these characteristics. The second empirical assumption is to 
do with the structure of the underlying inter-organizational networks of participating 
firms. I assume that a distribution of firms' positions in the networks of interest exists and 
that the networks are generally connected. In other words, if there is a single hub firm and 
all ties originate from such a hub firm, then there will be no variation in the network data. 
Similarly, if the network consists of nodes that are largely disconnected from most other 
nodes (e.g. cotton, paper and leather in Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007)), then centrality 
may not be a good predictor of firm behavior.  Finally, the arguments, especially in Essay 
One, also make an empirical assumption that the two inter-organizational networks 
(technological knowledge and strategic alliances) are not perfectly correlated. While 
there may certainly be some common drivers of path-dependence between inter-firm 
technological innovation and the formation of strategic business linkages (e.g. Stuart, 
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2000), it is reasonable to assume that they are not completely concomitant. For instance, 
the factors driving the formation of vertical alliances for contract-based manufacturing 
(e.g. cost) are likely to be different from the factors driving which firm's technological 
knowledge to build on (e.g. innovativeness or novelty).  
Contributions 
The highlights of the dissertation are summarized in Table 26 below. 
 
TABLE 26: Dissertation Highlights 
 Essay One Essay Two Essay Three 
Strategic 
action 
Contesting the 
emerging standard 
Forming a bi-lateral 
relationship 
Membership, products 
and patents in another  
standard 
Underlying 
tension 
Allowing tech. change 
versus exploiting 
existing position 
Building legitimacy 
for the standard versus 
pushing it through 
Helping the standard 
diffuse versus slowing 
its adoption 
Theoretical 
mechanism 
Contesting effect of 
centrality in alliance 
network moderated by 
supporting effect of 
centrality in the 
knowledge network 
Asymmetry in 
involvement and 
technological positions 
influences 
collaborations between 
central and peripheral 
players 
Links to sponsors 
increases products but 
reduces patent claims. 
Position in competing 
standard results in 
opposite effects. 
Empirical 
approach 
Panel data Poisson 
models 
Panel data logistic 
regression models  and 
panel data Poisson 
models  
Cox proportional 
hazard models and 
panel data Poisson 
models 
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 First and foremost, the findings and implications of this dissertation strongly 
advocate a shift from studying and measuring capabilities at the firm level to focusing on 
inter-firm capabilities that may exist within strategic inter-organizational networks, in 
particular for scholars and practitioners interested in studying firm behavior in multi-
organizational settings. In all the three essays, significant effects were found for different 
inter-firm measures after statistically controlling for firm-level capabilities.  
 While the relational view of the firm (e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1998) has long 
emphasized that the relationship between firms is an important unit of analysis, this 
dissertation advances this view by examining the nuances of different such relationships. 
In an increasingly interconnected corporate landscape, firms are linked together in 
different ways and at different levels, but we know little about the tradeoffs and the 
tensions underlying these multiplex connections. By establishing a relationship between 
firms’ positions in two important and salient such inter-organizational networks - 
technological and alliance - this dissertation emphasizes the simultaneous consideration 
of multiple inter-organizational relationships when modeling firms as actors in multi-
organizational settings (e.g. Shipilov and Li, 2010).  
 Beyond simultaneous consideration of these multiplex relationships, this 
dissertation also reveals hitherto unexplored mechanisms of tie formation within these 
networks. In particular, by theorizing on how firms may attempt to offset their growing 
technological marginalization resulting from the emerging standard by forming ties with 
central firms, Essay Two informs the substantial body of research on alliance formation. 
Thus in addition to a network formation theory of relational, social and technological 
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capital, there may be "political" capital drivers at play as well. The conflicting needs to 
enhance legitimacy but at the same time control the standard to be based on a central 
firm's foundational knowledge, may create the conditions and incentives for such 
bridging ties to emerge.  
 The findings from the dissertation also underscore an important point that the 
effect of an inter-organizational network position on a firm's actions is both context 
dependent and relation-type dependent. Not only may the same tie may predict firm 
behavior differently in different network contexts, but different types of ties may also 
predict behavior differently in the same network context. Further, there may be 
competing incentives arising from each type of tie that essentially reflect the uncertainty 
and complexity of the underlying business context. As Essay One demonstrates, although 
the rents from firms' external complementary capabilities may be preserved in the 
existing technological regime by partner scarcity or time-compression diseconomies 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998), the move to a new technological standard has the potential to 
erode these rents, and this in turn may create disincentives for firms to support 
technological change at the network level. Similarly, while centrality in the knowledge 
network in one standards context supports the emerging standard, the same centrality has 
an opposite effect in a competing standards context as firms may behave strategically to 
preserve network rents. 
 The focus on tie multiplicity also adds to an emerging debate on the divergent 
foundations and effects of knowledge and power in networks (Reagans and Zuckerman, 
2008). While the technological network position can be conceptualized as representing a 
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firm's knowledge position relative to peers, the alliance network position - a resource 
dependency relation - can be conceptualized as representing a firm's power relative to its 
peers. In a consensus-driven standards-setting context, where the negotiations are driven 
by technical considerations, the knowledge network position appears to be more 
influential than the power network position.  
 Beyond contributing to the relational view and strategic networks, this 
dissertation also makes important contributions to what has already been a central 
direction of inquiry in strategic management and organization theory research - how do 
firms compete in environments characterized by technological change (e.g. Henderson 
and Clark, 1990; Anderson and Tushman, 1990)? Recent research that has highlighted the 
importance of “dynamic capabilities” for firms in such environments (Teece et al, 1997; 
Helfat et al, 2007; Winter, 2003), has primarily focused on the ability of firms to modify 
and extend their existing capabilities to adapt to technological change. The ability of 
firms to systematically control or direct technological change has not received similar 
attention (cf. Teece, 2007). By creating and availing of opportunities to shape change in 
technical consortia that adjudicate amongst technological alternatives, firms have the 
capacity to shape technological outcomes in ways that enhance the value of their unique 
resources and capabilities (cf. Suarez and Utterback, 1998). This dissertation explores the 
characteristics of firms that are able to shape such change and the strategic choices they 
make to control change. It also makes an empirical contribution to the dynamic 
capabilities literature by showing how network-level capabilities (Rothaermel and Hess, 
2007) may help firms control technological change. As summarized in Table 26, all the 
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three essays focus on strategic choices firms make to control change - namely, supporting 
or opposing a standard (Essay One), attempting to build a broader consensus to support a 
particular technological direction (Essay Two) and using patents and products to control 
the technological evolution of standards (Essay Three).   
 Understanding decision-making in these consortia may also provide additional 
insights for both managers and policy makers who are interested in determining whether 
these coordinated outcomes promote industry-wide decisions that benefit consumers or 
whether they support only a few advantaged firms. Technical consortia are settings which 
are inherently characterized by conflict as firms with divergent interests seek to forge 
common ground. Essay One in this dissertation elaborates on the conditions for a network 
form of governance (Kogut, 2000) to enable the resolution of these conflicts.  The 
findings from this essay with regard to policy questions are mixed - while it appears that 
firms that are central in the alliance network are not able to wield their power to shape the 
standard favorably (thereby contesting it), it is also apparent that there is a systematic 
effect of firms being technologically peripheral in the network and contesting the 
standard. In other words, consistent with the dominant design theory (Tushman and 
Anderson,1986), firms elaborating the dominant design tend to coalesce around the 
knowledge that has been foundational in determining the dominant design and driving the 
innovations of the community of firms. While this may not necessarily be detrimental 
from a societal standpoint, it does raise additional questions about the inertia of 
knowledge, innovation and the potential crowding out of novel ideas from technological 
standards emerging out of these committees.  
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 From a managerial standpoint, firms not only need to make decisions whether to 
support standards, but also need to evaluate the investments they need to make in sending 
engineers to participate in drafting and contributing to these standards. These decisions 
are becoming more critical given the proliferation of standards forums in technology-
driven industries and their strategic importance. Managerial research on such types of 
arrangements is very emergent (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Waguespack and Fleming, 
2009) as the research focus in the 1980s on standards was studying the effect of network 
externalities and standards wars (e.g. Katz and Shapiro, 1986), and not the coordinated 
technology committees that characterize standards-setting today. A lot of the prior work 
on de-jure standards-setting is also case-based (e.g. Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Garud 
et al, 2002, Funk and Methe, 2001; Fontana, in press) and by providing robust large scale 
evidence of the effect of inter-organizational relationships, this dissertation enhances our 
understanding of firms' strategies in these technological change contexts.   
 
Future Research Directions 
 This dissertation also offers several fruitful avenues for future research in the 
areas of alliances, networks and technological change.  
 First, this dissertation is based on a single industry study in a standards-setting 
context that had two major industry-level standards committees. Future research could 
attempt to replicate this study in other settings, keeping in mind the scope limitations 
outlined in the prior section.  
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 Second, although they reflect an accurate track record of firms' actions, all the 
data used in this study were obtained from archival sources. The findings using this data 
could be greatly benefited by obtaining richer qualitative insights through participant 
interviews and/or ethnographies.  Similarly, by analyzing data from meeting minutes and 
email interactions of participants, even more granular measures that better reflect the 
tensions underlying the standard-setting process, can be constructed. This would help us 
understand whether the firm representatives in standard-setting committees cognitively 
view the underlying networks the same way as this dissertation conceptualizes them. 
 Third, building upon Essay Two, studies could also explore other mechanisms 
where central players in the standards committee try and build legitimacy and broaden 
the involvement of peripheral players. The movement of engineers across these 
organizations (Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2010) and investment of corporate venture capital 
into peripheral firms (Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2010) may constitute two examples of such 
alternate mechanisms. Recent research on patent pools (Joshi and Nerkar, 2011) has also 
revealed another interesting mechanism by which firms can accelerate standards adoption 
in settings that are marked by a complex web of intellectual property claims. 
 Fourth, empirically extending the concept of tie multiplicity, studies could 
consider the independent and joint influence of different types of inter-organizational 
relationships. For instance, individual-level ties between firms at the engineer level, 
financing ties or other types of interlocks between firms could be the focus of additional 
empirical work. It would be especially interesting to analyze contexts where tradeoffs 
between different types of inter-organizational ties exist.  
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 Fifth, the proliferation of such multi-firm standards organizations also makes it a 
very interesting and managerially relevant question to study the effect of membership and 
involvement across a larger set of standards-setting bodies on various dimensions of firm 
performance such as financial performance, innovative performance and firm survival 
(e.g. Waguespack and Fleming, 2009; cf. Lazzarini, 2007). Such a study could build on 
the emerging work and conceptual ideas from the alliance portfolio literature (e.g. Lavie, 
2007; Lavie and Miller, 2008).  
 Sixth, research on standards-setting and technological change could also greatly 
benefit by an in-depth qualitative focus within a single firm, with a broader objective of 
understanding the integral role standards-setting plays in overall firm strategy. A firm 
that is involved in several hundred standards initiatives is likely to have the structure and 
routines in place to direct participation across these initiatives and at the same time 
assimilate knowledge from such participation to drive business and corporate strategy.  
 Finally, this dissertation only looked at entry into and participation within 
standards organizations. Clearly, exit from these organizations is also an equally 
important strategic action that deserves research attention. As Lavie, Lechner and Singh 
(2008) note, the market does not salute companies that fail to abandon a sinking ship. 
Building on this dissertation, it would be insightful to contrast exit decisions with entry 
and involvement choices. In particular, building and testing a theory around the 
asymmetric nature of entry and exit would allow us to gain further insights into the 
determinants of technological evolution.  
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Conclusion 
 To conclude, the primary objective of this dissertation was to open up the "black 
box" of firm behavior in multi-organizational settings and examine its contents using an 
inter-organizational lens. While the resulting findings have greatly enhanced our 
understanding of the dynamics within these organizational communities, they continue to 
remind us that interactions between firms within such communities and interactions 
between competing communities are important determinants of technical change. My 
particular interest in focusing the inquiry of this dissertation on technology standards-
setting organizations stemmed from the sheer proliferation of these large-scale 
arrangements that are coordinated but at the same time embedded within a market-driven 
economic landscape. While the larger policy debate has been (and should be) whether as 
a society of technology consumers we benefit from these innovative organizational 
mechanisms that orchestrate technological evolution, this dissertation calls attention to 
the role that strategic management and organization theory scholars can play in 
contributing to this ongoing debate. By applying, synthesizing and extending knowledge 
on the inter-organizational determinants of technological change that are rooted in the 
relational view of the firm and strategic network theory, this dissertation has established a 
clear roadmap for future studies to continue to examine and uncover the richness of this 
multi-faceted phenomenon. 
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